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In recent years that involved the U.S.-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Qatar-
based satellite TV network Al-Jazeera became both an important source of news and a 
controversial actor signifying a challenge to U.S. foreign policy. This cross-national 
study compares journalistic responses to the rise of Al-Jazeera in the U.S. and Britain, 
considering both newspaper editorial policy and national context as possible reasons for 
differentiation. From multi-theoretical perspectives, the researcher examined the extent to 
which the two countries’ newspapers (1) diversified use of Al-Jazeera as a source of 
 vi
news, (2) expanded the range of non-official voices in coverage of issues involving Al-
Jazeera, and (3) employed normative ideas about journalism to recognize the value of 
Arab journalism or problematize the U.S. handling of Arab media. The findings indicated 
that the differences between the pro-war and anti-war press were far more pronounced 
than were the differences between the U.S. and British press, not only in their editorial 
view of Al-Jazeera but also in other features of reporting. In addition, the results of a 
thematic analysis showed noticeable differences between the two countries’ anti-war 
newspapers, in that the New York Times frequently invoked themes “defending” Al-
Jazeera, while the Guardian favored themes “attacking” the U.S. government. Further 
implications of the findings are discussed. 
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The early years of the twenty-first century saw a series of global events involving 
violence: terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001, and within two years, the 
U.S.-led military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, which marked the Bush 
administration's foreign policy dubbed the “War on Terror.” 1 The recent wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, comparable to the 1991 Gulf War that highlighted the global 
impact of news media on world perceptions of the war (Kellner, 1992), brought to light 
the importance of media outlets in describing how the conflicts involving Osama bin 
Laden, the Taliban leaders, and Saddam Hussein each unfolded. 
Yet there were important differences between the war coverage in 1991 and in 
recent years. While in 1991 the U.S. cable network CNN claimed a virtual monopoly on 
war information from Baghdad, during the recent crises in Afghanistan and Iraq the 
world saw greater diversity in media outlets that attempted to describe and interpret the 
Bush administration’s aggressive foreign policy and its implementation (Schwartz, 2004). 
 
1In this study, the researcher treats both the U.S.-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as part of the post-9/11 
U.S. foreign policy broadly called the “War on Terror.” The Afghanistan War in 2001 was intended to oust 
the Taliban regime and find Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, known to be the mastermind behind the 
September 11th attacks. In the case of the Iraq War in 2003, although the official U.S. position was that 
America was under a serious threat due to Iraqi possession of weapons of mass destruction, the Bush 
administration officials made implicit assertions of a 9/11-Iraq link to promote public support for the 
invasion of Iraq. For example, on May 1, 2003, in his declaration of the ending of the major military 
campaigns in Iraq, President Bush said: “The battle of Iraq is one victory in a war on terror that began 
September 11, 2001 and still goes on” (cited in Bennett, 2005, p. 2). Considering this U.S. perspective, the 
war in Iraq can be understood as a continued implementation of, and not a case separate from, the post-9/11 
U.S. policy of a global-scale war against terrorism. With the American media’s reluctance to critically 
scrutinize the White House’s dubious claims, a majority of Americans continued to believe, as late as the 
summer of 2003 — long after facts to the contrary came out — that the Iraqi regime was somehow linked 
to the event of 9/11, either through direct involvement by Saddam Hussein or through indirect assistance to 
Al Qaeda terrorists (Bennett, 2005, p. 2).  
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In particular, the Qatar-based satellite TV network Al-Jazeera suddenly became a major 
player in the war coverage and one of the most prominent and quoted media sources in 
the post-9/11 wartime period. Al-Jazeera was the only news service with a correspondent 
in Kabul before the fall of the Taliban regime and the outlet chosen by Osama bin Laden 
to release his videotaped statements in which he called on his fellow Muslims to join in a 
“jihad” against Americans. Soon after the military campaign in Iraq began, the Arabic 
network infuriated Coalition officials by airing footage of American troops held captive 
in Iraq and dead bodies of British soldiers. Al-Jazeera’s broadcasting of horrific war 
images of civilian casualties also sparked controversies related to issues of media ethics 
and bias.  
Launched in 1996, Al-Jazeera quickly gained popularity in the Middle East for its 
bold news reporting and its televising of political controversy, and New York Times 
columnist Thomas Friedman (1999) once described it as the “freest, most widely watched 
TV network in the Arab world.” The impact of Al-Jazeera and other “liberalized” Arab 
media in the Middle East has been discussed in relation to the rise of the “Arab public 
sphere,” a political phenomenon amplifying the Arab identity discourse centered on the 
Palestinian problem as well as the internally sharp disagreements over preferred policy 
choices (Lynch, 2006). Before 9/11 the influence of Al-Jazeera largely remained within 
the regional enclave of Arab political culture, isolated from international debates and 
concerns. During the post-9/11 developments, which involved the U.S.-led military 
campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq and the Israeli re-occupation of the West Bank, Al-
Jazeera surfaced in global communication both as an alternative source of war 
information and as a political window into the Arab world and its sentiment. The news 
channel’s concentration on civilian casualties in war coverage resonated with an 
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underlying regional perspective linking the situations of Palestine and Iraq in an overall 
theme of Arab suffering.  
The Western media’s relay of content from a non-Western news service, not to 
mention the spotlight it received, is a remarkable phenomenon in the modern history of 
international communication. Extensive research and a number of debates, including the 
UNESCO debate in the 1970s and early 1980s, have addressed issues related to the 
imbalance in international news flow (e.g., Masmoudi, 1979; McPhail, 1983). In the late 
1980s, with the rise of global media equipped with satellite technology, the dominance of 
U.S.-based transnational media firms, including news businesses, was strengthened, 
which some critics saw as a symptom of extended U.S. global hegemony (Herman & 
McChesney, 1997). Notably, critics of CNN’s war coverage in 1991 argued that the U.S.-
based global news distribution system, through the control and strategic use of 
information by the Pentagon, played an ideological role in glamorizing U.S. foreign 
policy and military supremacy (Kellner, 1992; Young & Jesser, 1997).  
Given the conventional wisdom assuming the ascendancy of Western, and 
specifically U.S., news media, often in the context of American global hegemony, the 
meteoric rise of “the Arabic CNN” in recent years is an interesting anomaly. In contrast 
to the first Gulf War, during the post-9/11 wartime period the White House struggled to 
control the global stream of war-related information, and subscription to the Al-Jazeera 
service in European countries skyrocketed. Al-Jazeera’s wartime performance signifies 
“a virtual reversal of the international news that usually runs from the West to the East 
and to the South” (Hafez, 2002, p.121) and can be interpreted as a daunting challenge to 
the U.S.-based global media system and its ideological forces.  
In a broader context, the recent dynamics in our global informational environment 
— not only the rise of Arab satellite news media but also noticeable divergences between 
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American and European media outlets in describing the U.S.-led war efforts and the 
advent of “blogging” services that enabled numerous individuals on the Web to give their 
own accounts of the ongoing crisis — suggests how the international flow of information 
has become more complicated than before. Since the introduction of satellite TV 
technologies in the 1980s and the expansion of Internet use in 1990s, the reach of varied 
forms of news outlets, from traditional mass media to the newest ones such as Weblogs, 
has been steadily, if unevenly, extended beyond regional and national boundaries 
(Volkmer, 2003). As a result, the world is now watching an emerging transnational 
communication infrastructure that may be called a “global news arena,” where different 
versions of reality and related points of view from multiple and often cross-referencing 
sources compete with each other (Reese, 2004). As the world was watching the U.S.-led 
“War on Terror” campaign, and especially the invasion of Iraq, Al-Jazeera became 
important in the arena of global news business and of public deliberation as a supplier of 
alternative war images and hostile opinions about the American foreign policy, defying 
the version of wartime reality presented by U.S. and Coalition officials.  
The changing landscape of global communication poses a challenge for foreign 
policy makers in a dominant country such as the United States. U.S. policy decisions and 
their implementation are now more easily exposed to intense scrutiny and critique by the 
rest of the world — not only by foreign leaders but also by various kinds of foreign 
audiences, all of which ultimately comprise world opinion. It is telling that in America’s 
countdown to the invasion of Iraq millions of citizens reportedly turned out in the streets 
of hundreds of cities around the globe to protest the U.S. war drive (McFadden, 2003). 
Although the anti-war movement failed to stop the war, the extent to which the 
legitimacy of U.S. foreign policy was widely questioned by a tangible entity of the 
“global public” was remarkable (Lee, 2003). After seeing this hostile mood worldwide, 
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both Pentagon officials and the U.S. media increasingly emphasized the need for the 
United States to win, not only the military combat in the battlefields of Iraq, but also the 
hearts and minds of Muslims in the Middle East and others watching the war.   
The globally increased demand for greater transparency of policy introduces a 
new factor for U.S. journalists to integrate into their procedure of news gathering and 
reporting, particularly when they cover issues related to U.S. involvement in wars abroad. 
In time of war, war coverage reporters have high chances of paying attention to foreign 
news media, tracking the trend of foreign public opinions, physically contacting foreign 
locals, and exchanging views with foreign correspondents — all of which actually 
happened in the recent wars in Afghanistan and in Iraq. Now, with easier access to non-
U.S. media discourses and grassroots voices offering harsh criticisms of American 
foreign policy, journalists who think of their profession as a global business are forced to 
critically examine their own journalistic practices, which have been accepted routinely in 
domestic political culture, and ponder universal values in journalism and a cosmopolitan 
way of reporting beyond national, regional, and cultural lines (Reese, 2004).  
Yet the heightened level of global monitoring often comes to clash with the 
nationalistic political culture sanctioned by the nation-state system. Immediately 
following the terrorist attacks on September 11 of 2001, American society witnessed a 
sweeping wave of patriotism that was boosted and amplified by government and military 
officials who articulated nationalistic themes related to the strength of America’s military 
and the demonic nature of America’s enemy (Hutcheson, Domke, Billeaudeaux, & 
Garland, 2004). Throughout the period of major military campaigns in Afghanistan and 
the ensuing policy debate on a proposal of war against Iraq, this overtly nationalistic 
mood made it difficult for the U.S. media to question the soundness of the post-9/11 
militaristic policy (Buncombe, 2002). Despite this strong nationalistic sentiment, 
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however, the White House’s war drive against Iraq was not without domestic resistance. 
Despite the virtual absence of dissent in the Congressional debate, dozens of anti-war 
rallies took place in major U.S. cities, reportedly on a scale reminiscent of the 1960s anti-
war movement (Murphy, 2003). The polarization in this country’s political culture 
continued around the time when the U.S. air strike on Baghdad began. While the ratings 
of overtly conservative media outlets such as Fox News skyrocketed, a number of 
Americans frustrated with their national media coverage flocked to the Websites of 
European news media such as the BBC and the Guardian to experience a different sense 
of war reality (Kahney, 2003).  
 These polarizations in the perception of the post-9/11 U.S. foreign policy — 
between U.S. opinion and world opinion at a global level on the one hand and between 
mainstream opinion and dissident opinion at the domestic level on the other hand — 
posed a challenging task for U.S. journalists of how to balance or reconcile nationalistic 
values with cosmopolitan ones in wartime reporting. In relation to the rise of Al-Jazeera, 
the ongoing conflict between the global mood of hostility to U.S. militarism and the 
domestically inflated nationalistic demand shaped a “political climate of opinion” in 
which American reporters and editors had to come to terms not only with the 
abovementioned “counterflow of information” from Al-Jazeera, but also with the war of 
words intensified by the confrontation between the Arab TV network and leaders of the 
Coalition. During the war in Iraq, Al-Jazeera’s broadcasting of the footage of U.S. 
prisoners of war met with wide criticism in U.S. society, particularly from Coalition 
officials who argued that the Arab broadcaster violated the Geneva Conventions (Collins, 
2003). Meanwhile, Al-Jazeera accused the U.S. military of “deliberately” attacking their 
facilities and employees first in Afghanistan and then in Iraq (McCarthy, 2003).  
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Given all of these circumstances, the U.S. news media’s use of Al-Jazeera as a 
source of news for reporting, along with their coverage of and commentary on the 
controversies surrounding the Arab network’s performance, is worthy of study: it 
illustrates how the U.S. editors and journalists in charge of foreign news selection and 
war coverage viewed Al-Jazeera — as either a fundamentally dangerous foreign force 
generating anti-Americanism and threatening journalistic identity outside their national 
community, or as a nonconformist yet “legitimate” provider of foreign news and critical 
opinion to the global forum of debate; it also showcases how American mainstream 
journalism responded to the dynamic nature of the emerging global news arena, 
especially when U.S. foreign policy encountered worldwide resistance that was facilitated 
by the changing global communication infrastructure. This dissertation research project 
capitalizes on the significance of this situation and focuses on the following question: 
what were the characteristics of the U.S. media discourse related to Al-Jazeera — 
discourse which either incorporated some of the information supplied by Al-Jazeera into 
news content or gave accounts of the events and issues involving Al-Jazeera as part of the 
journalistic construction of debate — during the period following 9/11?  
In determining a research design for this case study, the researcher considered a 
series of issues related to the selection of media text sources for study. One research issue 
concerned the choice of a news medium — whether to select TV news programs or 
newspapers for a case study of the media discourse addressing Al-Jazeera. In recent 
years, since the rise of the Arab media, there have been some journalistic commentaries 
and analyses on either the implications of Al-Jazeera-sourced images in American 
broadcast news or differences in war coverage between Al-Jazeera and major U.S. TV 
networks (e.g., Hickey, 2002; Jasperin & El-Kikhia, 2003). Yet these reviews focused 
almost exclusively on broadcast journalism, and little attention has been paid to the 
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repercussions of Al-Jazeera’s performance in the U.S. press discourse. For this case 
study, the researcher chose the print media for analysis. The print medium of newspapers, 
compared with television news, has an advantage of ample space that can be assigned to 
cover a variety of events and issues. Given this medium characteristic, newspapers were 
assumed to be in a better position to display a wide array of both information supplied by 
Al-Jazeera and subjects of debate involving Al-Jazeera’s controversial behavior as well 
as the U.S. approach to the Arab broadcaster.  
Another related issue for this content analysis project was to determine a basis for 
the selection of newspapers whose contents would be analyzed. At this stage, the 
researcher made the decision to adopt a comparative perspective, by which not only 
American newspapers but also British newspapers would be included in the analysis. 
This decision was intended both to capture effectively the possible variations within the 
media discourse involving Al-Jazeera and to interpret meaningfully key differences, if 
present, between the content from hawkish newspapers and anti-war newspapers by 
considering the national context in which media outlets operated and responded to their 
governments’ decision to go to war or to enter into alliance with one another. The cross-
national comparison of news media posits that the discretionary power of new media is 
both enabled and bounded by the political culture and the structure of the society, which 
in combination define the “permissible” intervention by the media in the political process 
(Semetko, Blumler, Gurevitch, & Weaver, 1991, p.1). The findings from a comparative 
content analysis were thought to be useful to reveal both similarities and unique features 
of the media discourse specific to the country’s political culture.   
In both the American and the British society there seemed to be a deepening 
polarization in the practice of wartime journalism between the hawkish and the dovish 
newspapers throughout the period of hostilities that culminated in the war in Iraq. During 
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America’s countdown to the invasion of Iraq, editorial pages of prestigious U.S. 
newspapers showed a divergence between editorial support for and criticism of the White 
House decision to go to war. For example, according to a Columbia Journalism Review 
article that reviewed the editorial pages at that time (Mooney, 2004), the Wall Street 
Journal editorially showed strong support for the war without a shade of doubt about the 
alleged Iraqi possession of weapons of mass destruction, while New York Times editorials 
criticized the Bush administration for rushing to the war without getting an approval by 
the United Nations. 2  In the case of the British “quality” broadsheet newspapers, 
conservative news outlets such as the Daily Telegraph and the London Times were 
editorially supportive of Prime Minister Tony Blair’s full cooperation with the White 
House from the beginning of the “War on Terror” policy, whereas mid-leftist newspaper 
the Guardian and the Irish-owned the Independent already began to reveal a critical tone 
in both reporting and commentary on the U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan 
(Kennedy, 2002). 
These apparently parallel phenomena in the U.S. and the British press make it 
possible to raise the question of whether there also existed in the press discourse about 
Al-Jazeera some parallel differences between the pro-war and the anti-war news outlets 
in the two countries. Yet it is equally important to note that the British media’s coverage 
of war seemed to have their own tones and styles. Some observers of British press 
coverage of the war in Afghanistan have noted that British journalists, regardless of the 
political stances at their affiliated newspapers, seemed to be more inclined than their 
American fellows to question official statements and describe the kind of information 
 
2It is worth noting that, as Mooney (2004) suggested, the anti-war position of the New York Times may be 
viewed as having been derived largely from a diplomatic basis, rather than from a fundamental doubt about 
the soundness of the war-oriented administration policy itself. It is unclear whether this editorial stance 
truly reflected this news organization’s opposition to the war on a purely diplomatic basis, or was a 
disguised attack on the Bush administration in a climate of public opinion supportive of the war. This point 
will be made again later in Chapter 4.   
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contradicting the official version of the reality sponsored by the war managers (e.g., 
Kennedy, 2002).  
If the observation just mentioned is valid, structural factors associated with the 
makeup of the British press system as well as situational factors in Britain can help 
explain this tendency. The British press is predominantly a national press and, in terms of 
readership, there is greater stratification in the British press than in its U.S. counterpart 
(Semetko, Blumler, Gurevitch, & Weaver, 1991). This stratification leads to 
differentiations among the British press in terms of not only the “quality’” (i.e., the 
differentiation between broadsheets, middle-brow tabloids and mass popular tabloids), 
but also partisanship (i.e., the tradition of political alignment with particular political 
parties). Perhaps for this reason, British journalists have a reputation of being less 
obedient to the norm of objective reporting (Kennedy, 2002). Situational factors include 
the British public’s relatively low or short-lived support for the post-9/11 U.S. policy that 
involved the war in Iraq. Although the level of British public support for the Iraq War 
reached as high as about 60% in May of 2003 — around the time when President Bush 
announced an ending to the major military campaigns in Iraq — the British support of the 
war remained lukewarm throughout the phases of pre-war debate and then of the military 
campaigns (PEW Research Center, 2004).3 Thus, it seems that, although British leaders 
showed unswerving support for the Americans-led military campaigns, the British public 
as well as the British media was not overwhelmed by the kind of patriotic mood that 
American society manifested immediately following the attacks of September 11.  
All of these considerations make it possible to identify conditions enabling a 
comparative analysis of newspapers, based on both the similarity between the United 
 
3The short-lived high rating of support for the war mentioned above is illustrated by the results of an 
international survey that, just ten months later, the British support for the Iraq War dropped down to about 
40%. At the same time, in May of 2004, American support for the war still remained at 60% (PEW 
Research Center, 2004). 
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States and Great Britain (i.e., the government policy to go to war in Iraq) and the 
dissimilarities between pro-war and anti-war newspapers (i.e., the news organization 
policy toward the government decision) and between the national contexts in the U.S and 
Britain (i.e., the national issue culture or the cultural basis from which each country 
sought to understand, interpret, and act on the issues and concerns causing, surrounding, 
and influenced by the war). This content analysis study thus adopts a two-by-two 
factorial research design, by introducing two factors of newspaper editorial policy (pro-
war versus anti-war) and national context (American versus British). 
With this research design, this case study examines three areas of possible 
differences across newspapers: specifically, possible differences in the extent to which a 
newspaper (1) diversified use of Al-Jazeera as a newsworthy source of information, (2) 
expanded the range of non-official opinions in coverage of the issues involving Al-
Jazeera, and (3) recognized the value of Al-Jazeera as a legitimate institution of 
journalism or problematized the intimidation of the Arab broadcaster by outside forces. 
For this task, the researcher identified three objects of examination in the media discourse 
concerning Al-Jazeera: media discourse addressing Al-Jazeera as (1) a source of 
information, as (2) a subject of media-mediated debate, and as (3) a normative issue of 
journalism. 
These objectives of research and their related key terms were developed through 
the review of three theoretical topics in communication research. Chapter 2, which begins 
with a case preview, extensively examines this review:  
 
1. The first topic is the traditional concern for imbalance in international 
communication, along with an insight into the changing landscape of the 
emerging “global news arena” in the age of globalization. For the purpose of 
 12
research, the researcher focuses on the problem of how challenging and 
meaningful the so-called reversal flow of information from a non-Western news 
service toward Western media was.  
2. The second topic is the U.S. media tendency of heavy dependence on official 
voices in coverage of foreign policy (e.g., Halberstam, 1979; Sigal, 1973), which 
is possibly counteracted by “icon-driven” reporting (Bennett & Lawrence, 1995; 
Lawrence, 1996), that is, a kind of journalistic practice involving use of some 
accidental events as an opportunity for giving a say to non-mainstream voices. 
These two different forms of reporting can be applied to the analysis of media 
accounts of controversies involving Al-Jazeera.  
3. The final topic sheds light on the rhetorical dimension of normative media 
theories (e.g., McQuail, 1994; Siebert, 1956) familiar to Western society. The 
focal point of the discussion is how different normative visions of journalistic 
identities can be invoked, through the filter of a news organization’s editorial 
policy, in the politicized media debate evaluating Arab journalism and the U.S. 
handling of Arab media as well. A review of various media-related norms is 
useful for developing a thematic content analysis scheme, which enables one to 
capture subtle and nuanced differences in the media text.   
 
All of these discussions lead to the identification of theoretical issues, the 
definition of key terms, and the statement of research questions at the end of Chapter 2. 
In Chapter 3, the specific methods used in a series of content analyses are described. The 
entire coding process involved use of multiple coding units. Chapter 4 presents findings 
from the multiple sessions of content analyses conducted, providing evidence of 
similarities and differences between the two countries’ press discourses in the three key 
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aspects just mentioned. Based on these findings, Chapter 5 summarizes the findings and 
gives concluding remarks about the cross-national research project. Final comments on 
the rise of the Arab media in the era of the emerging global news arena, along with the 
responses seen in the U.S. and British media, are offered. In doing so, this dissertation 
research provides a systematic, comprehensive analysis of various kinds of content 









While the advent of global television equipped with satellite communications 
technology in the 1990s has generated much concern with respect to commercialism and 
U.S. global hegemony, it has also been credited with facilitating the spread of 
“modernity” (Thussu, 2000, pp.200-223). Specifically, the globalization of Western or 
Western-inspired media has been argued to have a “liberatory” potential for nurturing 
democratic civic culture, particularly in some of developing countries where plurality of 
opinions and possibilities of open discuss ion had been greatly obstructed by state control 
of the national media (Dunn, 1992).   
The proliferation of television services in the Middle East since the 1990s has 
signaled a major change in media business and political communication, making obsolete 
the conventional wisdom that the Arab media are in the service of powerful states (Ayish, 
2002; Lynch, 2006). With the restructuring of government television systems and the 
launch of commercial services, the landscape of broadcasting journalism in the 
Arab/Muslim region has evolved into one marked by more professional and pluralistic 
approaches (Ayish, 2002). In particular, transnational satellite television such as Al-
Jazeera has brought disparate local debates together in a manner of promoting central 
pan-Arab issues, and has emerged as a location of vibrant and open political debates. 
Some saw this phenomenon as the rise of the “Arab public sphere” (Lynch, 2006).   
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Al-Jazeera, which translates as “the Peninsula,” was launched in November 1996 
by a decree of the emir of Qatar. The then-new emir, after having seized power from his 
father one year before, decided to create a Western-style news institution as a means of 
modernizing Qatar and lifted state censorship of the press (Zednik, 2002). Since its 
beginning of 24 hour broadcasting in February 1999, Al-Jazeera has gained a reputation 
for its daring approach to sensitive issues such as corruption and polygamy that had 
previously been untouched by the Arab media (Hafez, 1999). With its rapidly growing 
popularity among Arab audiences, Al-Jazeera’s bold reporting of news and provocative 
talk shows often incurred the anger of many Arab governments, which led to tensions 
between Qatar and those countries. Several Arab countries recalled their ambassadors 
from Doha to protest the network’s “intolerable” incitements against their leaders and 
value systems (Ayish, 2002).  
Al-Jazeera’s hard-hitting news reporting is often viewed as comparable to 
American commercial TV journalism in aspects of sensationalism and technically 
alluring features (Ayish, 2002). Some media critics hailed Al-Jazeera’s political debate 
programs as cultivating the democratic soil in the Arab world (e.g., Al-Hail, 2000), 
whereas others saw only scenes of shouting matches with little substance in the satellite 
TV debates that Al-Jazeera has popularized (e.g., Khouri, 2001). There also exists a 
suspicion that the Qatari-based network, still partially funded by the state, is reluctant in 
applying the standard of critical reporting to its host country (Pope, 2000). Despite this 
criticism, under the Qatari government’s avowed hands-off approach, Al-Jazeera is 
generally deemed the most independent Arab news institution enjoying press freedom.  
Before launching an immediate war in Afghanistan after September 11, 2001, the 
Bush administration apparently recognized the importance of satellite television in the 
battle for public opinion in the Arab world. Many U.S. officials appeared on Al-Jazeera 
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programs and claimed that the military action in Afghanistan would not only destroy the 
Al-Qaeda camps but also liberate Afghanis from the oppressive Taliban regime (Zednik, 
2002). However, the White House’s early hope of leveraging the TV station for its pre-
war public relations campaign turned into fury over the network’s hostile coverage of the 
U.S. war efforts. In early October, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell asked the Qatari 
emir to “tone down” unfriendly broadcasts on Al-Jazeera, which led to Arab intellectuals’ 
criticism of the Bush administration for making a mockery of its free speech rhetoric 
(Trofimov, 2001).  
Worthy of a note is that the aggravated Israeli-Palestinian conflict — which 
occurred around the time that the White House began to publicly target Saddam Hussein 
after the ending of major combats in Afghanistan — had direct repercussions in the Arab 
public’s perception of the U.S. policy toward Iraq. The Oslo peace process, which had 
been intended for Palestinians’ final settlement on the Gaza Strip and the West Bank and 
had led to the Israeli troops’ withdrawal in 1996 from the regions, reached in 2000 an 
impasse after failed negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians (Cook, 2003). In the 
early spring of 2002, the circle of Palestinians’ suicide attacks and Israelis’ reprisals 
culminated in the Israeli military’s bloody re-occupation of the West Bank. With this 
backdrop, as Lynch (2003) noted, the Arabs’ anger toward the American-led war against 
terror skyrocketed when the White House treated Palestinian rebels such as Hamas group 
as little different from the Al-Qaeda terrorists and defended the Israeli raid on them. 
Markedly, President Bush’s depiction of Israeli Prime Minister Sharon as a “man of 
peace,” which came out at the height of the above-mentioned tension, was aired 
repeatedly by Al-Jazeera and other Arab broadcasters and was viewed by their audiences 
as offending Arab sensitivities related to the Palestinian conflict.  
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As military conflicts in Iraq unfolded in early 2003, the battles of the propaganda 
war became intense, with Al-Jazeera often finding itself engaged in confrontation with 
the Coalition forces. As noted earlier, Coalition officials roundly blamed the Arab 
network for broadcasting pre-recorded bin Laden tapes, the interviews with prisoners of 
war, the corpses of American/ British combatants, and horrible scenes of the civilian 
casualties caused by U.S. bombing. Meanwhile, Al-Jazeera accused the U.S. military of 
“deliberately” destroying Al-Jazeera offices in Afghanistan and in Iraq and killing its 
employees in air strikes (Steinberg & Rutenberg, 2003). The Arab TV network also had 
some other difficulties; its newly-launched English Website went down by hacker 
attacks, and its reporters were temporarily banned from having access to the New York 
Stock Exchange.   
Against this background, Al-Jazeera’s wartime performance posed a serious threat 
to the Pentagon’s implementation of what Louw (2003) called the “PR-ized warfare 
model” that had been most successfully carried out in the first Gulf War. This PR-ized 
warfare model comprises a set of “framing strategies,” chiefly the demonization of 
opposition leaders, the sanitization of bloody war images, and the glamorization of 
technology-based U.S. military performance (Louw, 2003). Indeed, it is possible that the 
bin Laden’s hostility-charged religious rhetoric aired on the Al-Jazeera channel actually 
corroborated, when it was relayed by the Western media, their audiences’ perception of 
him as an irrational terrorist to be removed. Still, the Arab news outlet seriously damaged 
the U.S.-branded glamorized war images by concentrating its coverage on civilian 
damages and the Coalition forces’ military setbacks. Moreover, in its accounts Al-Jazeera 
provided an “Arab-oriented” perspective that located the American-led military 
campaigns in the context of — rather than fighting terrorism or the liberation of the 
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oppressed people — the problematic U.S. policy of supporting Israel and threatening the 
independence of the Arab world (Hickey, 2002). 
In the highly politicized context of a propaganda war, the American/British 
media’s practice of wartime journalism also drew criticism in opposite directions. 
Coalition leaders blamed their countries’ “liberal” media for giving allegedly too much 
weight to negative war images and the Coalition forces’ initial military setbacks (Stanley, 
2003), whereas some media critics said that the Western media’s war coverage was too 
“sanitized” and thus failed to get at the truth of war brutality (Wells, 2003). These 
altercations, along with Al-Jazeera’s sudden prominence, provided Western journalists 
with an opportunity to muse over not only the non-Western medium’s controversial 
behavior but also their own practice and related norms of journalism (Schwartz, 2004). 
Yet, given the politicized context of debate mentioned above, varying ideas on the 
normative principles of news media, such as media freedom and media responsibility, 
were expressed in a manner to strengthen or undermine positions of certain parties (that 




The features of the U.S. and British media discourse related to Al-Jazeera can be 
examined from three distinct theoretical topics: the nature of international news flow in 
the age of globalization (which consists of two lines of discussion), the American media’s 
source patterns in coverage of U.S. foreign policy, and the contestant nature of normative 




 International News Flow in the Era of Globalization 
As mentioned in the introduction, the rise of Al-Jazeera as an important news 
service in the Arab region, along with the Western media’s wartime use of information 
supplied by the Arab TV network, was a remarkable phenomenon with respect to the 
usual patterns of international news flow. Furthermore, in a broader and more recent 
perspective, the rise of Arab media equipped with satellite communications technology 
can be viewed as an interesting spin-off from the process of what has been termed 
globalization.  
 
NWIO Debate and International News Coverage 
Much research about international news coverage and selection has been directly 
or indirectly influenced by the historical debate called the NWIO. With its heyday in late 
1970s, the NWIO was a UNESCO-sponsored effort to achieve more equalization in the 
production and distribution of information between the First World and the Third World, 
or between the developed and the developing world. The forceful demands of the Third 
World nations reached a climax in the beginning of the 1980s, when the McBride 
Commission approved by the UNESCO issued a policy report titled “Many Voices, One 
World,” commonly known as the McBride Report. Calling for re-balancing of 
information flow between the “haves” and the “have-nots” of communication resources, 
the McBride Report defined a large number of significant concepts involved in the 
process of democratizing communications at a global level. Many ideas expressed in the 
key areas of the report (communication policy, technology, cultural identity, journalism, 
human rights and international relations) were a significant contribution to establishing 
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“the right to communicate,” more wide-ranging and comprehensive than traditional 
concepts such as freedom of the press (Mastrini & De Charras, 2005, p.275).    
Specifically, the push toward the NWIO was driven by three grievances, cited in 
Mowlana (1986). First, the majority of international news and information flow runs 
“vertically” from the developed world to the developing world by the way of dominant 
Western news agencies. Second, the United States and Western Europe receive the 
greatest amount of coverage in the world media, while the developing countries (as well 
as the socialist countries) receive the least. Third, although the “horizontal” news flow 
does exist within the developing world, this type of news flow represents only a small 
fraction of the overall international news coverage. In addition to addressing the 
quantitative imbalances in news exchange, proponents of the NWIO were also concerned 
with the qualitative aspects of the Western media coverage of the Third World, arguing 
that developing countries are usually depicted in a negatively stereotyped manner and 
that these nations’ genuine problems, achievements, and aspirations are largely ignored 
(for more on the NWIO debate, see Legum and Cornwell, 1978; Masmoudi, 1979; 
McPhail, 1983; Stevenson and Cole, 1984).  
The Third World arguments of imbalances in news exchange and an emphasis on 
negative news were generally supported by a number of empirical studies (e.g., Hester, 
1973; Kaplan, 1979; Larson, 1979; Lent, 1977; Peterson, 1980), although specific 
findings have also suggested that many factors influence the coverage of foreign events 
or information flow among countries. Much of the research on international news 
coverage stems from Galtung and Ruge’s (1965) classical study regarding multiple 
determinants of foreign news selection (Wu, 2000). Through their analysis, the authors 
offered a list of 12 factors, such as reference to elite nations and negativity, which 
constitute a system of “newsworthiness” according to which a certain foreign event is 
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likely or unlikely to become news. Galtung’s other famous work (1971), more strongly 
reflecting the cultural imperialism thesis (e.g., Schiller, 1976), proposed a “center-
periphery” model of news flow. He hypothesized that international news flows primarily 
from the “center,” or dominant countries, to the “periphery,” or dependent countries. His 
proposition can be interpreted as stating that the “eliteness” of a country is a primary 
criterion for foreign news selection, which was supported by Kariel and Rosenvall’s 
(1984) empirical study.  
Since Galtung and Ruge’s conceptual framework, numerous studies have 
highlighted different factors as the main predictors of foreign news coverage and 
selection in Western countries or other regions of the world. One group of research 
brought into focus country characteristics, by which certain countries would be deemed 
by news gatekeepers as more newsworthy than other countries, and tested the influences 
of some national traits, such as economic development and the size of population, on 
foreign news coverage and flow. Although some inconsistencies exist, the findings 
generally have revealed that the economic level of a country, measurable by indicators 
such as the volume of international trade, was a good predictor of the amount of coverage 
that a country receives in many countries’ news media (e.g., Adhern, 1984; Hester, 1973; 
Kariel & Rosenvall, 1984; Rosengren, 1977; Wu, 2000).  
Aside from the economic level of nations, other factors were also found to be 
important in determining international flow of news. One important category of the 
determinants can be linked to the notion of proximity by the standard of geography (e.g., 
Haynes, 1984; McClelland & Young, 1970; Ramaprasad, 1991) or cultural affinity (e.g., 
Burrowes, 1974; Hester, 1973; Johnson, 1997; Kariel & Rosenvall, 1984). The general 
idea is that the higher the proximity of a foreign country is, the more likely an event 
happening in the country to receive coverage. In many cases, high geopolitical or cultural 
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proximity can be viewed as implying the political or cultural significance of some “elite” 
countries, therefore an extension of country characteristics. However, the notion of 
proximity also relates to the inter-related aspects among nations, and, in this respect, the 
proximity or its similar criteria may well be grouped within relations characteristics. A 
variant of cultural proximity comes from the past history of colonialism. Some studies 
have found that old colonial ties are an important predictor of the news flow among 
countries, both vertically and horizontally (e.g., Atwood, 1985; Burrowes, 1974; Meyer, 
1989; Skurnik, 1981). For instance, Arab and African countries tend to get covered more 
frequently in the press of the countries belonging to the same colonial group (Atwood, 
1985).  
Other significant factors of newsworthiness in international coverage include 
event characteristics, especially the negative nature of events such as violent conflicts and 
natural disasters. News media preference for “bad news” is certainly not limited to 
international reporting, but negativity seems to play an enormous role in the U.S. and 
other Western media coverage of developing countries (Shoemaker, Danielian, & 
Briendlinger, 1991). As a result, developing countries are rarely visible in the Western 
media portrayals of the world unless they appear as locations for political crisis, violent 
conflicts, natural disasters, or organized criminal activities (Giffard & Rivenburg, 2000). 
In a similar vein, some studies of the U.S. media’s international coverage have found that 
the “deviance” of news stories was a predominant predictor of foreign news selection 
(e.g., Chang, Shoemaker, & Brendlinger, 1987; Ramaprasad, 1991; Shoemaker, 
Danielian, & Brendlinger, 1991). This line of research suggests that, in the context of 
U.S. media coverage, international events that are deviant in certain ways from the 
national values and that occur in nations of political and economic significance to the 
United States are more likely to be covered in the news. 
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By and large, past research tends to support the Third World’s arguments of the 
bias in the flow of information and Western media’s emphasis on bad news. Given this 
usual pattern, the rise of Al-Jazeera in recent years — which indicates both the popularity 
of the news channel in the Middle East and the relay by Western news media of the news 
supplied by the Arab TV network — may come as a surprise, signifying a non-Western 
media’s increased influence in the production and distribution of international news in 
time of war. There is, however, one important question to be answered; what does the 
“reverse” flow of news earlier mentioned (Hafez, 2002, p.121) mean, especially for the 
American (and other Western) media’s international reporting? Is it so meaningful as to 
make the U.S. media coverage of the world (especially the Arab/Muslim world) better? 
Reviewing the NWIO debate of more than two decades ago, it must be noted that the 
Third World grievances about the practices of the Western media were not driven simply 
by too much bad news about the state of developing countries. Rather, the real issue had 
more to do with the scant coverage by Western news agencies of the problems, concerns, 
and aspirations of the peoples in the Third World, in a comprehensive manner that would 
pay due respect to their own perspectives (e.g., Masmoudi,1979, p.181; Mcphail, 1983). 
Taking this long-standing concern into account, the political significance of the global 
news stream involving Al-Jazeera would ultimately rest on the question of whether the 
Arab news outlet was able to contribute to the discourse in the American (and the British) 
media by presenting not only terrorist messages of hate but also alternative accounts of 
war as well as the “Arab-oriented” perspectives on the current problems in the 
Arab/Muslim world — including the U.S.-led wars in the Muslim countries and the 
continuing Israeli-Palestinian conflicts.  
Considering the gatekeeping process on the part of U.S. news organizations, it 
seems natural that the stories related to bin Laden coming from Al-Jazeera were deemed 
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highly newsworthy by the American newsroom. This goes well with the past 
observations (Chang, Shoemaker, & Brendlinger, 1987; Shoemaker, Danielian, & 
Brendlinger, 1991) that the “deviant” event characteristic in light of American national 
values is a primary factor influencing international coverage and foreign news selection. 
Concerning other news stories from Al-Jazeera, such as its war coverage of Afghanistan 
and Iraq and news reports on the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts, however, it is much harder 
to predict how seriously American (and British) reporters considered Al-Jazeera as an 
easily accessible alternative source of news. It is possible that the high significance of 
these issues — the military developments of the U.S.-involved foreign crises were 
certainly the number one issue at the time, and also the Palestinian problem is arguably 
one of the most important unresolved foreign issues – may have encouraged journalists to 
make use of some relevant news contents from Al-Jazeera for reporting. To the contrary, 
it also can be said that the controversies and hostilities that surrounded the behavior of 
Al-Jazeera may have made it difficult for the U.S. and British news media to treat the 
Arab broadcaster as a “legitimate” news organization to which they would turn for 
getting information. Considering this uncertainty, the diversity of the Al-Jazeera-sourced 
content incorporated by the U.S. and British press can serve as an interesting subject of 
research.    
 
Globalization and Reframed Issues 
The NWIO debate has waned since the early 1980s, followed by the recent two 
decades that watched the ascendancy of discourses converging on such concepts as 
deregulation, information society, and globalization in both domestic and international 
arenas of policy debate (Carlsson, 2003; Mastrini & De Charras, 2005). The U.S. 
withdrawal from the UNESCO in 1984 contributed to the weakening of the U.N. body as 
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an international forum of policy debate (Herman & McChesney, 1997, p.25).4 Yet one of 
the most crucial factors that led to the failure of the 1980’s McBride ideas was the 
success of neoliberal ideas in the 1980s at the world level, which entailed, particularly in 
the political sphere, the disappearance of the context that had allowed for the 
development of the NWIO movement (Mastrini & De Charras, 2005). Proponents of 
neoliberalism argued for limiting the role of government largely to guarding the free 
market function and campaigned, both domestically and internationally, for the 
privatization and deregulation of sectors that had previously been under state authority, 
including telecommunications and broadcasting (Herman & McChesney, 1997; 
McChesney, 1999). The ascendancy of neoliberalism was further strengthened by the end 
of the Cold War in the late 1980s, which was hailed by many as the final triumph of both 
democracy and the free market (for a detailed recount of the rise and fall of the NWIO 
debate, see Carlsson, 2003).  
During the 1990s there was a shift in the important forum of debate regarding 
international communications policy. Replacing the UNESCO, which specializes in 
education and culture, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) emerged as a 
new location for a U.S.-led project for a “Global Information Society” (Herman & 
McChesney, 1997; Mastrini & De Charras, 2005). In March 1994, Al Gore, vice 
president of the United States at the time, launched a project to build a global 
infrastructure based on “information highways” at the World Telecommunication 
Development Conference of the ITU held in Buenos Aires. In his address, Al Gore noted 
that the inevitable democratization would arise from the new information highways, 
anticipating a “new Athenian Age of democracy” (quoted in Mastrini & De Charras, 
2005). Much of his rhetoric reflected the popularization of the futurist discourse in the 
 
4The United States returned to the UNESCO on October 1, 2003. 
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early 1990s (Mastrini & De Charras, 2005). Markedly, the convergence of different 
media enabled by the technology of digitalization was viewed by some futuristic thinkers 
(e.g., Negroponte, 1995; Toffler, 1980) as a technological revolution overriding the 
traditional distinctions among different forms of media and their respective public 
communication policies. Although many useful critiques have been provided from 
academia about the alleged rosy visions of an information society, the ascendancy of the 
futurist discourse, in the realms of both domestic and international policy debate, worked 
toward creating a social imagery that mixed a strong technological orientation with the 
logic of free market and the promise of electronic democracy in a harmonizing way 
(McChesney, 1999, pp.119-123). 
It is worth noting that the emphasis on the circumstantial factors in the waning of 
the NWIO debate does not mean that the logic of the NWIO itself was not flawed. In 
hindsight, Hamelink (1987), while recognizing the valuable contribution by the McBride 
Report, listed its weaknesses in several aspects: the lack of consideration of the specific 
economic, social, and cultural contexts; the lack of clarity in the process; the limited 
analysis of the existing process; and the absence of dialogue with civil society. More 
importantly, the NWIO was limited in the sense that the debate was mainly restricted to 
the participation of national governments and, to a lesser extent, of business and 
academic sectors with a varying capacity for lobbying (Mastrini & De Charras, 2005). 
Because much of the NWIO debate took place within a framework positing that the 
nation-state is the only viable and privileged actor in charge of democratizing 
communications, many of the Third World arguments driven by state authority (such as 
the threat of trans-border spillover by direct broadcasting satellite systems) were prone to 
attacks by Western media for the alleged reason of proposing state censorship of the press 
(Herman & McChesney, 1997, p.25). Furthermore, the demands for state regulation of 
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transnational corporations were regarded by believers of neoliberalism as increasingly 
losing ground, with the process of the so-called “globalization” that became distinctively 
visible in the 1990s in many regions of the world.5  
Although the gap between the developed and the developing countries in 
communication resources is a continuing problem (Carlson, 2003; Hamelink 1987), the 
process and its related phenomena of globalization contributed to re-defining many old 
issues within a new conceptual framework. Certainly, the concept of globalization is too 
big and complex for this short review to do justice to the diverse array of interpretations 
about the term that has appeared in the academic circle of debate (For a useful guide of 
the globalization debate, see Featherstone, Lash, and Robertson, 1995; Robertson, 1992; 
Scholte, 2000).6 Still, it seems that there have been two distinctively oppositional lines of 
thinking in academia. On the one hand, a host of intellectuals have asserted that 
globalization is largely an ideology-laden notion, often loosely connected to the 
neoliberalist and futurist ideas, which have been serving the interests of the transnational 
 
5The current phase of globalization has been viewed by many as incurring the relative weakening of nation-
states with respect to both national economy and patriotism, although different interpretations may be given 
about this observation (Pieterse, 1995, p.49).  
6Globalization is a multifaceted concept that has economic, political, cultural, and technological aspects. In 
many cases, globalization is described chiefly in economic terms, referring to the growing economic 
interdependence of countries worldwide as well as the process of lifting government-imposed restrictions 
on the cross-border movement of goods, services, and capital. In this sense, globalization is a “redundant” 
term, little different from “internationalization” or “(economic) liberalization” (Scholte, 2000, pp.15-16). 
However, the phenomenon of globalization has deeper implications. Globalization entails the 
reconfiguration of geography, so that social space is no longer wholly mapped in terms of territorial places, 
territorial distances and territorial borders (Scholte, 2000, pp.16-17). Sociologist Anthony Giddens thus 
views globalization as “the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such 
a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa” (1990, p.64). 
In this regard, globalization can be defined as “the processes of the compression of the world and the 
intensification of the consciousness of the world as a whole”(Robertson, 1992, p.8). Global 
interdependence and the consciousness of the world encourage individuals and national societies to 
interpret their very existence as parts of a larger whole. Under this condition of globality, what it means to 
live in the world as a whole, and how it must be ordered, become universal questions, although these 
questions may receive quite different answers from individuals and societies. The process of globalization 
incurs a greater volume of not only economic but also cultural exchanges across borders. One prominent 
form of the cultural flow is Westernization (or Americanization). Yet the impacts of globalization on 
cultural patterns seem to be more complex, making it possible to discuss the heterogeneous nature of global 
(or “glocal”) cultures (Robertson, 1992).  
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media industry engaged in the process of swamping the cultural autonomy of local 
communities and disseminating consumerist values around the globe (e.g., McChesney, 
1999; Wallenstein, 1998). On the other hand, other groups of thinkers have observed that 
globalization, or “glocalization” (Robertson, 1995) for the sake of this argument, involves 
complex interactions between different cultural forces, which would lead to the 
“hybridization” (Pieterse, 1995) of cultures in pluralistic ways, rather than to a cultural 
homogenization. 
Despite these disagreements, one important consequence of the globalization 
debate was the popularization of a problematic introducing the polarity of “global-local” 
(or, as a philosophical variant, of universal-particular), which has replaced the traditional 
arena defined by West/East division, after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Robertson, 
1995).7 Within this problematic, the “globalizing” trends are typically understood as in 
tension with “local” assertions of culture and identities, somewhat resembling the old 
polemics between the modernization thesis and the cultural imperialism thesis 
(Robertson, 1995). Some have seen dangerous trends from both sides of the globalizing 
and localizing tendencies. One famous example is Barber’s (1992) metaphorical 
juxtaposition of the “McWorld” and “Jihad World,” where the former represents a 
hegemonic homogenization toward a consumerist culture at the global level and the latter 
 
7Concerning the global-local relationship, the global and the local are politically contested concepts. 
Basically, given that one key feature of globalization is the rise of supraterritoriality (Scholte, 2000),  
the global refers to something (i.e., thinking, action, values, or the condition generating these) transcendent 
of territorial demarcations, while the local indicates something place-based or tied with territorial 
conditions. However, the two key terms are given additional (positive or negative) meanings by critics 
holding differing perspectives on the globalization. For proponents of globalization, the global largely 
represents the irreversible trend of spreading a set of “universal” rules and values in the historically 
evolutionary process. For those criticizing the ongoing process of globalization, the global often indicates 
the hegemonic or ideological systems that disseminate consumerist culture or support American 
imperialistic world order. The term local tends to have meanings that are opposite of the global. Positively, 
the local is viewed as a reservoir of indigenous tradition and a site of resistance to the homogenizing trend. 
Negatively, the local is deemed as a source of anti-modern, anti-democratic, or irrational ways of thinking 
and action, such as religious fundamentalism and ethnic atavism.  
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stands for a particularistic and even irrational way of building local solidarity against 
outer forces. His proposition, however, met criticism for the reason that he allegedly put 
too much emphasis on small fractions of extremist tendencies and ignored the 
complementary process in which the “locality” is simultaneously shaped by and 
incorporated into the inclusive conception of “globality” (e.g., Robertson, 1992, 1995).  
It is not the purpose of this study to delve into the difficult matter of assessing 
these claims. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the recent series of U.S.-involved 
crises involving the September 11 attacks, the resulting Afghanistan War, and the Iraq 
War in 2003, seemed to contribute much to shifting current issues of globalization from 
the homogenizing trend to the polarizing trend – specifically, the allegedly emerging 
threat of the “Jihad World” or approaching “clash of civilizations” (Huntington, 1996) 
between Islam and the non-Islamic West (e.g., Friedman, 2004; Seib, 2004). Of course, 
even before 9/11, there had been a gradual escalation in U.S. society in its perception of 
Islamic fundamentalism as an emerging global threat succeeding the old villain of 
communism (Esposito, 1999; Hardar, 1992; Karabell, 1995). Yet the terrorist attacks of 
9/11 seem to have provided to the American mind a decidedly amplifying moment for 
treating non-Western political communities outside the U.S. control, particularly those 
within the cultural boundary of Islam, as a present danger to American (often identified 
with modern) values (Karim, 2002; Seib, 2003).  
Considering both the academic debate on the global-local relationship and the 
alleged emergence of Islam as a global threat, the popularity of Al-Jazeera among Arab 
viewers, along with the “rise of the Arab public sphere” (Lynch, 2006) mentioned earlier, 
showcases the ambivalent nature of a “hybridization” between the Western and the non-
Western and the global and the local. The birth and operation of the 24-hour Arabic news 
channel was the result of a combination of several factors: satellite TV technology with a 
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reach going beyond the boundaries of Arab states, financial sponsorship by the Qatari 
emir, the hands-off approach by the government allowing editorial freedom, the recruits 
of BBC-trained staffs by happenstance, and the newsroom decision of adopting CNN-
style reporting. As a whole, these factors fit well into an image of the harmonious 
merging of communication technology, the free flow of information, and a free press 
without state censorship, wherein there arose a process of globalization virtually identical 
to the process of Westernization in the minds of Western observers. Yet, after 9/11, as the 
tensions of the Arab opinion on the U.S.-led wars mounted, the pre-9/11 optimistic 
visions of U.S. observers who had celebrated Al-Jazeera’s role in bringing free and open 
debate (e.g., Friedman, 2001a, 2001b) were largely replaced by worried remarks on the 
distinctively “Arab-oriented” nature of its coverage, such as graphic reporting on civilian 
causalities and a pro-Palestinian tone in the accounts of the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts 
(Ali, 2002). As a result, the predictable wartime impact of Al-Jazeera on its Arab 
audiences became a serious concern for some U.S. critics, “because clashes between 
civilizations can occur in ways other than armed conflict” (Seib, 2004, p.80).   
The complex nature of the recent tensions between the United States and the 
Arab/Muslim world indicates an increased need for the American news media to pay 
close attention to what is going on outside their country and to engage in a dialogue with 
residents of other foreign communities. Ironically, although U.S.-based transnational 
media firms have been the main driver of globalization disseminating a consumerist 
culture at the world level (Herman, & McChesney, 1997), American society might 
remain “provincial” in the sense of intellectual isolationism (Seib, 2004). This worry has 
some grounds, considering the trend since the 1990s of the decline in international 
reporting by the U.S. broadcast and print media outlets in both quantity and quality 
(Bennett, 2005, p.23; Moisy, 1996; Seib, 2004). The usual rationales for limited foreign 
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coverage in the news business have been the costly nature of international reporting and 
the conventional wisdom that Americans’ interests in foreign affairs declined after the 
demise of the Cold War (Moisy, 1996; Seib, 2004). Even after 9/11, according to a 2002 
PEW study that interviewed editors at U.S. newspapers with a circulation of at least 
100,000, 95% of the editors said that reader interest in international news had increased 
after the terrorist attacks, but 64% expected that this interest would soon decline to pre-
9/11 levels (Morris & Associates, 2002). Regardless of its empirical validity, the 
conventional wisdom held by media professionals about the state of American news 
audiences may well be a cause for concern to those believing that, in this age of 
globalization, the American media’s view of the world could and should become ever 
broader (Seib, 2004). 
In summary, while the traditional concerns of the U.S. media portrayals of the 
developing world reflect the massive cries of the Third World for a re-distribution of 
communication resources two decades ago (e.g. Masmoudi, 1979; Stevenson & Cole, 
1984), the recent tensions between the West and Islam suggest an increased need for U.S. 
media professionals to make efforts to build bridges, rather than dig ditches, between 
American society and pan-Arab communities (Friedman, 2004). Markedly, the sudden 
rise of Al-Jazeera as an influential wartime source of news and views critical of U.S. 
foreign policy came to signify one unpredictable aspect of the ongoing process of 
globalization. Against this background, the question of the U.S. media’s treatment of the 
Arab TV channel, as both an Arab-oriented source of information and a controversial 
subject of debate, has relevance to a more profound issue of how willing American 
mainstream journalism is to offer a fair hearing to a wide array of critical or hostile 
foreign views, ranging from terrorist messages of hate to reasoned critiques of U.S. 
approach to Arab-related problems. Narrowing down the focus to specific subjects of 
 32
research, one topic was already identified in the previous section – the content diversity 
of the information supplied by Al-Jazeera that can be found in the American and British 
press. There are also other approaches in examining the media discourse related to Al-
Jazeera. The following sections identify other subjects of research through theoretical 
discussions.  
 
Media Dependence on Official Sources and Icon-driven Reporting 
The scope of the U.S. (and British) media discourse related to Al-Jazeera goes 
beyond the incorporation of information supplied by the Arab broadcaster for reporting. 
Reporters of the two countries also covered a range of events and issues triggered by the 
performance of Al-Jazeera, such as their government’s high-ranking officials’ responses 
to the appearance of Osama bin Laden on the Arabic TV news channel. Given that many 
of the events involving Al-Jazeera implied a confrontation between the Arab TV network 
and the U.S.-led war forces, a question can be raised with regard to the nature of press-
government relations: in their construction of the debate about Al-Jazeera; how critically 
independent were the news media from the political clout of their government officials? 
Or, to reverse the question, how uncritically deferential were the news media to the 
official lines of the day set by high-ranking government officials?  This subject can be 
discussed in relation to the U.S. media’s tendency toward heavy reliance on official 
sources, which has been an ongoing concern among many journalists and scholars of 
political communication and media sociology.  
The nature of press-government relations in the U.S. has been a puzzle to many 
observers. There is a widespread belief among the American public that journalists are 
too antagonistic or “liberally biased” (Bennett, 2005, p.25). Some studies (e.g., Patterson, 
1993, 2000) show that journalistic negativity in political news stories has been on the rise 
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since the 1980s, often accompanying a personalizing approach to public issues (Bennett, 
2005, p. 40) or with an emphasis on tactical aspects of political life (Cappella & 
Jamieson, 1997). Meanwhile, many important studies on media coverage of political 
news indicate that this country’s free press relies perhaps too much on official sources 
and their perspectives in coverage of public concerns (e.g., Cohen, 1963; Cook, 1998; 
Gans, 1979; Halberstam, 1979; Sigal, 1973; Tuchman, 1978). For example, Leon Sigal’s 
(1973) pioneering study of the New York Times and the Washington Post over a 20-year 
period found that, in both newspapers, government officials (domestic or foreign) 
accounted for almost 75% of all sources in political news; nearly 60% of news in hard 
news stories came through routine channels, such as official proceedings, press 
conferences and press releases. U.S. media sourcing patterns, which privilege a small 
spectrum of official viewpoints, combined with journalistic negativity on a personal 
level, produce an odd mix of “a narrow range of political ideas, interspersed with cranky 
criticisms of politicians and the games they play” (Bennett, 2005, p. 153).  
The coupling of journalistic adversarialism with institutional deference (Orr, 
1980) has been viewed by critical media sociologists as the combined result of routine 
news-gathering practices and professional norms of journalism (Bennett, 2005). 
Journalistic work routines, imposed by news organizations to secure a steady supply of 
news products in culturally familiar forms (Tuchman, 1978), create a social environment 
for reporters that is largely shaped by their sources and fellow beat reporters (Cohen, 
1963; Gans, 1979; Sigal, 1973). Professional norms of journalism are the moral 
standards, codes of ethics, and guidelines about inserting one’s viewpoint into a story — 
the conventions of objective reporting — that guide journalistic decision making 
(Bennett, 2005). Media sociologist Bennett (2005) asserts that professional norms of 
journalism, in an interplay with organizational work routines, contribute to creating “a 
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ritualistic posture of antagonism between press and government…while keeping most 
news content to political perspectives certified by authorities” (p.189). A five-nation 
survey (1990-1992) of journalists by Patterson and Donsbach (1996) yielded an 
interesting finding: American journalists showed the least diversity in their decisions 
about whom to interview for different hypothetical stories. This suggests strong norms of 
objective reporting among American journalists, which leads to the homogenization of 
the political content of their reporting.  
American news media’s reliance on high-ranking official sources is particularly 
evident in coverage of U.S. foreign policy and U.S.-involved foreign crises (Bennett, 
1990; Cohen, 1963; Halberstam, 1979). This tendency was termed “indexing” by Bennett 
(1990). According to the indexing hypothesis, the press tends to “index” the range of 
diverse viewpoints on a public issue, in both news and editorials, to the presence of 
powerful governmental actors or members of the political elite who also share these 
views. When the indexing norm determines news source patterns, in circumstances where 
it is hard to find elite voices criticizing the government policy in the governmental or 
Congressional debate, one likely consequence is the marginalization of oppositional 
viewpoints of grassroots or activist groups (Bennett, 1990). Bennett (1990) expected the 
indexing norm to be especially influential in media coverage of military decisions, 
foreign policy, or areas of issues where a considerable level of elite consensus exists.  
As a general notion, the idea of news indexing resonates with a critical view (e.g., 
Hallin, 1986; Herman & Chomsky, 1988) of the mainstream new media as favoring the 
establishment position or at least avoiding offense to key principles of governance. As a 
specific theoretical expression, the indexing hypothesis predicts that the valence of media 
discussion about a given issue would be determined, regardless of public opinion, 
primarily by the degree of the elite conflict in Washington. Many studies of news 
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indexing in foreign policy have yielded findings supporting the original indexing 
hypothesis (e.g., Alexseev & Bennett, 1995; Bennett, 1990; Dorman & Livingston, 1994; 
Zaller & Chiu, 1996). Some studies of media coverage of U.S.-involved foreign crises, 
although they did not directly test the indexing hypothesis, produced findings backing the 
general notion of news indexing. For example, studies of media coverage of the policy 
debate and military performance during the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf Crisis found that, in 
spite of apparently ample criticisms of the administration policy and its performance, the 
nature of criticisms reported in the media tended to be procedural rather than substantive 
(Entman & Page, 1994) or tactical rather than fundamental (Mermin, 1999).  
Still, it is important to note that all research in this tradition did not follow suit. 
Some studies of news indexing in foreign policy found abundant criticisms of the U.S. 
government even when domestic officials and politicians were unified in their support of 
the administration’s decision (e.g., Althaus, 2003; Althaus, Edy, Entman, & Phalen, 
1996; Livingston & Eachus, 1996). These disagreements, although much of the 
discrepancies may be explained by the differences in ways in which “critical coverage” is 
defined (Althaus, 2003, p.386), suggest that news indexing as a specific form of a 
theoretical proposition is subject to a reconsideration. For example, Althaus and his 
colleagues’ study of news broadcasts during the 1985-1986 Libya Crisis concluded that 
official debate-based news indexing should be interpreted, not as determining the 
“proportions” of pros and cons about a given policy, but as affecting “parameters” of 
media debate (Althaus, Edy, Entman, & Phalen, 1996). Furthermore, in his study of 
evening TV news during 1990-1991 Persian Gulf Crisis, Althaus (2003) found that 
criticism of the administration occurred independently from the condition of indexing, 
and concluded that journalists exercised a substantial level of discretion in airing 
oppositional voices even in the absence of dissent from authoritative sources.  
 36
At least two explanations for a possible departure from the media habit of relying 
on the governmental debate have been suggested. One explanation sheds light on the 
flexible nature of professional media norms. In her discussion of objectivity as a strategic 
ritual, Tuchman (1972) noted that one of the strategies that reporters use to demonstrate 
objectivity is to “present conflicting possibilities” (p.665). This refers to a story-telling 
imperative by which journalists seek out sources of opposing opinion to meet the 
condition that every news story has at least two sides. While this tendency, which is 
usually called fairness or balance in the news, can be criticized as an artificial 
oversimplification of a complex issue (Bennett, 2005, p. 183), this story-telling 
imperative may also encourage reporters to actively seek out legitimate oppositional 
voices, such as foreign elite opinion, outside the official circle of debate, particularly 
when members of the opposition party in Congress do not dare to challenge a dominant 
policy position (Althaus, 2003; Althaus, Edy, Entman, & Phalen, 1996; Cook, 1998).  
The second explanation stems from the event characteristics of what Molotch and 
Lester (1974) identified as “accidents” and distinguished from “routine events” through 
their typology of news events. Many news events covered by journalists can indeed be 
classified into routine events, such as press conferences, where politicians make 
considerable efforts to turn media presentation of the situation to their advantage. Some 
routine events fall into the category of “pseudo-events” (Boorstin,1961), which are events 
deliberately planned, carefully managed, and fully controlled by powerful newsmakers to 
remain ambiguous in relating the presented images to the underlying reality. In contrast, 
“accidents” tends to have results that are opposite of routine events (Molotch & Lester, 
1974, p.109). Accident-driven news differs from the indexing of voices and views 
associated with the routine news-gathering, and some dramatic accidental events can 
license journalists to utilize nonmainstream voices and challenging ideas in significant 
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portions (Lawrence, 1996). Thus, some accidental occurrences beyond the control of 
official sources can provide “pegs” for journalists on which to hang criticism of a 
government policy (Althaus, 2003, p.405).  
This alternative possibility has been further explored by Bennett and his 
colleagues in their discussion of “news icons” (Bennett & Lawrence, 1995; Lawrence, 
1996). In their definition, a news icon is “an image that lives on beyond its originating 
event by being introduced into a variety of subsequent news contexts” (Bennett & 
Lawrence, 1995, p.20). Journalists can employ news icons to symbolically recount news 
stories about larger issues. For instance, the beating of Rodney King in 1991 was initially 
just one story but evolved over time into a news icon through the journalistic use of the 
story as a vivid example of the harassment of African Americans by police force and, 
ultimately, of the stubborn persistence of racism in American society (Lawrence, 1996). 
Indeed, only a small number of accidental occurrences can achieve the status of a fully-
fledged news icon. Officials may respond to accidental events with a unified voice and 
successfully depress their effects on political agenda. Lawrence (1996, p.447) specifies 
this type of accidental events as a “near-icon,” whose repercussions remain at the level of 
a short-lived prominence of challenging views in news discourse and soon subside. In 
some circumstances, however, officials may not manage the effect of icon-driven news 
effectively; fully-fledged news icons may stimulate political dynamics of “damage 
control,” which is further facilitated by journalistic use of news icons as a means of 
expanding the range of views in the news (Lawrence, 1996, p.447). 
Interestingly, all of the possibilities described so far (i.e., the media dependence 
on official sources and possible conditions for a departure from routine coverage) seem to 
be met by the characteristics of the pre-Iraq War climate: the continued post-9/11 
nationalistic mood promoted by the Bush administration, the virtual absence of 
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Congressional opposition to the government policy, the presence of globalized resistance 
to the American plan of going to war both within the United States and around the world, 
and the meteoric rise of Al-Jazeera as a global news agent signifying a challenge to U.S.-
led wartime PR campaigns. Prior to the war there was a good deal of diplomacy and 
debate over the U.S.-led war plan among the members of U.N. Security Council, with 
France and Germany emerging as leaders of the opposition group. Given this 
circumstance, American news media may well have cited French and German high-
ranking officials as legitimate “counterbalancing” voices in coverage of the international-
level policy debate. It is much more difficult, however, to conjecture how the American 
(and British) news organizations may have treated Al-Jazeera, a non-Western TV station 
that suddenly rose from obscurity to gain global fame, in coverage of the events and 
issues that often involved conflicts between the Arab TV network and the leaders of the 
U.S. and British governments.  
Under these circumstances, two alternative scenarios are possible. One is that the 
U.S. news media, either intimidated by government pressure or driven by their own 
nationalistic mindset, may have followed the government lead and largely dismissed Al-
Jazeera as an untrustworthy source of enemy propaganda. The other is that the 
unprecedented rise of Al-Jazeera, which signified a regional resistance to the U.S. foreign 
policy, may have prompted journalists to employ the maverick news outlet as a 
challenging “news icon” or “near-icon” (Lawrence, 1996) and thereby shift the story 
beyond the confines of the official debate to incorporate nonmainstream voices, 
especially those of Arab media workers and members of Arab/Muslim audiences. 
Certainly, it is probable that the American newsroom is neither completely dependent on 
the official line of the day nor fully independent of the patriotic pressure in wartime, but 
this cross-national case study can help determine, for the matter of covering controversies 
 39
related to the Arab broadcaster, where the news actually falls within the latitude of these 
two opposing possibilities. 
 
Normative Ideas about News Media in Contest 
For the purpose of this research, the previous discussion of source patterns in 
news reporting can be connected to a question of “who” appeared in news discourse as a 
voice speaking about Al-Jazeera and its related issues. In addition, media accounts of the 
controversies involving Al-Jazeera can be examined in terms of “what” was said about 
Al-Jazeera and the stand-off between the Arab TV network and leaders of the U.S.-led 
war-waging forces. In a broader context, Western media presentation of the so-called 
“Al-Jazeera effect” (Trofimov, 2003) — a shorthand in a Wall Street Journal headline 
that referred to the impact of the satellite TV news channel on the perception of the war 
among especially Arab audiences and others in the rest of the world — constituted an 
important part of the phenomenon called a “media war” or a “propaganda war.” 
Discussion of the media war, addressing manipulation of news by political actors and 
problematic practices of wartime journalism, inevitably brings up underlying concerns 
related to news media, such as society’s respect for journalistic autonomy and media 
professionals’ responsible reporting (Schwartz, 2004). In this regard, one possible 
approach for content analysis is to examine what kinds of normative visions about news 
media were brought into play in the U.S. and British media accounts of Al-Jazeera’s 
performance and of the reactions by governmental or military actors of the two countries.   
Normative thinking about news media has a considerable status in American 
literature of news media and mass communication. Much of this line of thinking draws 
on the widely acknowledged unique status of journalism in democracy (Josephi, 2005, 
pp. 575-576). For instance, the normative link between journalism and democracy was 
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emphatically summarized by noted media scholar James Carey, who called journalism 
“another name for democracy.” In Carey’s view, the practices of journalism are 
justifiable in terms of their contributions to democratic social order, and, in this respect, 
journalism without democracy is merely “something resembling a news business” 
(Carey, 1996). For journalism, its normative character serves as both its legitimization 
and a yardstick for assessing media performance (McQuail, 1994, pp. 4-5). Within this 
framework, criticisms of U.S. news media abound, pointing out how the mainstream 
American journalism falls short of meeting some expectations in light of democratic 
ideals. 
It is worth noting, however, that such normative discourse about journalism and 
news media emanating from Western, especially U.S., society has often been criticized 
by advocates of a comparative perspective as legitimizing a Western (or American) 
ethnocentric tendency (e.g., Curran & Park, 2000; Hallin & Mancini, 2004; Josephi, 
2005). For example, Freedom House, a U.S.-based non-profit organization judging a 
country’s news media by the degree of press freedom, for 2005 rated the majority of 
countries in the world as not free or only partly free (Freedom House, 2006). This yearly 
practice was viewed by some critics as an example of the attempts, by intentional or 
unintentional implication, to make journalism a prerogative of leading Western nations 
(e.g., Curran & Park, 2000; Kunczik, 1999, p.53). While there is little doubt that press 
freedom as a democratic value has great appeal to media practitioners in most regions of 
the world (McQuail, 1994, p.130), the practices of applying a normatively-based 
definition of journalism worldwide have often been regarded as privileging the historical 
experiences derived from the North American media system (Hallin & Mancini, 2004; 
Mancini, 2000). This contentious aspect of the normative discourse of journalism 
suggests gaps between the proposed scheme and its actual implementation and also, when 
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political or other interests intervene, inconsistencies between the rhetoric and the 
underlying reality. 
In academia, a host of scholars has made intellectual efforts to describe and sort 
out normative models of news media around the world. Siebert and his colleagues’ 
(1956) Four Theories of the Press has been the most widely-known and influential work 
on this subject. In the book, the authors suggested that the media system could be 
classified according to four main types of theory: authoritarian, libertarian, social 
responsibility, and Soviet theory. This classification system carried a bipolarity of 
libertarianism and authoritarianism, along with historical variants in the United States and 
in the Soviet Union (i.e., social responsibility and Soviet theories), which was presented 
in a way largely fitting within the Cold War mentality (Josephi, 2005; Nerone, 1995). 
Since the Four Theories, other scholars have proposed modifications or their own 
versions of the classification system. For instance, McQuail (1994, p.131) added to the 
original typology two models: developmental and democratic-participatory media; 
Hachten (1981) suggested five normative models: authoritarian, Soviet, Western, 
development, and revolutionary media; Altschull (1984) presented three models of media 
system: market, Marxist, and advancing media, corresponding to the divisions into the 
First, Second, and Third Worlds. Altchull also pointed out sizable gaps between theory 
and practice and concluded that all media systems, in reality, operate in service of the 
powerful.  
Drawing on these proposed normative theories or models, the researcher identifies 
four underlying core concepts about news media: free, responsible, developmental, and 
alternative media. The last term, alternative media, is a replacement of what McQuail 
(1994) called a democratic-participatory model of media, following theoretical accounts 
of alternative media (Atton, 2002) and radical media (Downing, 2001). These multiple 
 42
lines of media-related normative thinking were arranged to help examine thematic 
expressions found in the media presentation of controversies involving Al-Jazeera. Below 
is a summary of the four normative conceptions of news media that have been formulated 
in the academic circle of debate:  
 
Free Media. The concept of media freedom has been advocated most forcefully in the 
classical libertarian theory of the press (e.g., Rivers, 1970; Rivers, Miller, & Gandy, 
1975; Siebert, Peterson, & Schramm, 1956). As an expression of political philosophy, the 
libertarian conception of the press emerged through an extension from individual rights to 
freedom of opinion, speech, and assembly (McQuail, 1994, p.124). Libertarian theory has 
an origin traceable to the writings of Milton (Areopagitica) in Britain, but was fully 
developed in the North American colonies and during the early years of the U.S. republic. 
Historically, this theory made a strong case against state censorship, licensing, political 
control, and the victimization of journalists for reporting a controversial view or refusing 
to tell lies (McQuail, 1994, p.124). 
The libertarian notion of press freedom has been applied to different lines of 
thinking and rhetoric. The metaphor of “free marketplace of ideas,” which first appeared 
in the writing of Justice Oliver Holmes in 1919, gained popularity by combining an 
imagined battle of ideas with the optimistic economic tenet of free and uninhibited trade 
(Dickerson, 1996; pp.367-368). Another influential metaphor is the journalistic self-
conception of “watchdog,” where a free press is viewed as a means for monitoring and 
challenging the actions of the politically (and often economically) powerful, and by doing 
so representing and protecting the public interest. This familiar analogy suggests the role 
of journalism as an adversary to authority within the libertarian framework (Rivers, 1970; 
Rivers, Miller, & Gandy, 1975). 
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At the same time, the notion of press freedom has often been identified with 
property rights and has been taken to mean the right to own and use means of publication 
without restraint or interference from the government (Glasser, 1986, p.93; McQuail, 
1994, p.129). The pure form of libertarian theory has been frequently invoked to protect 
the owners of media, yet failed to give to an equivalent degree the arguable rights of free 
expression to media workers within the press or their audiences (Curran, 1991; McQuail, 
1994, p.130). Except for matters involving governmental actors, the libertarian theory has 
largely been ineffective in handling many pressures to which media are subject, 
especially those arising from market circumstances (Shoemaker & Reese, 1991). There 
are also other criticisms of the classical libertarian theory of the press, such as the 
vagueness in applying press freedom to broadcasting and the difficulty dealing with 
various issues related to the flow of information in the digital age (For more debate on 
this subject, see Curran, 1991; Glasser, 1986; Keane, 1991). 
 
Responsible media. The origin of this idea can be traced most clearly to the Commission 
on Freedom of the Press (commonly called the Hutchins Commission), which in 1947 
issued a report establishing the theory of socially responsible media. This report endorsed 
the prevailing principle of a free press but made an important change by adding the 
concept of social responsibility. Social responsibility theory involves a view that media 
ownership and operation are essentially a form of public trust, rather than an unlimited 
private franchise. At the same time, this theory states that the press should be free and 
self-regulated, at least in principle, without government interference. Criticizing 
sensationalistic media coverage, the Hutchins Report specified the main standards which 
a responsible press should observe, including: a truthful, comprehensive, and intelligent 
account of the day’s events in a context that gives them meaning; a forum for the 
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exchange of comment and criticism; the projection of a representative picture of 
constituent groups in society; and the presentation and clarification of the goals and 
values of the society (Hutchins, 1947). 
For the privately owned media, social responsibility theory has been expressed 
and applied mainly in the form of ethical codes of professional journalism (McQuail, 
1994, p.124). Sociological or historical studies of U.S. modern journalism (e.g., Mindich, 
1998; Schudson, 1978; Tuchman, 1978) have described key features of American 
professional reporting that have been advocated in the name of media responsibility. 
Lance Bennett (2005) summarized this literature and presented six components of 
professional journalism. Of these, two kinds of journalistic norms have direct relevance 
to the convention of objective and responsible reporting: the requirement of a journalist 
to be a politically neutral observer of the day’s events and the ethical duty of complying 
with the public’s standard of decency and good taste (Bennett, 2005, p.184).8  
The ideal of objectivity has been especially influential in the minds of American 
media professionals, and, as noted in the preceding discussion of the U.S. media’s 
dependence on official sources, a good deal of intense debate has taken place centering 
around the question of whether objective reporting is viable and desirable. In addition, 
the standard of decency and good taste has often been criticized, in that avoiding 
offensive ideas in reporting may lead to removing from public awareness some 
undesirable but true aspects of the real world (Bennett, 2005, p.193; Ellul, 1973). 
Although the general concept of media responsibility is sensible to most members of 
society, the social responsibility theory has never proved easy in reaching effective self-
regulation (McQuail, 1994, p.126). Also noteworthy is that the practices of objective 
 
8Bennett also delineates other characteristics of professional journalism as a practice: the practices of 
training journalists as generalists, as opposed to specialists, and the practice of editorial review (Bennett, 
2005, pp.184-185).  
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reporting historically preceded professional norms of journalism. Historical evidence 
suggests that media norms such as objectivity and balance appeared in correspondence 
with the development of the news business under market circumstances, rather than with 
ethical considerations in pursuit of truth (Mindich, 1998; Schudson, 1978). The notion of 
media responsibility has multifaceted aspects, serving not only as a culturally binding 
force but also as a means of self-justifying rhetoric.  
      
Developmental media. Unlike the libertarian and social responsibility press theories, the 
idea of developmental media has been applied mainly to non-Western societies outside 
the United States and Western Europe. This concept has its roots in developmental 
communication, which goes back to the 1950s and 1960s U.S.-involved policy debate 
dominated by the so-called modernization paradigm. Scholars of early developmental 
communication focused on transferring technology and the sociopolitical culture of 
developed societies to the traditional non-Western societies (e.g., Lerner, 1958; Pye, 
1963; Schramm, 1964). From this perspective, developed Western societies were 
presumed as the ultimate model that underdeveloped societies should emulate, and 
attitudes of “backward” people were viewed as obstacles to be removed for 
modernization. Differences among indigenous cultures were largely understood in terms 
of the degree of development rather than the unique nature of each. Within this paradigm, 
the concept of developmental media emerged as a vital means of teaching people modern 
(and also Western) attitudes, values, and lifestyles (Mohammadi, 1995). This conceptual 
framework has shaped much of the Western understanding about developmental 
communication and media in the Third World.   
Yet, by the late 1960s, various academic and development communities, 
especially in Latin America, began to challenge this Western view of developmental 
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communication. Proponents of dependency theory (e.g., Dos Santos, 1970) or cultural 
imperialism (e.g., Schiller, 1976) asserted that the prevailing poor conditions of Third 
World nations mainly came from international structures, where the main interest of the 
developed nations is to remain wealthy by perpetuating the poor state of the peripheral 
group of underdeveloped nations. Reflecting this intellectual mood, the aforementioned 
NWIO (or NWICO) movement in the 1970s called for balancing of international 
information flow and communication resources and advancing new models of 
developmental communication more sensitive to the needs of local people and more 
consonant with indigenous cultures (e.g., Masmoudi, 1979). The normative implications 
of developmental communication have since become more complicated, vacillating 
between the Westernization perspectives and the Third World’s own aspirations. 
However, since this case study examines the U.S. and British media’s view of the Arab 
TV network Al-Jazeera, the basic line of Western understanding about the developmental 
media will be considered for an analysis of thematic expressions in media discourse.  
In addition, there have been contentious arguments over the meaning of the 
related term “developmental journalism.” Simply speaking, developmental journalism 
refers to the kind of journalism underscoring issues related to the relevance of economic 
or other development projects to national or local needs (Edeani, 1993; Fair, 1988). In a 
sense, developmental journalism can be seen as reflecting the Hutchins Commission’s 
view of press responsibility (Gunaratne, 1998). However, many Western critics largely 
equate developmental journalism with a government-controlled form of communication, 
thus akin to the authoritarian or Communist conception of news media (e.g., Hachten, 
1992; Lambeth, 1995; Stevenson, 1994). According to this view, the concept of 
development itself entails a situation in which the government mobilizes mass media with 
methods that include the suppression of civil liberties such as press freedom. Meanwhile, 
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defenders of developmental or development journalism argued against the equation of 
development-oriented news with government-controlled news, asserting that this model 
involves critical examination and evaluation of development programs, independent from 
the government (e.g., Edeaini, 1993; Frederick, 1993; Gurantne, 1998; Ogan. 1982).9  
 
Alternative media. As a normative model, alternative media is perhaps the most elusive 
and underdeveloped in the field of communication. Similar underlying ideas to that of 
alternative media often go by different names, such as an “emancipatory” use of media 
(Enzensberger, 1970), the “radical” media as an alternative public sphere (Downing, 
1984), the “grassroots” media in developmental communities (Traber, 1985), and a 
“democratic-participatory” model of media (McQuail, 1994, p.131). However, custom 
and practice within this tradition appear to have settled on “alternative” as the preferred 
term (Atton, 2002). In the U.S. and European societies the calls for alternative types of 
media began in the 1960s and continued, in recognition of technological developments 
allowing for ordinary people’s use of small-scale media and of increasing criticisms of 
the mainstream media by public or private monopolies (McQuail, 1994, p.131).  
Although alternative media or its similar concepts rarely appear in a fully 
theorized form in the literature of communication, theoretical seeds can be found in the 
Marxist tradition, especially from the Gramscian notion of counter-hegemony that have 
been applied most clearly to working-class newspapers and radical socialist publications 
(e.g., Allen, 1985; Downing, 1984; Sparks, 1985). Meanwhile, McQuail’s (1994) 
accounts of democratic-participatory media can be seen as positioning alternative media 
as an extreme within the framework of liberal pluralism (Atton, 2002). These competing 
 
9Edeaini (1993) makes a distinction between developmental journalism and development journalism, 
largely equating the former with a government-controlled form of communication and the latter with 
independent and socially responsible reporting. In this writing, however, this belabored distinction is 
disregarded.  
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theoretical backgrounds suggest that the blanket term “alternative” encompasses far more 
than radical or social-change-aiming publishing can. British scholar Raymond Williams 
noted a difference between alternative practices and oppositional (which may be 
interpreted as counter-hegemonic) practices, saying that alternative culture seeks a place 
to coexist within the existing hegemony, whereas oppositional culture aims to replace it 
(Williams, 1983, p.250). This helps clarify nuanced differences within the ways in which 
alternative types of communication are organized and advocated through media use, yet it 
is often difficult to draw a line between the aforementioned two types of audience 
culture.  
The range of alternative media is quite broad in all their forms (printed, broadcast, 
and electronic), perspectives, and styles. The notion of alternative media has been 
extended into literary and artistic media producing apparently non-political contents, such 
as self-published underground magazines (commonly called zines) (Duncombe, 1997) 
and electronic publishing opposing intellectual property rights (Atton, 1999). Given this 
diversity, alternative media may be classified as largely a relational concept, depending 
on what is defined as dominant or mainstream. In addition, theoretical accounts of 
alternative media (e.g., Downing, 2001) underscore not only the differences in content or 
medium but also the differences in how communication as a social (rather than simply 
informational) process is formulated by media performance. Narrowing down the focus 
to the practices of journalism, the key difference between the mainstream media and the 
alternative media lies in their selection of news and in the way the selection is made, 
particularly how the alternative media politicizes the “repression of events” (Fiske, 1992, 
p.50).     
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The review of the literature on normative media theory delineated above has been 
selective and purposeful. The researcher’s intent has not been to chronicle theoretical 
trends but to uncover discernible lines of normative thinking that underlie specific 
expressions on subjects related to news media or journalism. For the purpose of this case 
study, the multiple lines of normative thinking about news media identified above can 
serve as a useful guide for developing a sophisticated content analysis scheme to examine 
what kinds of journalism-related normative themes were frequently brought to the media-
constructed debate over the controversies involving Al-Jazeera in the U.S. and British 
press. This content analysis strategy, compared with a simple measurement of the media 
tone in terms of positive versus negative, offers a better way of capturing the richness of 
the media discourse and uncovering nuanced differences in ways by which certain issue 
characters were given emphasis through media framing.10 A theme-based examination of 
the media discourse can uncover the differences between two positive evaluations of Al-
Jazeera, when, for example, the one was based on its developmental media function in 
the Arab world and the other highlighted its role as an alternative source of information 
beyond the U.S. control.    
 
10Political communication scholars in the tradition of constructionism underscore the significance of 
“framing” choices that government officials, politicians, journalists, interest groups, and other actors make 
to promote certain perceptions and interpretations that benefit one side in a given controversy while 
hindering others (Entman, 2003, p.416; for more on constructionism, see Neuman, Just, and Crigler, 1992, 
pp.17-18). Frames, the outcome of framing efforts, are “thematic categories that integrate and give meaning 
to the scene, the characters, their actions, and supporting documentation” (Bennett, 2005, p.38). Markedly, 
constructionist scholar William Gamson has made a link between specific media frames and larger cultural 
themes, saying that some media frames have more compelling power when they resonate with cultural 
themes that are widely accepted in a political culture (1992, p.135; See also Snow and Benford, 1988). The 
relationship between cultural themes and media frames in Gamson’s account is similar to the resonance 
between the socially shared media-related normative ideas and the specific themes applied to matters 
related to Al-Jazeera. In this regard, the researcher’s examination of normative media themes can be seen 
as a media frame analysis. However, media sociologist Stephen Reese criticizes the trend of reducing a 
frame into an issue position or a dominant theme identified in an individual story, emphasizing that a frame 
reflects a culturally accepted and broader way of addressing a range of issues (2003, pp. 13-14). To avoid 
terminological problems, this study uses the term theme, not frame, to refer to the thematic ideas invoked in 
the media accounts of the issues involving Al-Jazeera. 
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In addition, an examination of the media-related themes helps reveal how the 
normative aspects of journalism could be politicized in practice both by situational 
factors and by the interference of various interests. During the post-9/11 period of the 
War on Terror and the Iraq War, as mentioned in the beginning of this section, many 
analyses and discussions of the control and manipulation of information by key political 
actors took place in the Western media outlets, which reflected their underlying concerns 
related to the principles of journalism (Schwartz, 2004). As part of the phenomenon 
called the media war, Al-Jazeera’s rise as an important source of war-related information 
and its popularity especially among Arab Muslim audiences provided American and 
British journalists with an opportunity to think about their own practices of wartime 
journalism. Yet this journalistic self-reflexivity was played out in the nationalistic mood, 
especially in U.S. society, and also through the filter of the editorial stances of media 
outlets with regard to the U.S. military intervention within the Arab/Muslim world. Given 
these circumstances, an examination of thematic expressions in the media accounts 
related to Al-Jazeera can show how interlocking and competing journalistic visions were 
mobilized in newspaper discourses, in a way of either undermining the legitimacy of Al-
Jazeera or, to the contrary, advocating the Arab media outlet and furthermore utilizing 
some events or issues related to Al-Jazeera as a means of criticizing the U.S.-led war and 
its related policy.   
 
SUMMARY OF THEORETICAL ISSUES 
Against the backdrop of the wartime rise of Al-Jazeera in recent years, the 
literature review in the previous sections identified three theoretical issues:    
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1. Given the much-discussed imbalance in international news flow, what can we say 
about the so-called “reverse flow of information” from Al-Jazeera to the U.S. and 
the British media? Is it a genuinely meaningful phenomenon such that the Arabic 
news outlet provided to the discourse in the two countries’ elite press not only 
terrorist messages of hate but also alternative accounts of war and “Arab-
oriented” perspectives on the U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East?  
2. Given the tendency of the U.S. mainstream media’s reliance on official sources in 
coverage of U.S.-involved foreign crises, what is the implication of the mediated 
public debates over the events and issues related to Al-Jazeera in the U.S. and the 
British press? In particular, how often did the media attention to Al-Jazeera lead 
to “icon-driven” news stories in which the journalist referenced the Arab news 
organization to introduce a wide range of views of non-official sources, especially 
employees at Al-Jazeera, its Arab/Muslim audiences, or those critical of the post-
9/11 U.S. foreign policy?  
3. Given the various normative notions of news media and their role in society, what 
kind of themes related to the norms of journalism did the U.S. and the British 
news media invoke in describing Al-Jazeera’s performance and its confrontation 
with the U.S.-led war-waging forces? In the post-9/11 politicized context of 
media discussion, what rhetorical roles did the thematic elements brought into the 
media discourse play, in either undermining the legitimacy of Al-Jazeera as an 
institution of journalism, or advocating the value of Arab journalism and 
furthermore criticizing the U.S. government’s approach to the Arab news outlet?  
 
To gain a better overview of the media discourse associated with these theoretical 
issues, this study conducts a comparative content analysis of prestigious U.S. and British 
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newspapers that editorially took different stances toward the Bush administration’s post-
9/11 foreign policy, especially the war in Iraq. One basis for this comparison is the 
commonality of the U.S. and the British government positions – in both countries the 
government decided to invade Iraq (and, in a broader context, to co-participate in the 
“War on Terror” campaign). Simultaneously, as described in the Introduction (Chapter 
1), the researcher considers two possible causes of differences among newspapers, one 
being a newspaper’s editorial policy toward the war (pro-war versus anti-war) and the 
other being the national context about the government policy (American versus British).  
Thus, by introducing a two-by-two research design into the content analysis, this 
study attempts to capture potential differences among the two countries’ hawkish and 
dovish press, in both citing Al-Jazeera for news reporting and expressing views regarding 
the Arabic news channel. This will help determine whether the discourse related to Al-
Jazeera was peculiar to the U.S. press or a more general feature of the Western news 
establishment. In addition, it will help determine how much the discourse concerning Al-
Jazeera was a result of political considerations – especially the specific policy position of 
the news organization. Key concepts and research questions are identified in the 
following sections.  
 
DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS 
Each of the three theoretical questions outlined in the previous section suggests a 
focus for analyzing the media text in which the word “Al-Jazeera” occurs in a variety of 
contexts. In order to make clear what will be examined throughout the series of content 
analysis, it is helpful to distinguish between different modes of addressing Al-Jazeera in 
media discourse. In the following conceptualization of three addressing modes, the 
researcher uses the term AJ, an acronym for Al-Jazeera, to indicate that, as a word, Al-
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Jazeera occurs in the media text within the specific context outlined in each of the three 
modes: 
 
1. AJ as source of information. In this addressing mode, AJ is referred to as a source 
of information that American or British journalists describe in news stories. The 
range of AJ-sourced information includes: contents from Al-Jazeera’s own news 
stories and non-news programs, Al-Jazeera’s broadcast of the material originally 
produced by a third party such as Al Qaeda, and comments from an Al-Jazeera 
employee interviewed by American or British journalists. 
2. AJ as subject of media-mediated debate. In this addressing mode, AJ is mentioned 
as a subject of a media-constructed debate, in which a variety of sources are 
directly or indirectly quoted as commenting on Al-Jazeera itself or other actor’s 
behavior toward Al-Jazeera. The range of AJ-related subjects covers the 
characteristics of Al-Jazeera as a news organization, the quality of AJ-sourced 
information, the conduct of employees at Al-Jazeera, and the behavior of other 
actors, including the U.S. government and military, toward Al-Jazeera. 
3. AJ as normative issue of journalism. In this addressing mode, AJ is mentioned in 
the context of raising a normative issue, by which a variety of themes related to 
norms of journalism or philosophies of news media can be invoked by either the 
reporter, a source quoted by the reporter, or the writer of an opinion piece. These 
AJ-related normative themes reflect underlying notions such as society’s respect 
for media freedom, media responsibility codified into professional conduct, the 
developmental function of the Third World media, and the role of media as an 
alternative outlet of news and views.  
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These three AJ-addressing modes are the key features of the media discourse in 
the U.S. and British newspapers on which this research project concentrates in 
developing a set of research questions. For convenience, from now on, the researcher will 
call these addressing modes AJ as source, AJ as subject and AJ as normative issue, 
respectively, except when specifying their full names would be helpful for clarification. 
For this study’s research, the concept of AJ as source plays a guiding role in 
identifying and examining the kind of media content that incorporates some information 
sourced from Al-Jazeera, while both concepts of AJ as subject and AJ as normative issue 
are useful for analyzing the kind of media content that describes, favorably or 
unfavorably, either the news organization Al-Jazeera or the conduct of other actors 
toward Al-Jazeera. For the purpose of analysis, the difference between AJ as subject and 
AJ as normative issue is that, while the former focuses on the matter of who is quoted in 
media discourse about Al-Jazeera, the latter is concerned with the matter of what is said 
about Al-Jazeera, either by the reporter/writer or those quoted.  
 
STATEMENT OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Based on all of the discussions laid out so far, the researcher developed the 
following research questions: 
  
1. During the Bush administration’s “War on Terror” period, what were the 
characteristics of the media discourse with AJ as a source of information in the 
U.S. and British elite press? In other words, what kind of information was 
selected from Al-Jazeera by the two countries’ journalists for news reporting? 
How were editorial policy and national context related to use of information 
sourced from Al-Jazeera? 
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2. What were the characteristics of the media discourse that addressed AJ as a 
subject of the media-mediated debate in the U.S. and British press? In other 
words, who was quoted by the two countries’ journalists as expressing views 
about Al-Jazeera and other actors’ behavior toward Al-Jazeera? How were 
editorial policy and national context related to the extent to which the two 
countries’ journalists quoted official sources and non-official sources for news 
reporting? 
3. What were the characteristics of the media discourse that addressed AJ as a 
normative issue of journalism in the U.S. and British press? In other words, what 
kinds of normative themes were invoked in describing Al-Jazeera and the other 
actors’ behavior toward Al-Jazeera in news stories and opinion pieces? How were 
editorial policy and national context related to the kinds of normative themes 
invoked? 
 
In short, the three research questions stated above address potential differences 
among the two countries’ pro-war and anti-war news outlets, in terms of (1) what AJ says 
as a source, (2) who speaks about AJ as a subject, and (3) what is said about AJ as a 
normative issue. The next chapter describes the methods employed in the research 
project, including data selection, the development of coding schemes, and the coding 
procedure for a series of content analyses conducted. In particular, for the purpose of 
examining the three types of AJ-addressing media discourse, three key variables will be 





In this chapter, the description of the research methods are divided into three 
steps: (1) raw data gathering and initial data sorting, (2) an article-unit analysis of AJ-
sourced content, and (3) two sessions of analyses of AJ-evaluative content. The 
examination of AJ-evaluative content involved two separate coding procedures, one for a 
source-unit analysis and the other for a theme-unit analysis. The three sessions of coding 
in the second and third steps of research (an article-unit analysis of AJ-sourced content, a 
source-unit analysis of AJ-evaluative content, and a theme-unit analysis of AJ-evaluative 
content) correspond to the researcher’s aim to analyze three modes of AJ-related media 
discourse — specifically, media discourse addressing AJ as source, subject, and 
normative issue, respectively.  
 
 
DATA SELECTION AND INITIAL DATA CATEGORIZATION 
For a comparative content analysis, four prestigious newspapers were selected: 
the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times from the United States, and the Daily 
Telegraph and the Guardian from the Great Britain. For simplicity, from now on, these 
four newspapers are denoted in an abbreviated form: the Journal, the Times, the 
Telegraph, and the Guardian, respectively. Of these newspapers, the Journal and the 
Telegraph editorially supported the U.S.-led military campaigns in Iraq, whereas the 
Times and the Guardian editorially opposed their governments’ decision of going to war 
(See the Introduction for more on their editorial stances). In addition, articles from the 
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Sunday Telegraph and the Observer, the sister Sunday weeklies of the Telegraph and the 
Guardian respectively, were also collected and compiled into their respective affiliated 
dailies’ contents. The sister weeklies just mentioned are generally regarded as the Sunday 
versions of their related dailies. The inclusion of the Sunday editions was done to make a 
fair comparison between the U.S. and the British papers in the number of stories 
published throughout the entire week. 
Content analysis data were gathered from two online news databases, Factiva and 
Lexis-Nexis. Except for the Times stories, all articles published by the newspapers were 
collected from Factiva. Since the stories published by the Times were not accessible at 
Factiva, the Lexis-Nexis database was instead used for the retrieval of the Times data. 
Using the search words “al-jazeera” and “al jazeera,” the researcher retrieved both news 
stories (straight news stories, news analyses, and features) and opinion pieces (editorials, 
columns, and letters to the editor pieces) from the two online databases.   
The time period for research was set up between September 11, 2001 and 
December 31, 2003, beginning with the World Trade Center attacks in 2001 and ending 
around the time when U.S. authorities announced the arrest of Saddam Hussein in mid-
December of 2003. As a matter of fact, the researcher retrieved all articles that had been 
published by the four newspapers since the launching of the Al-Jazeera channel in 
November 1994, including stories dated prior to 9/11. Nevertheless, because the number 
of the pre-9/11 stories retrieved was very small, this study concentrates on analyzing the 
post-9/11 media content, except when a comparison between the pre-9/11 data and the 
post-9/11 data would show meaningful findings. 
After a series of online searches were conducted, a total of 1,177 articles (1,073 
published after 9/11) were collected at Factiva and Lexis-Nexis. Table 1 shows the 
overview of articles retrieved from the four news outlets. Worthy of note is that, as 
Table 1: Overview of Raw Data Initially Retrieved 
Pro-war Paper Anti-war Paper
Raw Data Type Journal Telegraph Times Guardian 
News story with 
substantial lengtha
   66.1%    81.5%    79.0%    74.0% 
News story without 
substantial length 
13.2   3.4   3.4   3.6 
Opinion piece, except 
letter-to-the-editor 
20.7 13.7 13.7 20.1 











aNews story more than 150 words 
bFigures may not add up to totals because of fractional weighting and rounding. 
presented in Table 1, the number of articles retrieved was larger from the two countries’ 
anti-war newspapers (i.e., the Times and the Guardian) than from the other hawkish 
newspapers (i.e., the WJ Journal and the Telegraph). Table 1 also shows, from each 
newspaper, both the number of news stories with more than 150 words and of opinion 
pieces excluding letters to the editor. Although the extremely short news stories  
and letters-to-the-editor pieces were included during the entire coding stages, the 
researcher will later concentrate on presenting findings based on the analysis of post-9/11 
articles having substantial lengths.  
The initial raw data included any story containing the keyword, regardless of the 
context in which the word occurred. Using the individual article as a unit of analysis, the 
researcher created a preliminary coding protocol in order to determine different types of 
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raw data, according to the context in which Al-Jazeera is addressed in an article. As a 
result, four types of articles were identified in the following manner: 
  
(1) Article only with AJ-sourced content was assigned to the news stories (i.e., 
straight news stories, news analyses, and features) in which the reporter identified either 
the news channel Al-Jazeera, an individual affiliated with Al-Jazeera, or some material 
broadcasted by Al-Jazeera, as a source of information.  
(2) Article only with AJ-evaluative content was assigned to the report or opinion 
pieces in which either the reporter, any source quoted by the reporter (for news stories), 
or the writer (for opinion pieces), showed a positive, negative, or mixed tone in 
describing or commenting on either Al-Jazeera, an individual affiliated with Al-Jazeera, 
or some material broadcasted by Al-Jazeera, or the behavior of another actor toward Al-
Jazeera. 
(3) Article with both types of contents was assigned to the news stories that met 
the conditions for both the first and the second categories. 
(4) Article without any type of content was assigned to the news stories or opinion 
pieces that did not meet the conditions for any of the prior categories. 
 
For further clarification, the articles classified into the category of either (1), (2), 
or (3) altogether can be thought of as constituting the media discourse that involves at 
least one of the three AJ-addressing modes laid out in the previous chapter, namely, AJ as 
source, AJ as subject, and AJ as normative issue. Specifically, the articles containing AJ-
sourced content — article type (1) or (3) — can be thought of as the media discourse 
addressing AJ as source, while the articles containing AJ-evaluative content — article 
type (2) or (3) — can be thought of as the media discourse addressing AJ either as subject 
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or as normative issue. In contrast, articles assigned to article type (4) were treated as 
irrelevant to the purpose of this study and were thus excluded from further coding 
procedures. 
Using this coding scheme, two graduate students participated in the task of sorting 
out the initially retrieved raw data into one of the four categories listed above. The 
specific instructions that the coders received in order to identify AJ-sourced content and 
AJ-evaluative content are described in Appendix B. Reliability across the two coders was 
assessed on a sample of 100 randomly selected articles from the four newspapers. 
Letters-to-the-editor pieces and news stories shorter than 151 words were not included in 
the sample, because the researcher wanted to perform a reliability test on articles with 
substantial lengths. The inter-coder agreement reached 87% (Cohen’s Kappa= .82). 
These figures are also presented in Appendix A. 
The results of the initial data categorization are given in Table 2. The figures 
indicate that, as already mentioned above, there was a discrepancy in the size of raw data 
between the pro-war and anti-war newspaper groups. When comparing the proportions of 
different article types between the newspapers that held editorially similar positions, there 
was a somewhat noticeable difference between the Journal and the Telegraph. The 
Journal marked a lower percentage (indeed, the lowest of the four newspapers) of articles 
only with AJ-sourced content. Given that the Telegraph showed the highest percentage 
on the same article type from all of the newspapers, a somewhat contrasting pattern can 
be found within the pro-war newspaper group. By both standards of frequency and 
proportion, the Journal was the least likely to relay the information coming from Al-
Jazeera for news reporting in a neutral manner.  
Of the four types of articles sorted, all articles that included either AJ-sourced 
content or AJ-evaluative content — article types (1), (2), and (3) — were used in  
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Table 2: Presence of AJ-sourced and AJ-evaluative Contents in Raw Data 
Pro-war Paper Anti-war Paper 
Article Type Journal Telegraph Times Guardian 
Only with AJ-sourced content    27.6%    36.6%    34.6%    32.7% 
Only with AJ-evaluative content 30.5 28.3 24.4 29.1 
With both types of content  9.8 13.7  8.1  9.3 
Without any type of content 32.2 21.5 32.9 28.9 
Total 










further steps of content analysis. Throughout the steps of the coding procedure, three 
coding schemes were used, with the one intended for coding of AJ-sourced content and 
the other two developed for coding of AJ-evaluative content. In developing these coding 
schemes, of prime importance was the task of constructing measures of three key 
variables, namely, AJ-as-source topic, AJ-as-subject source, and AJ-as-issue theme. 
Specifically, the measure of AJ-as-source topic was arranged to analyze the AJ-sourced 
content, and the measures of AJ-as-subject source and AJ-as-issue theme were created to 
analyze the AJ-evaluative content. These measures of the three variables were vital in 
answering RQ 1, 2, and 3, all of which were set up to examine the media discourse 
involving the three AJ-addressing modes (i.e., AJ as source, AJ as subject, and AJ as 
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normative issue) in the media discourse across the pro-war and anti-war newspapers of 
the two countries.  
The following sections describe two consecutive steps of the whole content 
analysis procedure taken in this research. The former step involved use of a coding 
protocol for an analysis of AJ-sourced content, while the latter step involved use of two 
coding protocols for a series of analyses of AJ-evaluative content.  
 
ARTICLE-UNIT ANALYSIS OF AJ-SOURCED CONTENT 
To answer RQ 1, concerning the content diversity of AJ-sourced information in 
news discourse, an article-unit content analysis was conducted on the news material 
containing AJ-sourced content — that is, the group of news stories classified into type (1) 
or (3) — in the four newspapers. The coding scheme employed in this step included 
measures of one key variable, AJ-as-source topic, and two additional variables, content 
importance and voice within AJ-sourced content. Below are specific categories arranged 
for each of these variables:   
 
AJ-as-source Topic. Various categories for this variable were initially created and finally 
collapsed into the following eight major categories: 
 
(1) Messages from U.S. enemy: Information obtained from Al-Jazeera’s broadcast 
of statements by oppositional leaders, including (a) Osama bin Laden and other Al-Qaeda 
leaders, and (b) Taliban leaders, and officials of the Saddam Hussein regime. 
(2) Military developments: Information obtained from Al-Jazeera’s news content 
about, or an Al-Jazeera reporter’s comments on, the military conflicts in Afghanistan and 
in Iraq.   
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(3) Showing of dead/captured soldiers: Information obtained from Al-Jazeera’s 
broadcast of the footage that shows either U.S. servicemen or women in Iraqi captivity or 
dead bodies of U.S. or other Coalition troops.    
(4) Civilian damage: Information obtained from Al-Jazeera’s coverage of civilian 
damage that occurred in either Afghanistan, Iraq, or a zone affected by the U.S./Coalition 
forces, except the violent conflicts between Israel and Palestine (For this case, refer to the 
fifth category). 
(5) Regional Affairs/opinions. Information obtained from Al-Jazeera’s news 
content regarding either (a) an incident related to Israel-Palestinian conflicts, which may 
involve civilian damage, and (b) other regional affairs or Arab/Muslim opinions 
concerned with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or U.S. foreign policy.11
(6) Performance of Al-Jazeera. Information obtained from staffs or other 
employees at Al-Jazeera, regarding the performance of the news organization itself or 
other Arab media   
(7) Threat to Al-Jazeera activity. Information obtained from Al-Jazeera’s news 
content or Al-Jazeera employee’s statements regarding an incident that can be interpreted 
as a threat to Arab media freedom, whether it is (a) U.S.-involved or (b) not.  
(8) Others. Information obtained from Al-Jazeera’s broadcast or an Al-Jazeera 
employee’s statements, which is unrelated to any of the prior categories.   
 
Content importance. During the preliminary content analysis, the researcher felt it 
necessary to control for the importance of AJ-sourced content in a news story. In some 
 
11For coding of Arab opinions cited from Al-Jazeera, the researcher did not distinguish between Arab 
opinions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and on the U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, because the 
“Arab-oriented” views coming through Al-Jazeera tended to associate the Palestinian problem with the 
current U.S. intervention in the Arab world and therefore it was usually difficult to distinguish between the 
two discussion topics.  
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cases Al-Jazeera was cited as a primary source in breaking news stories or other articles 
featuring the Arabic TV station, while in other cases the portion citing Al-Jazeera was 
negligible in the story because the source was mentioned briefly in a passing manner.     
The measure of content importance was constructed in terms of three degrees: 
high, medium, and low. For coding decisions, the location, the quantity, and the 
informational value of the AJ-sourced content in a story were considered as a composite. 
Specifically, the content importance was rated as high when the news organization Al-
Jazeera or its employee was treated as either the first source in a breaking news story or a 
primary source in a news analysis or a feature. In contrast, the content importance was 
rated low when (a) the AJ-sourced content had a full length of no more than one 
paragraph and, at the same time, (b) either the content was located only at the end of the 
news story, or it briefly described some “old” information that was covered previously. 
Finally, the content importance was rated medium when the importance of the AJ-
sourced content did not fit in any of the two prior categories and was therefore seen as 
falling somewhere between the two opposing ends.  
     
Voice within AJ-sourced Content. In addition, a list of categories was created to identify 
a variety of “voices,” that is, those whom American and British journalists cited in the 
context of relaying either news content from Al-Jazeera or comments offered by Al-
Jazeera employees. The most noticeable example of the voices within AJ-sourced content 
is Osama bin Laden, who chose Al-Jazeera as an outlet for releasing his pre-recorded 
statements to the Arab world and other regions of the world. Other examples include the 
Arab/Muslim voices which were originally aired by Al-Jazeera and then secondhand-
cited by American or British journalists for their news reporting. There are also cases in 
which Al-Jazeera’s own voices — voices of Al-Jazeera representatives and other 
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employees — were cited in news stories as uttering their own views about some issues in 
the Arab/Muslim world, rather than narrating news of the day during regular TV 
programs. In order to code all of these voices found in AJ-sourced content, various 
categories were initially suggested and finally collapsed into five major categories as 
follows:  
       
(1) U.S. Enemy. Osama bin Laden and other leading members of the Al-Qaeda 
network, leaders of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and officials of the Hussein regime 
in Iraq. 
(2) Al-Jazeera employees, not during their news programs. Al-Jazeera 
representatives, reporters, staffs, and other individuals affiliated with the news 
organization, not in the context of describing the content of a news program aired by Al-
Jazeera but in other context (e.g., being interviewed by a U.S. or British reporter).  
(3) Palestinian/radical Muslim leaders. Officials of the Palestinian Authority and 
leaders of Palestinian factions, such as Hamas, and of Islamic militant groups (Al-Qaeda 
members are excluded here). 
(4) Other Arab/Western Muslims. Other Arab Muslims and Muslim residents in 
the United States and Europe, including both Arab elites and ordinary people. 
(5) Others. Other sources quoted within the AJ-sourced content. 
 
In constructing the categories listed above, the researcher separated the category 
of “Palestinian leaders” and “radical Arabs/Muslims” from the category of other non-
enemy voices in the Arab world. This distinction was intended to efficiently capture 
potential differences between the pro-war and anti-war newspapers in delivering radical 
voices in the Arab world via Al-Jazeera. Given that the violent conflicts between 
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Palestine and Israel exacerbated during the “War on Terror,” the question of whether the 
news gate in the U.S. and British press opened to radical Palestinian and Arab/Muslim 
voices by way of the Arabic news outlet seemed to be meaningful for the matter of 
judging how seriously the U.S. and British journalists treated Al-Jazeera, not only as a 
conduit of enemy propaganda but also as a source of alternative points of view from the 
Arab world.  
 
The coding protocol used in the article-unit content analysis includes measures of 
other variables, such as time period and article length (See Appendix B and C for details). 
Using the coding scheme described thus far, three graduate students, not including those 
who participated in the initial data categorization, conducted the coding task on the news 
stories that contained AJ-sourced content. A reliability test was performed on a sample of 
75 randomly selected articles in which only news stories longer than 150 words were 
included. For the three main measures described above, the average percentages of inter-
coder agreement ranged between 85% and 90% (Cohen’s Kappa ranging between 0.81 
and 0.86). Specific figures are presented in Appendix A.  
 
ANALYSIS OF AJ-EVALUATIVE CONTENT 
After the news material including AJ-sourced content was analyzed, the next step 
was the examination of AJ-evaluative content in media discourse. This step consisted of 
two coding tasks, the one relevant to RQ 2, and the other relevant to RQ 3. For RQ 2, the 
primary concern was the journalistic selection of sources who were allowed access to the 
debate of matters related to Al-Jazeera. For RQ 3, at the heart of issue was the invocation 
of normative themes in media descriptions of Al-Jazeera and its related issues, such as 
Al-Jazeera’s controversial approach to war coverage and the U.S. military’s alleged 
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misconduct toward Al-Jazeera. To answer RQ 2 and RQ 3, two key variables were 
arranged for measurement: AJ-as-subject source and AJ-as-issue theme.  
Considering that one news story (or opinion piece) may contain multiple AJ-as-
subject sources as well as multiple AJ-as-issue themes, the measurement of these AJ-
related variables involved use of two coding schemes, the one designed for source-unit 
coding of AJ-as-subject source and the other intended for theme-unit coding of AJ-as-




A source-unit coding scheme was developed to examine the news stories that 
were classified into article type (2) or (3) through the initial data categorization. Opinion 
pieces were excluded in this analysis since they were not relevant to the examination of 
sourcing patterns in news reporting. The coding scheme rests on one key variable and 
two additional variables, namely, AJ-as-subject source, news context, and source tone. 
Specific categories for each of these variables are described below. 
 
AJ-as-subject Source. This type of source covers a range of sources, named or unnamed, 
who were directly or indirectly cited as those expressing their views on such subjects as 
the characteristics of Al-Jazeera, the content of some news material aired by Al-Jazeera, 
the conduct of Al-Jazeera employees, or the conduct of other (governmental) actors 
toward the news organization. Purely factual statements about Al-Jazeera offered by a 
source were ignored. When a source commented on the material released by a third party 
via Al-Jazeera news channel (e.g., Osama bin Laden’s pre-recorded statements), it was 
accepted as an AJ-as-subject source unless his/her comments specifically targeted the 
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original producer of the message, not the messenger. In addition, a source was also 
treated as addressing AJ as subject when the source’s evaluation, even though it did not 
directly involve Al-Jazeera, “contextually” favored or disfavored it by affectively 
describing either other news media by comparison or other actor’s conduct toward the 
Arabic news organization.  
For classification, five categories of AJ-as-subject source were used: (1) 
U.S./British government/military officials, (2) U.S./British others, (3) Al-Jazeera 
employees, (4) Arab/Muslim others, and (5) others. For clarification, the third category, 
Al-Jazeera employees, was applied when an individual affiliated with Al-Jazeera was 
cited as a voice commenting on the news organization itself or some issue involving Al-
Jazeera. However, an Al-Jazeera anchor or reporter was not treated as an AJ-as-subject 
source when the news story mentioned the person only in the context of describing the 
content of a news program aired by Al-Jazeera.12 It is also worthy of a note that 
Arab/Muslim residents in the United States or European countries were classified into the 
fourth category of Arab/Muslim others, not into the second category of U.S./British 
others. This coding decision was made on the basis that ordinary residents in Muslim 
local communities were typically cited in news discourse as viewers of the Arabic news 
channel.  
In actual coding, while the principle of source-unit coding was maintained, an 
adjustment was made to enhance coder reliability. Specifically, a unique source was 
counted only once per article, regardless of the quantity of the quotation (i.e., the portion 
 
12For further information, when an AJ-as-subject source was identified as Al-Jazeera employees, it 
happened because the quotation from this source met both conditions of AJ-sourced content and AJ-
evaluative content. Not all views coming from Al-Jazeera employees, however, were accepted as AJ-
evaluative content. Only when the remarks offered by an Al-Jazeera employee were directed toward his/her 
own news organization or the behavior of other actor toward the news outlet, the individual was accepted 
as an AJ-as-subject source. Otherwise, the quotation from an Al-Jazeera employee was treated only as AJ-
sourced content. 
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allotted to the utterance of an AJ-related view) from the unique source. However, when 
there existed in a news story multiple unique AJ-as-subject sources, all of whom were 
codable into the same category, all of these sources were counted. For example, if the 
news story had three relevant quotes from the U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld and two relevant quotes from the British Prime Minister Tony Blair, two 
sources were coded from the story on the category of U.S./British government/military 
officials.  
  
AJ-as-subject Source Tone. In addition, the tone of voice uttered by an AJ-as-subject 
source was measured per AJ-as-subject source in one of the following terms: (1) 
favorable or contextually favorable, (2) unfavorable or contextually unfavorable, and (3) 
mixed or unclear. Here, the term “contextually favorable (or unfavorable)” is applied to 
the case in which the source in question did not directly engage in the evaluation of Al-
Jazeera but, by making a value judgment about either other news media in comparison or 
another actor’s conduct toward the Al-Jazeera, gave “contextually” an advantageous (or 
disadvantageous) statement toward the Arabic news organization. 
 
News Context. This measure was introduced to examine the parameters of news 
discourse that governed both the selection and the gravity of cited voices that uttered AJ-
related views. As already noted in the theoretical review (Chapter 2), throughout the 
period included in this research, a series of unexpected events was triggered by the 
performance of Al-Jazeera, and U.S. and British government and military officials played 
“catch-up” with those developments to keep the situation under control. Given the media 
tendency of relying on official sources in coverage of foreign policy, the two countries’ 
reporters may have willfully followed their government leads or simply bowed to the 
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post-9/11 political pressure of patriotism. It is also possible, however, that the continuing 
performance of Al-Jazeera, along with a number of its associated controversies, may have 
licensed the journalists to employ the maverick news outlet as a challenging “news icon” 
(Bennett & Lawrence, 1995; Lawrence, 1996) and thereby bring nonmainstream voices, 
especially those of Arab media workers and members of Arab/Muslim audiences, into the 
media-constructed public forum.   
These alternate possibilities, each of which might have been realized to different 
degrees across the newspapers under examination, prompted the researcher to identify 
two patterns of news context: beats-oriented news and icon-driven news. Since the 
coding decision here is essentially article-based, multiple AJ-as-subject sources cited in a 
news story were classified into the same category, that is, one of the following:  
 
(1) Beats-oriented news. A news story was assigned to this category when the 
predominant voices in the story originated from government- or military-controlled beats, 
including both the regular ones anchored in “routine politics” and the temporary ones set 
up by the U.S. Central Command at Doha during the military campaigns in Iraq. This 
type of news context does not necessarily mean that the first-appearing source in the 
news story should be an official voice. Even when a news story began with a mention of 
a news report or a piece of material broadcast by Al-Jazeera, the story was coded as 
beats-oriented news if the coverage concentrated on depicting the reactions or responses 
from U.S./British government or military officials, rather than delivering the actual 
content of the cited material. A battle report was also classified into this category when it 
was clear or easily inferable that the prevailing portion of war information came from the 
U.S./British military or intelligence services.   
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(2) Icon-driven news. A news story was assigned to this category when the 
dominant portion of those voicing a perspective came from either Al-Jazeera employees, 
ordinary members of Arab/Muslim audiences of the news channel, or Arab media 
professionals and experts commenting on the news organization. Typically, icon-driven 
coverage occurs when the journalist either (a) pays a visit to the facilities of Al-Jazeera to 
observe staff members working there and listen to their views about the news 
organization and other concerns, (b) goes to the “Arab street” or a Muslim local 
community to meet ordinary citizens who utilize their viewing experiences of Al-Jazeera 
channel in expressing their concerns and perspectives, or (c) consults with Arab media 
professionals and regional experts to gain insights regarding Al-Jazeera’s regional and 
global impacts as well as their related issues. Although icon-driven reporting does not 
require the exclusion of American and British official sources in picking up competing 
points of view, in order for a news story to be assigned to this category, the official 
voices, if present, should be marginal in the overall tone of the story. 
(3) Other/unclear news context. A news story was assigned to this category when 
the story in question did not fit in any of the two prior categories. Specifically, this 
category was applied either (a) when any group of voices mentioned above did appear but 
did not dominate in news discourse and therefore it was hard to choose between the two 
types of news context, or (b) when the news story highlighted other kinds of voices or 
topics and therefore neither of the two news contexts seemed relevant to the news 
discourse in question.  
 
Theme-unit analysis 
Finally, for all the news stories or opinion pieces including AJ-evaluative content, 
a theme-unit coding scheme was established. The main components of the coding scheme 
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were measures of AJ-as-issue theme and story tone. Below are the descriptions of the two 
measures.  Below are the descriptions of the two measures.   
 
AJ-as-issue Theme. This type of theme was defined by two requirements: (1) the theme 
should be applied to evaluation of either Al-Jazeera (including an individual affiliated 
with Al-Jazeera and output from Al-Jazeera) or another actor whose interaction with the 
network was brought into focus, and (2) the theme should reflect some “normative” ideas 
about news media, not purely performance-based evaluations (e.g., journalistic scoop or 
business-related assessment). 
The AJ-as-issue theme list consisted of 14 theme categories, 7 positive and 7 
negative. Each theme group (positive or negative) had 4 norm-based theme categories 
(which were further divided into subcategories), 2 interaction-based theme categories, 
and 1 “other/unspecific” theme category. First, tapping into the discussion of normative 
media models in the literature review, the researcher determined four cultural norms 
underlying the media discussion of Al-Jazeera: (1) free/independent media status, (2) 
professional reporting/responsible conduct, (3) developmental/educational media 
function, and (4) alternative media role. For each norm category, two subcategories were 
arranged as specific criteria based on which Al-Jazeera (including an individual affiliated 
with Al-jazeera and output from Al-Jazeera) could be positively or negatively evaluated 
(Therefore, the four norm-based theme categories were divided into eight subcategories, 
each of which provided positive and negative forms of evaluation). Second, the 
researcher was also interested in examining how the U.S. and British press characterized 
and emphasized particular types of interaction between Al-Jazeera and outside actors. 
Two interaction-based theme categories were identified: target of bullying and enemy 
propaganda tool themes. On a situational basis, the former theme was considered 
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positive, while the latter theme was considered negative. For each interaction-based 
theme, its “rebuttal” was arranged as an oppositional form of evaluation. In addition, the 
unspecific/other theme category also had positive and negative versions of evaluations.  
Below are brief descriptions of the AJ-as-issue theme list. For convenience, all 
themes are presented only in a positive form of evaluation except the enemy propaganda 
tool theme. For this theme, the original form of theme invocation (not the “rebuttal” 
form) involved a negative evaluation:  
 
(1) Free/independent media status. Originating from the libertarian normative 
theory of the press, this norm-based category had two subcategories: (a) free press 
without outside control, which was assigned to the themes that described Al-Jazeera in 
terms of editorial freedom without government censorship or other characteristics 
suggesting media independence from outside control; and (b) adversary to authoritarian 
regimes, which was applied to the themes that underscored Al-Jazeera’s watchdog role of 
monitoring and challenging the actions of the powerful in authoritarian regimes of the 
pan-Arab world.  
(2) Professional reporting/responsible conduct. This group of themes reflects the 
normative media theory of social responsibility as well as the professional codes of 
journalism. Two subcategories were (a) professional/balanced news reporting, which 
was applied to the themes that favorably described Al-Jazeera’s approach in news 
reporting (or the quality of its news content) using such terms as objectivity, neutrality, 
impartiality, fairness, or lack of bias; (b) non-sensational/ethical handling of graphic 
information, which was applied to the themes that favorably described the graphic nature 
of material broadcast by Al-Jazeera (or its decision regarding whether or not to broadcast 
sensitive images) on the basis of non-sensationalism (e.g., “not emotive”; “not rating-
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driven”; “meeting public taste”) or ethical concerns (e.g., withholding of sensitive 
information that might reveal personal identities).  
(3) Developmental/educational media function. This group of themes, rooted in a 
developmental view of news media as an educator enlightening the public or enhancing 
the conditions of non-Western communities, had two subcategories: (a) catalyst for Arab 
democracy, which was applied to the themes that praised the function, role, or impact of 
Al-Jazeera as either a promoter of free and open debate or an advocate of democratic 
reforms in the Arab/Muslim world; (b) educator of pro-U.S./Western views, which was 
applied to the themes that mentioned Al-Jazeera’s efforts to counter anti-U.S./Western 
extremism or tell its audience some “good things” about U.S./Western societies. 
(4) Alternative media role. This group of themes is based on an extension into a 
global context of radical thinking about news media as a means of bringing non-
mainstream ideas into the public arena and thereby challenging the hegemony of power 
holders. Two subcategories were (a) source of oppressed news/views, which was assigned 
to the themes that invoked the role or impact of Al-Jazeera as a source of nonmainsteam 
“Arab-oriented” news and marginalized Arab/Muslim voices, and (b) antidote of Western 
bias, which was applied to the themes that suggested the justifiability of Al-Jazeera’s 
approach by contrasting it against some problematic aspects of U.S./Western media 
discourses or stereotypes dominant in Western society.  
(5) Target of bullying and (6) enemy propaganda tool. Unlike the norm-based 
themes, two interaction-based theme categories were determined on the basis of media 
presentation of a particular type of interaction between Al-Jazeera and outside forces: the 
target of bullying category was assigned to the themes that described Al-Jazeera in a 
sympathetic tone by suggesting that this news organization (or an individual affiliated 
with the organization) was being threatened by some intimidating action of an outside 
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actor; the enemy propaganda tool theme was applied to the themes that described Al-
Jazeera in a negative tone by suggesting either the connection with a U.S. enemy group 
(e.g., “bin Laden’s mouthpiece”) or the absence of journalistic integrity (e.g., “liar”; 
“false reporting”) for the purpose of serving enemy interests.  
(7) Other/unspecific. This theme category was applied when the linguistic 
expression involved a positive evaluation of Al-Jazeera but the basis for the evaluation 
was unacceptably “irrational” (e.g., a praise of Al-Jazeera for serving enemy interests) or 
too ambiguous to determine (e.g., “the best news organization in the world”; “good 
guys”). Similarly, the negative version of this category was applied when a negative 
evaluation of Al-Jazeera was identifiable but the basis for the evaluation was deemed 
irrational or too ambiguous to determine (e.g., “Al-Jazeera viewers just happen to be U.S. 
haters.”; “the news channel doesn’t seem good.”). 
  
Since on the same normative basis Al-Jazeera may be praised (e.g., “Al-Jazeera is 
an independent news outlet”) or criticized (e.g., “Al-Jazeera is not as independent as it 
seems”), all the themes found were coded as either “positive” or “negative.” For the 
norm-based theme categories, coding of a negative theme happened when either (1) the 
assertion in question involved linguistic elements that were interpreted as contrary to the 
meaning of a positive theme (e.g., “state-owned media” contrary to “free media”), or (2) 
a positive theme was invoked but was immediately refuted (e.g., “the claim that Al-
Jazeera is an independent news outlet is not true”) 13. For the enemy propaganda tool 
theme, as stated above, the original form of theme invocation was coded negative, while 
 
13Strictly speaking, both of the two coding instructions were employed to identify negative AJ-as-issue 
themes for the first three norm-based categories (free/independent, professional/responsible, and 
developmental/educational media). As regards the fourth norm-based category (alternative media), 
however, the researcher found that only the second instruction (the rebuttal of a positive theme) was 
sufficient for identifying a theme in a negative form.   
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the rebuttal of the theme was coded positive. In the coding process, for each passage 
containing AJ-evaluative content, coders judged the presence of any unique AJ-as-issue 
theme codable into one of the theme categories listed above. While the unit of coding was 
a unique theme, coders counted the same theme subcategory within a single story a 
maximum of three times per article. This constraint was intended both to secure reliable 
coding and to control for a handful of extremely long articles (that is, “outliers” in article 
length) that invoked the same kind of themes in a repetitive manner throughout the story. 
Other detailed coding instructions were offered to enhance inter-coder reliability.14
 
Story Tone. As an additional measure, the tone of the entire article toward Al-Jazeera 
was coded in the following manner: (1) favorable or contextually favorable, (2) 
unfavorable or contextually unfavorable, (3) mixed or unclear. Since the coding decision 
here is essentially article-based, multiple AJ-as-issue themes invoked in a news story 
were classified into the same category. As for the term contextually favorable (or 
unfavorable), the same coding instructions were applied as were used in the measurement 
of AJ-as-subject source tone. 
 
 
14Specific coding instructions covered other issues: when a linguistic expression was found to reflect one 
of the four major norms (e.g., “Al-Jazeera is a professional news organization,” which reflects the 
professional/responsible media category) but was too ambiguous to determine which theme subcategory 
would be relevant, the assertion was assigned to the first subcategory within the norm (e.g., for the previous 
example, the professional/balanced news reporting subcategory), based on the assumption that the first 
subcategory for each norm represents the common interpretation of the underlying normative idea. In 
addition, when some thematic elements were found within a quotation, a coding decision was made as to 
the inferable intention of the writer. If the writer cited a source in a favorable or neutral fashion, the 
presence of a theme within the quote was accepted. If the writer expressed doubts about or rebutted the 
source’s claim, the thematic elements within the quote were ignored (when doubted) or were interpreted as 
constituting a theme in the opposite direction (when rebutted).  
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Extra Remarks on Analysis of AJ-evaluative Content 
The two coding schemes described thus far, the one intended for source-unit 
coding and the other for theme-unit coding, included measures of additional variables, 
such as time period and article length (See Appendix D and E for details of the two 
coding schemes respectively). Aided by these coding protocols, two sessions of content 
analyses were conducted. Of the four graduate students who participated in the article-
unit content analysis, two students were assigned to source-unit coding, and the other two 
students were assigned to theme-unit coding.  
For each of the two coding tasks, inter-coder reliability was assessed on a sample 
of 50 randomly selected articles in which one or the other coder recorded the presence of 
at least one AJ-as-subject source (for the source-unit analysis) or one AJ-as-issue theme 
(for the theme-unit analysis). For source-unit coding, the percentages of inter-coder 
agreement among the three measures ranged from 87% to 92% (Cohen’s Kappa ranging 
between .82 and .88), and, for the part of theme-unit coding, the percentages of inter-
coder agreement for the two measures were 86% and 85%, respectively (Cohen’s Kappa 





This chapter presents findings from a series of content analyses, which were 
conducted as described in Chapter 3, and compares the nature of the media discourse 
related to Al-Jazeera in the U.S. and British major newspapers that held different editorial 
policies toward the post-9/11 U.S. foreign policy. Here the main references for the 
comparison are the editorial policy (pro-war versus anti-war) of a news organization and 
the national context (U.S. versus British) for the practice of wartime journalism.  
 
OVERVIEW OF CONTENT ANALYSIS DATA 
Table 3 provides an overview of the raw data throughout the entire research 
period, which was divided into six sub-periods. Each of these sub-periods was labeled so 
as to refer to the main event characteristic of the period. Below is a brief description of 
the sub-periods: 
 
1. Pre-9/11 (12/27/1998 ~ 09/10/2001). Al-Jazeera began its service in November of 
1996. From the data gathered from the four newspapers, the earliest article 
containing the keyword Al-Jazeera was found in the Times, with its publishing 
date of December 27, 1998.  
2. Afghanistan War (09/11/2001 ~ 12/31/2001). This second period runs from 9/11 
through the ending of major military campaigns in Afghanistan around the end of 
2001. On November 12, 2001, the U.S.-backed Northern Alliance, Afghanistan’s 
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opposition force of the Taliban regime, seized the Afghanistan capital of Kabul, 
and, during the following month, the Taliban’s and Al-Qaeda’s major strongholds 
fell to the Alliance. 
3. Palestinian uprising (01/01/2002 ~ 09/11/2002). While small-scale military 
combats were under way in Afghanistan, the conflict between Israelis and 
Palestinians reached a peak in the spring of 2002. In early April, facing 
Palestinians’ increasing suicide attacks, Israel launched a military operation 
named Operation Defensive Shield, which led to the re-occupation of Palestinian 
areas and the apprehension of members of Palestinian militant groups. The bloody 
violence did not abate until late summer that same year.  
4. Pre-Iraq War debate (09/12/2002 ~ 03/16/2003). On September 12, 2002, 
President George W. Bush addressed the opening of the U.N. General Assembly, 
asking the body to confront the “grave and gathering danger” of Iraq. His address 
signaled the beginning of the U.S.-initiated international debate over the war 
proposal, with France and Russia emerging as the leaders of the opposition group. 
President Bush, in his 2003 State of the Union speech, blamed Saddam Hussein 
for “not disarming,” and announced that he was ready to attack Iraq, even without 
a U.N. mandate.  
5. Iraq War (03/17/2003 ~ 05/01/2003). On March 17, 2003, President Bush gave 
Saddam Hussein and his sons 48 hours to leave Iraq or face war. Two days later, 
the invasion of Iraq began when the United States launched Operation Iraqi 
Freedom. On April 9, 2003, U.S. forces advanced into Baghdad. In the following 
days, Kurdish fighters and U.S. forces took control of the northern cities in Iraq. 
On May 1, 2003, President Bush declared an end to major combat operations in 
Iraq. 
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Table 3: Overview of Study Results by Period 
Pro-war Paper Anti-war Paper
Period Journal Telegraph Times Guardian 
News stories including AJ-sourced content 
Pre-9/11 4.6%   0.0% 6.3% 3.1% 
Post-9/11     
Afghanistan War  26.2 37.9 25.1 24.5 
Palestinian uprising 20.0 13.6 13.7 14.7 
Pre-Iraq War debate 24.6 18.4 20.0 17.2 
Iraq War 12.3 18.4 14.3 24.5 
Post-Iraq War developments 12.3 11.7 20.6 16.0 
Subtotal 95.4 100.0 93.7 96.9 
Total (N of articles) 100.0 (65) 100.0 (103) 100.0 (175) 100.0 (163)
News stories including AJ-evaluative content 
Pre-9/11 2.0 0.0 4.6 0.0 
Post-9/11     
Afghanistan War 28.6 39.4 34.5 24.2 
Palestinian uprising 12.2 7.7 11.5 6.1 
Pre-Iraq War debate 10.2 12.1 10.3 7.0 
Iraq War 32.7 28.8 23.0 40.4 
Post-Iraq War developments 14.3 12.1 16.1 22.2 
Subtotal 98.0 100.0 95.6 100.0 
Total (N of articles) 100.0 (49) 100.0 (66) 100.0 (90) 100.0 (99) 
Opinion pieces including AJ-evaluative content 
Pre-9/11 0.0 0.0 7.0 0.0 
Post-9/11     
Afghanistan War 28.6 45.0 32.6 20.0 
Palestinian uprising 9.5 5.0 9.3 8.0 
Pre-Iraq War debate 19.0 10.0 14.0 4.0 
Iraq War 23.8 20.0 30.2 56.0 
Post-Iraq War developments 19.0 20.0 7.0 12.0 
Subtotal 100.0 100.0 93.0 100.0 
Total (N of articles) 100.0 (21) 100.0 (20) 100.0 (43) 100.0 (50) 
Grand Na 118 160 274 276 
Grand N, except pre-9/11 data 115 160 258 271 
aSince some news stories were double-coded as having both AJ-sourced content and AJ-
evaluative content, the grand N is smaller than the sum of the Ns.  
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6. Post-Iraq War developments (05/02/2003 ~ 12/31/2003). During this period, the 
U.S.-backed rebuilding process began in Iraq, yet the U.S. military noticed a 
gradually increasing flurry of attacks on the coalition troops in various regions. 
On May 12, 2003, Paul Bremer took over as a U.S. civil administrator in Iraq and, 
in mid-July, Iraqi’s interim governing council was inaugurated. Meanwhile, the 
U.S. hunt of Saddam Hussein continued throughout the year. In mid-December, 
Paul Bremer announced the arrest of the former Iraqi leader.  
 
The data presented in Table 3 are divided into three classes: news stories 
including AJ-sourced content, news stories including AJ-evaluative content, and opinion 
pieces including AJ-evaluative content. With regard to the overall distribution of these 
raw data over the whole analytical period, three points can be made.  
First, the percentages in the two bottom rows labeled “grand total” and “grand 
total, except pre-9/11 data” in Table 3 show that, from all four newspapers, the 
proportions of the news stories or opinion pieces prior to 9/11 (and including either AJ-
sourced content or AJ-evaluative content) were quite low. Indeed, the Telegraph did not 
carry any pre-9/11 article including either AJ-sourced content or AJ-evaluative content. 
For the Journal and the Guardian, the percentages of their respective grand totals save 
pre-9/11 articles exceeded 97% (115 out of 118 Journal articles and 271 out of 276 
Guardian articles), therefore indicating that, from the two anti-war newspapers, the 
percentages of pre-9/11 data remained less than 3% of the grand totals. In comparison, 
the Times carried the highest number of pre-9/11 articles including either AJ-sourced 
content or AJ-evaluative content. Still, even for this newspaper, the percentage of the 
grand total save the pre-9/11 data reached around 94% (258 out of 274 Times articles). 
All of these suggest that the two countries’ media attention to Al-Jazeera was by and 
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large a post-9/11 phenomenon, mainly initiated by the dramatic appearance of Osama bin 
Laden in the Al-Jazeera news channel.  
Second, the distributions of news stories including AJ-sourced content are 
presented in the upper row section of Table 3. According to the data here, all the 
newspapers showed an early surge in the frequency during the Afghanistan War period 
(09/11/2001 ~ 12/31/2001), which lasted less than four months and began immediately 
following 9/11. It is no surprise that Al-Jazeera’s continued scoops in this period, such as 
broadcasts of Osama bin Laden’s pre-recorded statements and exclusive coverage of 
Kabul under an imminent attack, captured American and British media’s attention in their 
coverage of events and issues related to the U.S.-led “War on Terror” policy. After this 
period, the four newspapers continued to produce considerable amounts of news 
discourse that incorporated AJ-sourced content. During the Iraq War period that lasted 
about four weeks (03/17/2003 ~ 05/01/2003), the Guardian seemed to be especially 
attentive to the news content coming from Al-Jazeera, with 24.5% of Guardian stories 
appearing during this short period. On the other hand, the Times, the anti-war newspaper 
on the U.S. side, showed a steady interest in picking up information coming from Al-
Jazeera for news reporting after the major military campaigns in Iraq ended — 20.6 % of 
Times stories were found in the post-Iraq War period (05/02/2003 ~ 12/31/2003).  
Finally, about the articles including AJ-evaluative content, two sets of data are 
presented in the middle row section (for news stories) and the bottom row section (for 
opinion pieces) of Table 3. It should be noted that, since AJ-evaluative content referred to 
only non-neutral descriptions of events and issues involving Al-Jazeera, the raw data did 
not include news stories or opinion pieces that provided only event-oriented descriptions 
of Al-Jazeera in a neutral manner. Given this, the collection of the news stories and 
opinion pieces including AJ-evaluative content did not constitute a complete 
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representation of the media discourse describing all events and issues involving Al-
Jazeera. Still, the percentages in Table 3 suggests that, for all of the four news 
organizations, much of issue-oriented coverage and commentaries related to Al-Jazeera 
took place during the two relatively short periods of the U.S.-led military campaigns at 
first in Afghanistan and next in Iraq. Although some variations existed, all the 
newspapers had essentially one pattern in common (05/02/2003 ~ 12/31/2003): the 
percentages both for the news stories and the opinion pieces including AJ-evaluative 
content went up at first in the Afghanistan War period, declined afterwards, and then 
surged again in the Iraq War period. Markedly, the Guardian distributions, both for news 
stories and opinion pieces, showed particularly high percentages during the Iraq War 
period, with 40.4% of news stories and 56.0% of opinion pieces classified into this 
period. Later in this chapter, the results of an AJ-as-theme analysis will show that during 
the war in Iraq this British anti-war newspaper took an active interest in raising the kind 
of issues bringing into focus U.S. behavior toward Al-Jazeera, mainly for the purpose of 
criticizing the U.S.-led militaristic policy in the Arab/Muslim world. 
The whole scope of the raw data presented in Table 3 included all articles 
regardless of article length. The presence of extremely short articles, however, might 
distort the results of frequency-based analyses. Table 4 presents the same type of 
distributions as in Table 3, except that this time the raw data were limited to articles of 
“substantial length.” An article with substantial length was defined as, for a news story, a 
news report exceeding 150 words or, for an opinion piece, not being a letter to the editor 
piece (thus it should be an editorial or a signed column).  
When comparing the figures presented in Table 3 and in Table 4, the overall 
features in Table 4 remained largely the same as in Table 3, despite small decreases in the 
grand totals from all of the newspapers due to the exclusion of extremely short news  
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Table 4: Overview of Substantial Story Frequencies by Period 
Pro-war Paper Anti-war Paper
Period Journal Telegraph Times Guardian 
News stories including AJ-sourced content 
Pre-9/11 5.3%   0.0% 6.6% 3.3% 
Post-9/11     
Afghanistan War 28.1 37.8 26.3 23.0 
Palestinian uprising 21.1 14.3 14.4 15.8 
Pre-Iraq War debate 24.6 19.4 19.2 17.1 
Iraq War 14.0 17.3 15.0 25.0 
Post-Iraq War developments 7.0 11.2 18.6 15.8 
Subtotal 94.7 100.0 93.4 96.7 
Total (N of articles) 100.0 (57) 100.0 (98) 100.0 (167) 100.0 (152) 
News stories including AJ-evaluative content 
Pre-9/11 2.2 0.0 4.6 0.0 
Post-9/11     
Afghanistan War 30.4 39.4 33.0 24.2 
Palestinian uprising 10.9 7.5 11.4 6.1 
Pre-Iraq War debate 10.9 12.1 12.5 7.0 
Iraq War 34.8 28.8 25.0 40.4 
Post-Iraq War developments 10.9 12.1 13.6 22.2 
Subtotal 97.8 100.0 95.5 100.0 
Total (N of articles) 100.0 (49) 100.0 (66) 100.0 (87) 100.0 (99) 
Opinion pieces including AJ-evaluative content 
Pre-9/11 0.0 0.0 9.1 0.0 
Post-9/11     
Afghanistan War 28.6 52.3 24.2 20.9 
Palestinian uprising 9.5 5.9 9.1 9.3 
Pre-Iraq War debate 19.0 5.9 15.2 5.1 
Iraq War 23.8 23.5 33.3 51.2 
Post-Iraq War developments 19.0 11.8 9.1 14.0 
Subtotal 100.0 100.0 90.9 100.0 
Total (N of articles) 100.0 (21) 100.0 (17) 100.0 (33) 100.0 (43) 
Grand Na 110 152 253 258 
Grand N, except pre-9/11 data 107 152 237 253 
Note. Only articles of substantial length were analyzed. 
aSince some news stories were double-coded as having both AJ-sourced content and AJ-
evaluative content, the grand N is smaller than the sum of the Ns.   
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stories and letters to the editor pieces. Somewhat noticeable changes were found from the 
Journal (for news stories including AJ-sourced content) and from the Times and the 
Guardian (for opinion pieces including AJ-evaluative content). The number of Journal 
stories including AJ-sourced content dropped from 65 (in Table 3) to 57 (in Table 4), 
which was a 12.3% decrease. This change was mainly due to the exclusion of daily news 
abstracts in the front page under the title of What’s News: World-Wide. For the Times, the 
number of opinion pieces including AJ-evaluative content dropped from 43 (in Table 3) 
to 33 (in Table 4), causing a decrease by 23.3%. This suggests that the Times op-ed pages 
carried many letters-to-the-editor pieces that expressed opinions usually from ordinary 
readers about matters related to Al-Jazeera. For the same reason, the number of the 
Guardian’s opinion pieces reduced from 50 to 43 (a 14.0% decrease). 
In relation to the multiple sessions of content analysis noted earlier, different 
types of media text were used. Specifically, the news stories including AJ-sourced 
content were examined through the article-unit content analysis in which the central 
coding task was to measure AJ-as-source topic. The news stories including AJ-evaluative 
content were used in the source-unit analysis that involved measurement of AJ-as-subject 
source. Finally, both news stories and opinion pieces including AJ-evaluative content 
were examined in the theme-unit analysis intended to measure AJ-as-issue theme. In 
terms of measurement, these three variables (i.e., AJ-as-source topic, AJ-as-subject 
source, and AJ-as-issue theme) are the foci of RQ 1, 2, and 3. Table 5 presents the 
different scopes of post-9/11 data examined through the three sessions of content 
analysis. Within each of the three row sections of Table 5 the raw data are divided into 
two categories, articles of substantial length versus articles lacking substantial length. Of 
the post-9/11 stories from the four newspapers, as the figures in Table 5 shows, the 
percentages of extremely short articles (i.e., news stories fewer than 151 words and  
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Table 5: Overview of Post-9/11 Story Frequencies by Research Question Focus 
Pro-war Paper Anti-war Paper
Story Type Journal Telegraph Times Guardian 
For analysis of AJ-as-source topic 
With substantial length 87.1% 95.1% 95.1% 93.0% 
Without substantial length 12.9 4.9 4.9 7.0 
Total (N of articles) 100.0 (62) 100.0 (103) 100.0 (164) 100.0 (158)
For analysis of AJ-as-subject source 
With substantial length 100.0 100.0 96.5 100.0 
Without substantial length 0.0 0.0 3.5 0.0 
Total (N of articles) 100.0 (48) 100.0 (66) 100.0 (86) 100.0 (99)
For analysis of AJ-as-issue theme 
With substantial length 98.6 96.5 89.7 95.3 
Without substantial length 1.4 3.5 10.3 4.7 
Total (N of articles) 100.0 (70) 100.0 (86) 100.0 (126) 100.0 (149)
     
Grand Na 118 160 274 276 
aThe grand N is smaller than the sum of Ns because (1) some news stories were double-
coded as including both AJ-sourced content and AJ-evaluative content, and (2) the news 
stories including AJ-evaluative content were used twice in the analysis of AJ-as-subject 
source and the analysis of AJ-as-issue theme.  
 
letters-to-editor pieces) were overall fairly low, ranging between zero and 12.9%.    
In the following sections, which present findings from the three content analyses, 
the researcher mainly concentrates on showing the results of the analyses done on the raw 
data belonging to the category of post-9/11 articles with substantial length. The exclusion 
of pre-9/11 data was done because this study focuses on the media discourse produced in 
the post-9/11 political climate and, in addition, the Telegraph data did not include any 
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pre-9/11 stories. The exclusion of articles lacking substantial length was done to avoid 
the inflation of frequencies especially when the unit of analysis was the article. 
Nevertheless, in the following sections, the researcher will offer comments on the results 
of the analyses done on the full range of the raw data when noticeable differences from 
the main findings were found.  
  
CHARACTERISTICS OF MEDIA DISCOURSE ADDRESSING AJ AS SOURCE 
As noted in the introduction to this study, the meteoric rise of Al-Jazeera in recent 
years is a remarkable phenomenon which suggests how pluralistic the international flow 
of information has become than ever. Since the dramatic appearance of Osama bin Laden 
in the broadcasts by Al-Jazeera, this Arabic satellite TV station has become a major 
player in wartime coverage and one of the most prominent and quoted media sources in 
the post-9/11 era dubbed the “War on Terror.” The relay by Western media of content 
from a non-Western news service may be viewed as a reversal of the traditional flow of 
international news, which usually runs from the West to the East and the South.  
The true significance of Al-Jazeera as an alternative source of regional 
information and “Arab-oriented” perspectives, however, as discussed in the theoretical 
review, rests much on the question of whether and how often the Western news services 
took advantage of the Arabic news outlet, not only as an outlet of terrorist messages, but 
also as a source of war-related information and regional news and perspectives. Although 
Al-Jazeera gained global fame largely due to its exclusive broadcasts of Al-Qaeda 
messages, the broadcasts were only a small part of Al-Jazeera’s wartime journalism in the 
post-9/11 period of hostilities between the Arab/Muslim world and the U.S.-led war-
waging forces. Considering this, RQ 1 was constructed to compare the content diversity 
of AJ-as-source topic, along with voices within AJ-sourced content, in the media 
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discourse produced by the U.S. and British news organizations that editorially differed on 
the issue of the war in Iraq.  
 
Distribution of AJ-as-source Topics 
Before comparing the content diversity of AJ-as-source topic in the two countries’ 
press discourses, it is useful to briefly explain the concept of diversity and the index of 
diversity used here. In mathematical terms, diversity is defined as the distribution of 
population elements along a continuum of homogeneity to heterogeneity with respect to 
one or more variables (Teachman, 1980). Indeed, the concept of diversity can be seen as 
consisting of two dimensions — one concerning the number of categories within a given 
distribution and the other concerning the allocation of elements to the categories 
(McDonald & Dimmick, 2003). There is a variety of measures of diversity available in 
social science, but in this study Simpson’s (Simpson, 1949) D is used as an indicator of 
the diversity of AJ-as-source topic. Simpson’s D, which has long been considered as a 
primary measure of diversity, especially outside the field of communication, is known to 
be primarily sensitive to the proportions across categories, although the value of D is 
affected also by the number of categories (McDonald & Dimmick, 2003).15 The value of 
D ranges between 0 and 1, with the higher the value, the higher degree of diversity. For 
the analysis of AJ-sourced content, Simpson’s D value is used to represent the degree of 
the diversity of AJ-as-source topics for a newspaper when the story was the unit of 
analysis. 
 
15Simpson’s D is calculated by summing the squared proportions and subtracting the sum from 1.0 (D = 1- 
∑ p12 ). See McDonald and Dimmick (2003) for a discussion of the differences among multiple measures of 
diversity.  
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Table 6: Distribution of AJ-as-source Topics, Using Article as Unit of Analysis  
Pro-war Paper Anti-war Paper
Major AJ-as-source Topic Journal Telegraph Times Guardian 
Sig.a
Messages from U.S. enemy 57.4% 50.0% 41.7% 38.1% P<.05
War information 11.1 22.4 13.5 21.1 P<.10
Regional affairs/opinions 9.3 10.2 22.4 21.1 P<.05
Events/issues specific to Al-
Jazeera 16.7 9.2 15.4 15.6 n.s. 
Others 5.6 8.2 7.1 4.1 n.s. 
Total 









Simpson’s D .618 .674 .729 .740 
Note. Post 9/11 news stories including AJ-sourced content were examined. News stories 
shorter than 151 words were excluded from the calculation. 
aThe p value for each category was acquired based on the chi-square distribution, by 
pitting the percentages of the category in question against the summed percentages of all 
other categories. 
 
Table 6 presents the distributions of AJ-as-source topic whose categories were 
collapsed into five major categories. The data in Table 6 can be interpreted as showing, 
for each newspaper, how diversified was the journalistic use of Al-Jazeera as a source of 
information in terms of the source of enemy messages, war information, regional news 
and opinions, events and issues specific to Al-Jazeera, and others. According to the 
Simpson’s D values at the bottom of Table 6, the two countries’ anti-war newspapers 
showed a higher degree of content diversity than did their hawkish counterparts. 
Specifically, the Guardian (.740) ranked first, followed by the Times (.729) and the 
Telegraph (.674) as the second and the third, respectively; finally, the Journal (.618) 
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marked the lowest degree of content diversity. With a closer look into each of the AJ-as-
source topic categories, four points can be made as follows: 
First, the biggest difference between the pro-war and anti-war newspapers was 
found in the proportion of the “message from U.S. enemy” category. The Journal showed 
the highest degree of concentration (57.4%) on this category, followed by the Telegraph 
(49.0%). In contrast, the percentages of the same category from the two anti-war 
newspapers stayed around 40% (41.7% for the Times and 38.1% for the Guardian). The 
differences in the percentage of this category among the four newspapers were 
statistically significant (χ2 = 8.280, d.f. = 3, p = .042). This suggests that the pro-war 
newspapers were more likely than the anti-war newspapers to raise the bar in selecting 
information coming from Al-Jazeera, thus in general limiting the use of the Arabic media 
outlet as a source of news to the quotation of Al-Qaeda and other oppositional leaders’ 
propagandistic messages. 
Second, a noticeable difference between the U.S. press and the British press, 
regardless of their political leanings, was found in the proportions of the “war 
information” category. For both British newspapers, the percentages of this category 
exceeded 20% (22.4% for the Telegraph and 21.2% for the Guardian), whereas in the 
U.S. media outlets the percentages of the same category stayed a little higher than 10% 
(11.1% for the Journal and 13.5% for the Times). The proportional differences among the 
four newspapers was not exceedingly great, but they were statistically significant at .10 
level (χ2 = 6.687, d.f. = 3, p = .083). This gives an impression that the British newspapers, 
regardless of their editorial stances, were more active than the U.S. press in picking up 
the war-related information supplied by Al-Jazeera and incorporating it into news 
discourse.  
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Third, the Times and the Guardian seemed to be more active than their pro-war 
counterparts in using Al-Jazeera as a source of regional news and Arab or Muslim 
opinions. More than 20% of news stories including AJ-sourced content in the anti-war 
press were classified into the “regional affairs/opinions” category (22.4% of Times stories 
and 21.1% of Guardian stories). In contrast, for the two pro-war newspapers, the 
percentages of the same category remained around 10% (9.3% of Journal stories and 
10.2% of Telegraph stories). The differences in this category among the newspapers were 
statistically significant (χ2 = 9.933, d.f. = 3, p = .019). 
Finally, from all the newspapers except the Telegraph, there were found 
substantial portions of news stories whose AJ-as-source topic was classified into the 
category of “events or issues specific to Al-Jazeera.” The percentages of this category in 
the three newspapers reached a little higher than 15%, while in the Telegraph the 
percentage remained at 9.2%. The inter-newspaper differences in this category, however, 
were not statistically significant (χ2 = 2.709, d.f. = 3, p = .439). It is worth noting that, 
despite the relatively low percentage of this category in the Telegraph, the number of 
Telegraph stories classified into this category was indeed the same as the number of 
Journal stories (9 articles). While the proportional differences just mentioned may be 
viewed as indicating that the Telegraph was less interested than others in featuring the 
Arabic news outlet, the data in Table 6 alone seems to be insufficient for supporting this 
interpretation.   
In addition, the overall distributive patterns reported above did not change when 
the news stories shorter than 151 words (at the first stage) and pre-9/11 stories (at the 
second stage) were added into the analysis.16  
 
16In fact, when the extremely short articles were included, the Journal distribution of AJ-as-source topic 
showed an even higher degree of concentration than before on the category of “messages from U.S. 
enemy,” with the percentage of this category going up from 57.4% (in Table 6) to 61.3%. After the pre-
9/11 raw data was added, the percentage of the category just mentioned in the Journal stories became 
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To gain a better insight into the general features of the news stories that contained 
AJ-sourced content, Table 7 presents the distributions of AJ-as-source topic, involving 
detailed categories. Due to the increase in the entire number of categories used, the 
overall level of Simpson’s D went up this time (i.e., the value of D is affected by the 
increased number of categories), but the rank order in content diversity among the four 
newspapers still remained unchanged, with the Guardian ranking the first, followed by 
the Times, the Telegraph, and finally the Journal, in the order of ranking. 
The first row section of Table 7 gives the percentages of two subcategories under 
the major topic category of “messages from U.S. enemy.” The figures indicate that the 
Journal, of the four news organizations, was the most likely to use Al-Jazeera solely as 
an outlet of Al-Qaeda leaders’ propagandistic statements in news reporting (55.6%). 
Even under the U.S. enemy message category, three other newspapers showed higher 
percentages than did the Journal on the topic of messages from “other U.S. enemy,” 
which referred to the statements from leaders of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan or 
officials of the Hussein regime in Iraq. Specifically, the percentage of the “messages 
from other U.S. enemy” category was merely 1.9% from the Journal, while the 
percentages of the same category ranged from 6.1% to 8.6% in the other three 
newspapers.  
The second row section of Table 7 shows the percentages of three subcategories 
under the topic of war information. These data indicate that the British newspapers, 
compared to their U.S. counterparts, carried relatively high percentages of news stories 
whose AJ-as-source topics were assigned to the two sub-topic categories of “military  
 
58.5%. At the same time, the percentage of the Journal stories classified into the regional affairs/opinions 
category also went up from 9.3% (in Table 6) to 12.3%. These changes, however, did not seem to be 
meaningful, as the number of stories assigned to this category only increased from 5 to 8 stories. As for 
other newspapers, few proportional changes were found in the distribution of AJ-as-source topic after the 
inclusion of extremely short news stories and then pre-9/11 stories.  
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Table 7: Distribution of AJ-as-source Topics, Using Detailed Categories  
Pro-war Paper Anti-war Paper
AJ-as-source Topic Journal Telegraph Times Guardian 
Messages from U.S. enemy  
From Al-Qaeda 55.6% 43.9% 34.6% 29.3%
From other U.S. enemy 1.9 6.1 6.4 8.8 
Subtotal 57.4 50.0 41.7 38.1 
War information     
Military developments 5.6 12.2 7.7 10.9 
Dead/captured soldiers 3.7 7.1 3.3 6.1 
Civilian damage 1.9 3.1 2.6 4.1 
Subtotal 11.1 22.4 13.5 21.1 
Regional affairs/opinions     
Palestinians-related 3.7 6.1 10.3 11.6 
Other regional affairs/opinions 5.6 4.1 12.2 9.5 
Subtotal 9.3 10.2 22.4 21.1 
Events/issues specific to Al-
Jazeera     
Performance of Al-Jazeera 7.4 3.1 8.3 6.8 
Threat to Al-Jazeera activity 9.3 6.1 7.1 8.8 
Subtotal 16.7 9.2 15.4 15.6 
Others 5.6 8.2 7.1 4.1 
     
Total 









Simpson’s D .508 .691 .751 .758 
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developments” (12. 2% of Telegraph stories and 10.9% of Guardian stories versus 5.6% 
of Journal stories and 7.7% of Times stories) and “showing of dead/captured solders” 
(7.1% of Telegraph stories and 6.1% of Guardian stories versus 3.7% of Journal stories 
and 3.3% of Times stories). These figures may be viewed as suggesting that, especially 
regarding the “military development” subcategory, British journalists were more likely 
than their American colleagues to diversify sources of information in war coverage, in a 
manner of not solely relying on the government and military officials who routinely 
hosted press briefings in the periods of military conflicts. However, the story frequencies 
for the subcategories were quite low, which makes it difficult to give a reliable 
interpretation about the inter-newspaper differences at the subcategory level.17 It suffices 
to say that the relatively high percentage of the upper-level “war information” category in 
the British press was largely attributable to the percentages of the two subcategories of 
military development and showing of dead/captured soldiers.  
The third row section of Table 7 is assigned to the presentation of data subsumed 
under the major topic category of regional affairs/opinions. This part of the data indicates 
that the Times and the Guardian, in terms of both frequency and proportion, were more 
likely than their conservative competitors to carry the news stories that cited Al-Jazeera 
as a source of news related to Palestinian-related affairs. Specifically, 10.3% of Times 
stories and 11.6% of Guardian stories including AJ-sourced content were classified into 
this category, whereas only 3.7% of Journal stories and 6.1% of Telegraph stories were 
assigned here. Markedly, more than half of the two anti-war newspapers’ stories that 
mentioned this AJ-as-source topic (10 out of 16 Times stories and 11 out of 17 Guardian 
 
17Indeed, the frequencies of these two subcategories in Telegraph stories were similar to those in Times 
stories. In the case of the “military developments” category, both newspapers marked the same frequency 
(8 articles). In the “showing of dead/captured soldiers” category, the number of Telegraph stories classified 
into this category (7 articles) was slightly higher than that of Times stories (5 articles). Due to the gap in the 
size of raw data between the two newspapers, however, the percentages of these subcategories were higher 
in the Telegraph distribution than in the Times distribution. 
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stories) came out during the period of the Palestinian uprising (01/01/2002 – 09/11/2002). 
This can be viewed as indicating that Times and Guardian correspondents, in their 
coverage of the then-ongoing conflicts between Israelis and Palestinians, recognized the 
merit of Al-Jazeera as a source of pro-Palestinian news and perspectives. This point will 
be made again in the next section, which addresses the analysis of voice within AJ-
sourced content.  
Finally, the percentages under the upper-level category of “event/issues specific 
to Al-Jazeera,” which are presented in the fourth row section of Table 7, do not show 
remarkable differences among the four newspapers, except that the percentage of news 
stories whose AJ-as-source topic was the “performance of Al-Jazeera” seemed especially 
low in the Telegraph (3.1%). This percentage-based interpretation, however, does not 
appear meaningful, considering that the frequencies in this category were generally low, 
especially for the press on the pro-war side (3 Journal stories and 4 Telegraph stories). In 
addition, the percentages of the “threat to Al-Jazeera activity” category were roughly 
similar among the four news organizations (ranging between 6.1% and 9.3%). This topic 
category just mentioned covered both U.S.-involved cases and other cases. Of the stories 
whose AJ-as-subject topic was classified into this category, even though the overall 
frequencies were quite low, more than a half of the stories turned out to be the ones that 
referred to U.S.-involved cases. By this standard, the Guardian carried the highest 
number of stories that met this condition (8 out of 13 Guardian stories; for other 
newspapers, 6 out of 11 Times stories, 6 out of 9 Telegraph stories, and 5 out of 9 
Journal stories). Indeed, the heavy volume of attention paid by the Guardian to the U.S.-
involved misbehavior toward Al-Jazeera can be more clearly illustrated in later sections 
that deal with the presence of AJ-as-issue themes in media discourse.  
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Consideration of Content importance and Real-world Circumstances    
It is worth noting that all of the findings described so far only dealt with the 
presence of Al-Jazeera as a source; the findings did not consider the relative weight given 
to AJ-sourced content within each story. It is possible that a story citing Al-Jazeera as a 
source did not attach much importance to the information coming from the TV network, 
and thus the informational value of AJ-sourced content was minimal. An example can be 
found that some news stories only mentioned in a passing manner the developments 
triggered by Osama bin Laden’s appearance on the Al-Jazeera channel. For this reason, 
content importance — the prominence of AJ-sourced content in the story — was 
introduced as a controlling variable, which was measured at the coding stage in terms of 
high, medium, or low. Table 8 gives figures showing the distribution of AJ-as-source 
topics when the content importance was rated high or medium. 
When the raw data was limited to the news stories whose AJ-sourced content had 
high or medium importance, the results shown in Table 8 show that the inter-newspaper 
differences in content diversity held essentially the same patterns as those reported in 
Table 6. Although this time the percentage of the “messages from U.S. enemy” category 
dropped from all of the newspapers, Simpson’s D values indicate that there was no 
change in the rank order among the newspapers by content diversity. The Guardian still 
ranked top, followed by the Times and then the Telegraph; the Journal remained the 
lowest. The Journal was unchanged in its heavy concentration on the AJ-as-source topic 
category of “messages from U.S. enemy,” and, in this category, the differences among 
the newspapers remained significant at the level of .10 (χ2 = 6.694, d.f. = 3, p = .082). As 
for other AJ-as-source topic categories, the overall distributive features were quite similar 
to those from the results of the previous analysis done without controlling, although inter-
newspaper differences for the “war information” category, which had been significant in  
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Table 8: Distribution of AJ-as-source Topics, Under High or Medium Content 
Importance Condition  
Pro-war Paper Anti-war Paper
Major AJ-as-source Topic Journal Telegraph Times Guardian 
Sig.a
Messages from U.S. enemy 51.1% 46.8% 36.0% 33.3% p <.10
War information 13.3 24.7 14.4 22.8 n.s.
Regional affairs/opinions 11.1 10.4 24.0 21.9 p<.05
Events/issues specific to Al-
Jazeera 20.0 11.7 19.2 19.3 n.s.
Others 4.4 6.5 6.4 2.6 n.s.
Total 









Simpson’s D .508 .691 .751 .758 
Note. Post 9/11 news stories including AJ-sourced content were examined. News stories 
shorter than 151 words were excluded from the calculation. 
 
the prior analysis, failed to reach the commonly accepted significance level (χ2 = 5.315, 
d.f. = 3, p = .150). The differences for the “regional affairs/opinions” category remained 
statistically significant at the level of .10 (χ2 = 6.694, d.f. = 3, p = .082), with the anti-war 
press showing higher percentages than the pro-war press. 
It is worthwhile to note the result of the same analysis when the raw data included 
only the news stories whose AJ-sourced content had high importance. The overall story 
frequencies were quite low under this condition, and only two topic categories 
(“messages from U.S. enemy” and “events/issues specific to Al-Jazeera”) occupied 
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considerable percentages in the distribution from all of the newspapers.18 This result 
suggests that only the two topic categories — the release of Al-Qaeda messages via the 
Al-Jazeera network and the “character” of the news organization — were accepted by 
American and British reporters as newsworthy enough to justify their choice of Al-
Jazeera as the primary source for reporting. This finding is not surprising, given that in 
the post-9/11 political climate Osama bin Laden dramatically emerged as “America’s 
most wanted” and Al-Jazeera suddenly became a major player in the international media 
business. When other kinds of AJ-source-topics are concerned, however, it would be 
somewhat unrealistic to expect this Arab TV channel to appear as the first source of news 
in Western media accounts of such events as the U.S.-led military campaigns or Israeli-
Palestinian conflicts. In the news discourse describing these events and their related 
issues, Al-Jazeera, if it appeared, was usually citied as a supplementary or 
counterbalancing source.   
Finally, real-world circumstances were considered as a possible covariate 
affecting the distributive patterns of AJ-as-source topics. Close examination of the 
tabulation data by time period suggested that some AJ-as-source topics had time-specific 
occurrences. For instance, Osama bin Laden issued his pre-recorded statements via Al-
Jazeera three times in late 2001 (the “Afghanistan War” period in the research time 
frame) and once again in September of 2002 (the “pre-Iraq War debate” period), which 
grabbed a heavy volume of attention from U.S. and British media.19 AJ-sourced news 
content produced within these time periods is likely to contain a topic related to Al-Qaeda 
 
18The total frequencies of news stories that met the condition of high content importance were 9 (the 
Journal), 33 (the Telegraph), 55 (the Times), and 42 (the Guardian). The percentages of the “message from 
U.S. enemy” category ranged from 47.6 % to 66.7%, and the percentages of the “events/issues specific to 
Al-Jazeera” category fluctuated between 18.2% and 33.3%. The percentages of these two AJ-as-source 
topic categories ranked the first and the second for all of the newspapers.  
19Bin Laden’s pre-recorded video-taped statements were broadcast on Al-Jazeera on October 7, November 
3, and December 26 of 2001. On September 16, 2002, bin Laden issued a statement, this time denying his 
involvement in the September 9th attacks of 2001, via Al-Jazeera.    
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messages in all the newspapers. Also, much of the AJ-sourced content produced during 
the “Palestinian uprising” period — the climax of the bloody conflict between Israelis 
and Palestinians — is likely to have described the regional affairs or Arab opinions 
related to the conflict. Similarly, it is reasonable to assume that the AJ-sourced content 
produced during the two periods of the Afghanistan War and the Iraq War had a 
relatively high chance of falling into the AJ-as-source topic category of war information. 
Therefore, in assessing the effects of newspaper editorial policy and national 
context on the distributive features of AJ-as-source topics, it was necessary to control for 
possible associations between some time periods and AJ-as-source topics. Using the data 
from news stories of medium or high content importance, a binary logistic regression was 
performed for each of three AJ-as-source topic categories: Al-Qaeda messages (a sub-
category of the enemy messages category), regional affairs/opinions, and war 
information. Binary logistic regression is a statistical technique used to predict a 
particular value of a dichotomous dependent variable from a set of independent 
variables.20 In this study, logistic regression was employed to estimate the effects of 
editorial policy, national context, and time-specific real-world circumstance in predicting 
the modeled AJ-as-source topic category.   
 
20Logistic regression analysis is similar to discriminant analysis, in that both analyses require that the 
dependent variable be categorical. Typically, discriminant analysis is employed when at least some of 
independent variables are continuous and all of them can be assumed normally distributed. Logistic 
regression analysis is an alternative method, especially when all of the predictors are categorical or they 
cannot be assumed normally distributed. Logistic regression function computes the probability that a case 
with a particular set of values for the independent variables will fall into the modeled category of the 
dependent variable. In the logistic regression equation, individual coefficients are expressed in natural log 
units. To compute the effect of a particular independent variable, the logistic regression coefficient (or 
simply, the logit coefficient) for the variable is used as the power to which the base of the natural logarithm 
is raised. The computed result indicates the odd ratio or the change in the “odds” (i.e., the ratio between 
being in the modeled category and not being in the category) of the modeled event associated with a one-
unit change in the independent variable. See Hosmer and Lemeshow (1989) for further discussion of 
logistic regression analysis.  
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In each logistic regression, the dependent variable was dichotomized in terms of 
the modeled topic category versus others. The five post-9/11 time periods (described in 
the section titled “overview of content analysis data”) were also collapsed and 
dichotomized differently in each regression: for the Al-Qaeda messages, the dummy 
category of the time period variable was the bin Laden prominence period (which 
combined the Afghanistan War period with the pre-Iraq War debate period); for the 
regional affairs/opinions, the dummy category was the Palestinian uprising period; for the 
war information, the dummy category was the military campaign period (which 
combined the Afghanistan War and the Iraq War periods). Since each newspaper editorial 
policy (“anti-war” = 1) and national context (“British” = 1) had two nominal values, all 
the variables tested were in a binary form. Interaction terms were not included in the 
analysis because the results of preliminary logistic regression analyses showed no 
interaction effect between newspaper editorial policy and national context.21
Table 9 depicts the results of two of the three logistic regression analyses, one for 
the Al-Qaeda messages topic (in the upper row section) and the other for the regional 
affairs/opinions topic (in the bottom row section). In both of these logistic regression 
models, the time period characteristic was strongly associated with the modeled topic 
category, yet newspaper editorial policy was also statistically significant in predicting 
that the AJ-sourced content would contain the particular AJ-as-source topic, while the 




21Given the relatively small data size, interaction terms were not included in the logistic regression analysis 
to limit the number of independent variables. Instead, without controlling for the impact of time period, a 
series of preliminary logistic regression analyses was performed to assess the effect of the interaction term 
of editorial policy × national context. No significant interaction effect was found on any of the three AJ-as-




                                                
In the logistic regression for Al-Qaeda messages, the bin Laden prominence 
period (i.e. the control variable) was positively associated with the modeled topic 
category (b = 1.791), whereas the anti-war newspaper policy was negatively associated 
with the dependent variable (b = -.581). The anti-war editorial stance had a statistically 
significant effect of lowering the odds (.559 times or 44.1% decrease) that the AJ-sourced 
content would describe a topic related to Al-Qaeda.22 This suggests that the anti-war 
newspapers were more likely to diversify their use of Al-Jazeera as a news source, 
treating the network as more than an outlet of terrorist propaganda. In the logistic 
regression for regional affairs/opinions, both the Palestinian uprising period (b = 1.958) 
and the anti-war editorial position (b = 1.011) were positively associated with the 
modeled topic category, that is, the anti-war newspapers, even after controlling for the 
impact of real-world circumstances, were more likely to cite Al-Jazeera as a source of 
regional news and opinion, especially in coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts and 
their related Arab/Muslim views. 
In contrast, the effect of national context on the production of the AJ-sourced 
content related to the third category, war information, was not clearly identifiable. In the 
logistic regression for this category, the occurrence of the AJ-as-source topic was 
strongly associated with the time period of military campaigns (b = 1.444; Wald = 
22.983, d.f. = 1, p < .001) and was virtually unrelated to anti-war editorial stance (b = -
.036; Wald = .015, d.f. = 1, p = .904). As to the national context factor, the Wald statistic 
 
22For interpretation, the logit coefficients in the original logistic equation are converted through the 
exponent function. The exponentiated value (eb), which is denoted by Exp (b) in Table 9, represents the 
odds ratio (or the change in the odds) associated with the independent variable. Specifically, in the logistic 
regression for Al-Qaeda messages, the odd ratio for the bin Laden prominence period is 5.995. Thus, the 
odds for the AJ-sourced news content produced during the bin Laden prominence to contain the topic of 
Al-Qaeda messages is 5.995 times (or 499.5% greater than) the odds for the AJ-sourced news content 
produced in the remaining time period to contain the same topic. With regard to anti-war editorial policy, 
its odds ratio is .559. Thus, the odds for the AJ-sourced news content produced by the anti-war press to 
contain the topic of Al-Qaeda messages is .559 times (or 44.1% smaller than) the odds for the AJ-sourced 
news content produced by the pro-war press to describe the same topic.   
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for the British papers was statistically significant at the level of 10% (b = .562; Wald = 
3.712, d.f. = 1, p = .054). Comparing two predictive models, however, one including only 
the time period variable and the other including all the three independent variables, the 
result of the likelihood ratio test indicated the statistical insignificance of the model’s 
improvement after national context and editorial policy were added (χ2 = 3.961, d.f. = 2, p 
= .138). 23 The data failed to support the interpretation that British journalists were more 
active than Americans in using Al-Jazeera as an alternative source of war information. 
In summary, regarding RQ 1, the results of the logistic regression analysis 
confirm the prior findings: even after the AJ-sourced content with low importance was 
removed and the time-specific real-world circumstances were considered, a newspaper’s 
editorial policy had a significant impact on how diversified its use of Al-Jazeera as a 
source for news reporting was, while the impact of news context was far weaker.  
 
Distribution of Voice within AJ-sourced Content 
In addition, using the article as the unit of analysis, the researcher examined the 
presence of voices within AJ-sourced content (i.e., those quoted by U.S. and British 
reporters in the context of describing news content from Al-Jazeera or comments made 
by Al-Jazeera employees) in the news discourse produced by the U.S. and British press. 
Table 10 presents the distributions of voices within AJ-sourced content from the four 
newspapers. As the table shows, the two pro-war newspapers showed a higher degree of  
 
23In logistic regression modeling, the likelihood ratio test (commonly called LR test) is used to test the 
difference between a proposed model and its nested model having been estimated in a prior step. The 
difference is measured in a chi-square term, which represents the difference in likelihood ratios (i.e., the 
difference between two -2 log likelihoods) for the two models. For the LR test, degree of freedom is the 
difference in degrees of freedom for the two models. The chi-square difference is used to help decide which 
variables to drop from or add to the model.  If the result of the LR test shows statistical insignificance of 
model improvement, the model with a fewer number of independent variables is preferred on the basis of 
parsimony. Usually, the LR test is a better criterion than the Wald statistic when considering whether and 
which variables to drop from the logistic regression model (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 1989).  
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Table 10: Distribution of Voice Within AJ-sourced Content 
Pro-war Paper Anti-war PaperVoice Within AJ-sourced 
Content Journal Telegraph Times Guardian Sig.a
U.S. enemy 60.4% 63.2% 42.8% 41.3% p<.01
Al-Jazeera employees, not 
during their TV programs  22.9 14.5 26.1 27.3 n.s.
Arab/Western Muslims     
Palestinian/radical 
Muslim leaders 2.1 6.6 10.1 14.9 
Other Arab/western 
Muslims 6.3 6.6 13.0 6.7 
Subtotal 8.4 13.2 23.1 21.5 p<.10











Note. Post 9/11 news stories including AJ-sourced content were examined. Stories 
shorter than 151 words were excluded from the analysis. 
aThe p value for each category was acquired based on the chi-square distribution, by 
pitting the percentages of the category in question against the summed percentages of all 
other categories. The p values for the two subcategories of Arab/Western Muslims were 
not calculated because the overall frequencies were too low.  
bThe number of news stories in which any voice within the AJ-sourced content was 
present. 
 
concentration on the voice category of U.S. enemy (60.4% for the Journal and 63.2% for 
the Telegraph) than their countries’ anti-war counterparts (42.8% for the Times and 
41.3% for the Guardian). The differences in the percentages in this category was 
statistically highly significant (χ2 = 13.585, d.f.= 3, p = .004), which goes in tandem with 
 105
the previous findings showing the relatively high concentration in the pro-war press of 
the AJ-as-source topic of “messages from the U.S. enemy.”  
The percentages of Al-Jazeera employees within AJ-sourced content (excluding 
those quoted from Al-Jazeera’s own news programs) were similar among the three 
newspapers (ranging between 22.9% and 27.3%) but differed from Telegraph (14.5%). 
This low percentage in Telegraph data might be viewed, in combination with the 
previous findings regarding AJ-as-source topic, as strengthening the interpretation that 
this British newspaper remained less active in featuring the Arabic satellite TV station. 
The differences among the newspapers, however, seemed to be too small to be conclusive 
(χ2 = 4.874, d.f. = 3, p = .181). 
As for the category covering a variety of Arab/Western Muslim voices within AJ-
sourced content, both the Times and the Guardian marked relatively high percentages 
(23.1% and 21.5%, respectively) on this category, while the Telegraph stayed at a 
slightly lower percentage (13.2%) and the Journal remained the lowest (8.4%). The inter-
newspaper differences on this category were significant at the level of .10 (χ2 = 7.474, d.f. 
= 3, p = .058). Although the percentages of all Arab/Western Muslim voices within AJ-
sourced content were similar in Times and Guardian stories, there was a noticeable 
difference in the sub-distribution within the “Arab/Western Muslims” category between 
the two anti-war newspapers. The Guardian seemed to be more concerned than the Times 
with picking up Palestinian and radical Muslim voices from the news material aired by 
Al-Jazeera. Specifically, about 70% of Guardian stories including Arab or Muslim voices 
within AJ-sourced content (18 out of 26) were classified into the category of 
Palestinian/radical Muslim leaders. In contrast, about 45% of Times stories under the 
same condition (14 out of 32) were assigned to that voice category. This proportional 
difference suggests that, even within the news organizations that had similar anti-war 
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editorial policy, the British anti-war newspaper was more aggressive in utilizing the kind 
of Palestinian or Arab voices likely to be the most critical of the U.S. approach to the 
Palestinian problem and the Arab/Muslim world.  
As a next step of analysis, content importance of Al-Jazeera in the news story was 
introduced as a control variable into the analysis of voices within AJ-sourced content, just 
as the same adjustment was made in the previous analysis of AJ-as-source topic. Table 11 
shows the distributions of voice within AJ-sourced content when news stories were 
limited to the ones whose content importance was rated high or medium. Even after the 
news stories whose AJ-sourced content had low importance were removed, the 
differences among the newspapers in the percentage of the “U.S. enemy” voice category 
remained statistically highly significant (χ2 = 13.970, d.f. = 3, p = .003), which confirms 
again the differentiation between the pro-war and the anti-war newspapers in the 
concentrated use of Al-Jazeera as a source of enemy propaganda. 
On the other hand, the differences in the percentage of the “Al-Jazeera 
employees” category, after controlling, became even smaller than before (χ2 = 2.978, d.f. 
= 3, p = .395), which suggests that, in comparison with the other newspapers, the 
Telegraph’s apparently low willingness to feature the Arabic news organization was not 
indeed particularly meaningful. The differences among the newspapers in the percentages 
of Arab/Western Muslim voices were still statistically significant in the same direction at 
the level of 0.10 (χ2 = 7.144, d.f. = 3, p = .067), which is congruent with the previous 
findings in the analysis of AJ-as-source topics that showed that both the Times and the 
Guardian were more willing than their countries’ pro-war press to taking advantage of 
Al-Jazeera as a source of regional news and points of view.  
This last point is noteworthy in relation to media coverage of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflicts and their related issues. With a closer examination into the Times  
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Table 11: Distribution of Voice Within AJ-sourced Content, Under High or Medium 
Content Importance Condition 
Pro-war Paper Anti-war PaperVoice Within AJ-sourced 
Content Journal Telegraph Times Guardian Sig.a
U.S. enemy 56.4% 61.4% 37.5% 35.8% p<.01
Al-Jazeera employees, not 
during their TV programs  25.6 19.3 29.5 31.9 n.s.
Arab/Western Muslims 10.3 13.3 25.0 23.2 p<.10











Note. Post 9/11 news stories including AJ-sourced content were examined. Stories 
shorter than 151 words were excluded from the analysis. 
aThe p value for each category was acquired based on the chi-square distribution, by 
pitting the percentages of the category in question against the summed percentages of all 
other categories.  
bThe number of news stories in which any voice within the AJ-sourced content was 
present. 
 
and Guardian stories that secondhand-quoted Palestinian or radical Muslim leaders by 
way of Al-Jazeera, there were found cases of “counterbalancing,” in the sense that Israeli 
officials’ accounts of the Palestinian uprising were contrasted with quotes from such 
Palestinian figures as Hamas leaders who originally appeared on Al-Jazeera news 
programs. There has been much criticism of the nature of U.S. media portrayals of the 
Palestinian issue (Said, 1997; Wolfsfeld, 1997), and, from a journalistic point of view, 
one of the reasons for a “pro-Israel” bias in media coverage has been identified as the 
problem of access – while Israeli spokespersons are easily accessed, interviewing the 
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Palestinian side is more difficult due to such obstacles as the checkpoints, the curfews, 
and the violence in the streets (Hassan, 2003). Considering these circumstances, the 
efforts made by some Western journalists in the recent wartime to relay the Palestinian 
and radical Arab voices mediated by Al-Jazeera, if continued, might help achieve more 
“balanced” reporting of the unremitting regional conflicts.  
Finally, parallel to the previous analysis of AJ-as-source topics, time period 
characteristic was introduced as a control variable in assessing the effects of editorial 
policy and national context on voice within AJ-sourced content. Using the voice 
frequency data from news stories of high or medium Content importance, a binary 
logistic regression was performed for each of two voice categories: U.S. enemy and 
Arab/Muslim voices.  
In each logistic regression, the time period variable was dummy-coded 
differently: for the U.S. enemy voice, the dummy category of the time period variable 
was the bin Laden prominence period (which combined the Afghanistan War period and 
the pre-Iraq War debate period); for the Arab/Muslim voice, the dummy category was the 
Palestinian uprising period. Essentially the same logic as in the earlier logistic regression 
for the AJ-as-source topic was employed: a voice cited through AJ-sourced content 
within the bin Laden prominence period (which involved Al-Jazeera’s broadcasts of bin 
Laden’s statements) was expected to have a high chance of being the one belonging to 
the U.S. enemy category; a voice cited through AJ-sourced content within the Palestinian 
uprising period (which involved the intense conflict between Israelis and Palestinians) 
was expected to have a high chance of falling into the Arab/Muslim voice category.  
Table 12 depicts the results of the two logistic regression analyses. In both of 
these logistic regression equations, the time-specific real-world circumstances were 
strongly associated with the modeled voice categories, yet newspaper editorial policy was 
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also statistically significant in predicting the particular voice categories. The national 
context, in contrast, showed virtually no impact in prediction.  
In the logistic regression for U.S. enemy voice (in the upper row section), the 
logit coefficient for the anti-war press had a negative sign (b = -.720), which indicated 
that the anti-war editorial policy had a statistically significant effect of lowering the odds 
that a voice cited through AJ-sourced content would originate from the U.S. enemy 
(Wald = 7.499, d.f. = 1, p <.01). In other words, the anti-war newspapers were more 
likely than the pro-war papers to use Al-Jazeera as a source of non-enemy voices. In the 
logistic regression for Arab/Muslim voice (in the bottom row section), the logit 
coefficient for the anti-war editorial policy had a positive sign (b = .700), indicating that 
the anti-war stance had an effect of raising the odds that a voice within AJ-sourced 
content would be Arab or Muslim (Wald = 4.024, d.f. = 1, p <.05). This suggests that the 
anti-war press, even after controlling for the impact of time period characteristic, were 
more likely to cite Al-Jazeera as a source of Arab/Muslim voices. 
Therefore, findings from the logistic regression analysis support the interpretation 
that the two countries’ anti-war papers were more active than the pro-war papers in 
picking up non-enemy and particularly Arab/Muslim voices from the stream of news 
content coming from Al-Jazeera.  Returning to RQ 1, which asked whether and how 
news organization policy and national context were related to journalistic use of Al-
Jazeera as a news source, both of the analyses of AJ-as-source topic and voice within AJ-
sourced content yielded a key finding: newspaper editorial policy had a far more 
pronounced effect than national context on the diversified use of Al-Jazeera as a news 
source in post-9/11 wartime reporting. 
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CHARACTERISTICS OF MEDIA DISCOURSE ADDRESSING AJ AS SUBJECT 
As noted in the theoretical review, critical media scholars have been concerned 
with American media’s heavy dependence on official sources especially in coverage of 
U.S.-involved foreign affairs. Throughout the recent “War on Terror” period, which 
involved military campaigns in Afghanistan and then in Iraq, officials of the U.S.-led 
war-waging forces had a great deal of difficulty in managing the wartime public relations 
campaign. Markedly, Al-Jazeera’s wartime journalism involved the dissemination of 
alternative images of war, provoking U.S. and British government and military officials’ 
criticism of the Arabic news outlet for its alleged collaboration with U.S. enemies and its 
violation of media ethics.  
Considering this circumstance, RQ 2 asks how the U.S. and British institutions of 
journalism opened or closed the news gate to a variety of voices expressing their views 
about Al-Jazeera or issues involving the Arabic news network. Specifically, in coverage 
of controversies related to Al-Jazeera, did the two countries’ journalists select sources 
largely within the boundaries of the debate initiated by government or military officials? 
Or, as suggested in some scholars’ discussion of journalistic use of “news icon” (Bennett 
& Lawrence, 1995; Lawrence, 1996), did the journalists recognize the near-iconic status 
of Al-Jazeera and, by shifting the story beyond the official debate, bring the nonofficial 
voices of Arab media workers and members of the Al-Jazeera audiences into the 
mainstream forum of debate? The following sections explore this issue by presenting 
findings from the analysis of AJ-as-subject source as well as news context.  
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Distribution of AJ-as-subject Sources      
In operational terms, the objectives of RQ 2 are to examine the distribution of AJ-
as-subject sources in the news discourse of American and British major print outlets and, 
by doing so, to seek potential variances across the newspapers that held different editorial 
policies. As an initial step of data presentation, Table 13 shows the presence-based 
distribution of AJ-as-subject sources for each of the four newspapers. For this article-unit 
analysis of source presence, the originally coded data, in which the unit of analysis was a 
unique source, were converted into presence-based ones, where the criterion of re-coding 
was whether or not any unique source belonging to a certain AJ-as-subject source group 
was “present” in the news story.24
From the source presence data presented in Table 13, the most noticeable 
difference is between the pro-war and anti-war papers in the percentage of the 
“U.S./British officials” source category. When the total was set as the number of news 
stories that mentioned any AJ-as-subject source,25 the percentages of the stories that cited 
at least one U.S. or British official as an AJ-as-subject source were far higher in the two 
pro-war newspapers (65.6% of Journal stories and 61.4% of Telegraph stories) than in 
the remaining anti-war newspapers (39.3% of Times stories and 40.3% of Guardian  
 
24Originally, the news material including AJ-evaluative content was coded under the guide of the source-
unit coding protocol, as described in the section titled “source-unit analysis” in Chapter 3. Through the data 
conversion, a news story that mentioned at least one unique source suiting a certain AJ-as-subject category 
(say, “U.S./British officials”) received the same score (“present”) on the category, regardless of how many 
unique sources belonging to a group referred to by the source category were quoted in the story.  
25In the article-unit analysis of AJ-as-subject source presence, the total for each newspaper was set as the 
number of stories quoting any AJ-as-subject source, not the number of all news stories including AJ-
evaluative content (i.e., the full range of news material examined in the source-unit analysis). Logically, the 
AJ-evaluative content in a news story can originate solely from the reporter, not from the source(s) quoted 
by the reporter. Therefore, a news story including AJ-evaluative content does not necessarily cite an AJ-as-
subject source. Considering this, to make a “fair” comparison across the newspapers, the total for each 
newspaper was decided as the number of stories quoting at least one AJ-as-subject source. In fact, the 
results of the analysis remained virtually unchanged even when the total was set as the number of all news 
stories including AJ-evaluative content. Under this totaling condition, the inter-newspaper differences on 
the source category of U.S./British officials were statistically significant at the level of .10 (χ2 = 7.710, d.f. 
= 3, p= .052).  
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Table 13: Presence-based Distribution of AJ-as-subject Source, Using Article as Unit 
of Analysis 
Pro-war Paper Anti-war PaperAJ-as-subject Source 
Category Journal Telegraph Times Guardian Sig. 
U.S./British officials 65.6% 61.4% 39.3% 40.3% p<.05
U.S./British others 21.9 15.9 34.4 30.6 n.s.
Al-Jazeera employees  43.8 25.0 34.4 33.9 n.s.
Arab/Muslim others 25.0 31.8 16.4 19.4 n.s.
Others 6.3 9.1 9.8 11.3 n.s.
Total 









Note. Post 9/11 news stories including AJ-evaluative content were examined. Stories 
shorter than 151 words were excluded from the calculation. 
aThe number of news stories in which at least one AJ-as-subject source was present. 
Since the presence-based percentage of each category is independent of the percentages 
of other categories, the sum of the percentages in each column does not add up to 100%. 
 
stories). The differences among the newspapers were statistically significant (χ2 = 10.372, 
d.f. = 3, p = .016), which suggests that the two countries’ anti-war newspapers were more 
likely than their counterparts to cite comments from their government or military officials 
in coverage of events and issues related to Al-Jazeera.  
With regard to the percentages of other AJ-as-subject source categories, however, 
none of the proportional differences among the newspapers were statistically 
significant.26 The Telegraph data, though, compared with other newspapers’ data, showed 
                                                 
26The chi-square values for all other categories were as follows: for “U.S./British others,” χ2 = 5.279, d.f. = 
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somewhat low percentages in the two categories of “U.S./British others” and “Al-Jazeera 
employees,” and a somewhat high percentage in the category of “Arab/Muslim others.” 
In addition, the Times and the Guardian, in comparison with their pro-war competitors, 
marked relatively high percentages in the “Arab/Muslim others” category. Still, 
considering that none of these irregularities turned out to be statistically significant, it 
seems hard to give a further interpretation about the discrepancies among the news 
organizations in their selection of non-official voices in coverage of events and issues 
related to Al-Jazeera.  
The results of the article-unit content analysis just mentioned, however, do not 
give a complete picture about those who were given a say about Al-Jazeera or issues 
involving the Arabic network in the media-constructed forum of debate, especially in that 
the presence-based data ignore the frequency with which AJ-as-sources within a certain 
source category appeared in a news story. In this regard, it is worthwhile to examine the 
results of the frequency analysis, which are presented in Table 14. The unit of analysis 
here was the unique source.  
First, the percentages of U.S./British official sources were far higher in the pro-
war newspapers (44.4% of sources for the Journal and 43.7% for the Telegraph) than in 
the anti-war newspapers (24.6% for the Times and 26.5% for the Guardian). The inter-
newspaper differences on this category were statistically highly significant (χ2 = 12.838, 
d.f. = 3, p = .005). This confirms again the findings from the previous presence-based 
analysis telling that the anti-war news outlets were more likely than their pro-war 
competitors to give non-official voices a say in the media discussion of such issues as the 
journalistic identity of Al-Jazeera and the U.S. approach to the Arabic satellite TV 
channel. 
 
3, p = .152; for “Al-Jazeera employees, not in their news programs,” χ2 = 2.954, d.f. = 3, p = .399; for 
“Arab/Muslim others,” χ2 = 3.994, d.f. = 3, p = .399; and for “others,” χ2 = .620, d.f. = 3, p =.892. 
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Table 14: Distribution of AJ-as-subject Source, Using Unique Source as Unit of 
Analysis 
Pro-war Paper Anti-war PaperAJ-as-subject Source 
Category Journal Telegraph Times Guardian Sig. 
U.S./British officials 44.4% 43.7% 24.6% 26.5% p<.01
U.S./British others 14.3 9.9 25.4 21.3 p<.05
Al-Jazeera employees 20.6 19.7 22.8 25.5 n.s.
Arab/Muslim others 17.5 21.1 19.3 17.0 n.s.
Others 3.2 5.6 7.9 9.6 n.s.
Total  









Note. All unique sources were found in the post 9/11 news stories including AJ-
evaluative content. Stories shorter than 151 words were excluded from the analysis. 
 
Second, unlike the findings from the previous article-unit analysis that showed the 
proportions of all nonofficial source categories did not differ significantly across the 
newspapers, there was found a significant difference between the pro-war and the anti-
war papers in the percentage of the “U.S./British others” category. The percentages of 
sources classified into this category were higher from the Times (25.4%) and the 
Guardian (21.3%) than from the Journal (14.3%) and the Telegraph (9.9%), and the 
inter-newspaper differences in this category were statistically significant at the level of 
.05 (χ2 = 8.150, d.f. = 3, p = .043). The source category of “U.S. and British others” 
mainly consisted of media professionals and those cited as having expertise in Arab 
media or Middle East politics. This suggests that the reporters at the Times and the 
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Guardian, compared with their colleagues at the pro-war press, were relatively active in 
getting opinions from the circles of professionals and experts in their countries and 
thereby expanding the scope of the controversies involving Al-Jazeera or the U.S. 
approach to Arab media. 
Third, except for the two source categories just mentioned, the proportions of the 
sources assigned to the remaining categories did not differ significantly across the 
newspapers. For the “Al-Jazeera employees” category, both the Times and the Guardian 
cited a higher number of sources inside the Al-Jazeera news organization (26 for the 
Times and 24 for the Guardian) than did their pro-war competitors (13 for the Journal 
and 14 for the Telegraph). The differences among the newspapers, however, turned out to 
be quite small (χ2 = 0.942, d.f. = 3, p = .815). The percentages of sources classified into 
the “Arabs/Muslim others” category seemed to be quite similar among the four 
newspapers, and therefore no significant difference was found (χ2 = 0.539, d.f. = 3, p = 
.910).  
In summary, this analysis shows that both the Times and the Guardian, in 
coverage of issues involving Al-Jazeera, were more likely than the Journal and the 
Telegraph to bring into the forum of debate non-official voices from a variety of 
domestic and foreign sectors. Markedly, in order to construct relevant parties in this 
expanded scale of debate, the journalists at the two anti-war newspapers were aggressive, 
compared with their colleagues on the pro-war side, in using their domestic source pools 
of media professionals and other experts. Indeed, the anti-war newspapers also cited a 
higher number of Al-Jazeera employees and people in the Arab/Muslim communities 
than did the pro-war newspapers, although the proportions of Al-Jazeera and other 
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Arab/Muslim sources in the AJ-as-subject source distribution were similar between the 
pro-war and anti-war newspapers.27
In relation to the media selection of AJ-as-subject sources just described, one 
question can be raised: Did the degree of source diversification in the media-mediated 
debate also affect the journalistic balancing of the overall direction of opinions about Al-
Jazeera within the entire group of AJ-as-subject sources? Table 15 gives one answer. As 
shown in this table, for the three categories of source tone toward Al-Jazeera (i.e., 
favorable/contextually favorable, unfavorable/contextually unfavorable, and 
mixed/unclear), none of the proportional differences among the newspapers was 
statistically significant. For instance, the percentages of the AJ-as-subject sources whose 
tone was measured as favorable/contextually favorable were a little higher for the anti-
war newspapers (37.7% for the Times and 42.6% for the Guardian) than for the pro-war 
newspapers (34.9% for the Journal and 33.8% for the Telegraph). The differences in 
these percentages, however, were not statistically significant (χ2 = 1.610, d.f. = 3, p = 
.657). In a similar fashion, the percentages of the sources whose tone was unfavorable or 
contextually unfavorable differed somewhat among the newspapers (ranging from 42.1% 
to 49.3%), but the proportional differences among the newspapers were statistically 
insignificant (χ2 = 1.220, d.f. = 3, p = .748).  
These findings indicate that, although the pro-war newspapers relied more on 
official sources than did the anti-war newspapers, there were few differences between the  
 
27There are two combined reasons for this result. One reason is related to the discrepancies in the size of 
data between the pro-war and anti-war papers. The anti-war newspapers showed higher totals of unique AJ-
as-subject sources (113 from the Times and 94 from the Guardian) than the pro-war newspapers (67 from 
the Journal and 71 from the Telegraph). Thus, it is possible that the percentage of a certain category is 
similar between the pro-war and anti-war newspapers even though the frequency of the category is higher 
in the anti-war press than in the pro-war press. The other reason is associated with the distributional 
features. In the case of pro-war newspapers, the percentages of the “U.S./British others” and “others” 
categories were quite low, which resulted in the rise in the proportions of the remaining AJ-as-source 
categories, including Al-Jazeera employees and Arab/Muslim voices. 
Table 15: Distribution of AJ-as-subject Source Tone  
Pro-war Paper Anti-war PaperSource Tone Toward 
Al-Jazeera Journal Telegraph Times Guardian 
Sig. 
Favorable/contextually 
favorable 34.9% 33.8% 37.7% 42.6% n.s.
Unfavorable/contextually 
unfavorable 47.6 49.3 42.1 42.6 n.s.
Mixed/unclear 17.5 16.9 20.2 14.8 n.s.
Total 









Note. All unique sources were found in the post 9/11 news stories including AJ-
evaluative content. Stories shorter than 151 words were excluded from the analysis. 
 
two newspaper groups in the likelihood of citing sources having one of the following 
tones: favorable, unfavorable, and ambivalent toward Al-Jazeera. It is worth noting, 
however, that there existed subtle differences among the newspapers when the ratio of 
favorable (or contextually favorable) sources to unfavorable (or contextually 
unfavorable) sources was considered. By this standard, the Telegraph (.686) was rated 
the lowest, followed by the Journal (.733) as the second lowest. On the other hand, the 
ratios for the Times (.896) and the Guardian (1.000) were relatively high. Therefore, 
when only the dichotomy of favorable versus unfavorable tone was considered, the pro-
war paper distribution of source tone toward Al-Jazeera was tilted toward a negative 
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direction, although this leaning, compared with the almost equally balanced tone of the 
anti-war paper distribution, was not statistically significant.28
All in all, the results of the source analysis in Table 15 suggest that the 
journalistic norm of balancing was at least apparently at work in the media discussion of 
matters related Al-Jazeera. Still, these findings do not rule out the possibility that there 
existed nuanced forms of differences among the two countries’ elite press in their 
coverage of events and issues involving the Arabic news organization. A closer 
examination would be useful to explore the ways in which certain groups of voices were 
granted access to and privilege in the media-constructed forum of debate. The next 
section deals with this topic.  
  
Consideration of News Context and Real-world Circumstances 
The foregoing discussion on the differences among the newspapers in the 
journalistic selection of AJ-as-subject sources does not consider the context of news 
discourse in which certain categories of voices appeared as the sources commenting on 
such subjects as the character of the Al-Jazeera network, the journalistic quality of the 
news material aired by Al-Jazeera, or the U.S. behavior toward this Arabic news outlet.  
For this reason, as described in Chapter 3, additional measurement was done on 
the news material at the coding stage to determine the news context that surrounded the 
quotation of AJ-as-sources, in terms of either beats-oriented news, icon-driven news, or 
other news context. Using the story as a unit of analysis, Table 16 shows the proportions 
of three types of news contexts in the news stories that mentioned at least one AJ-as- 
 
28When the category of “mixed/unclear” in Table 15 was removed, the proportional difference between the 
two groups of the pro- war and the anti-war newspapers was still not statistically significant (χ2 = 1.250, d.f. 
= 1, p = .264).  
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Table 16: Distribution of News Context in the AJ-evaluative Content, Using Article 
as Unit of Analysis  
Pro-war Paper Anti-war Paper
News Context Type Journal Telegraph Times Guardian Sig. 
Beats-oriented news 43.8% 50.0% 26.2% 29.0% p<.05
Icon-driven news 25.0 20.5 34.4 33.9 n.s.
Other/unclear 31.3 29.5 39.3 37.1 n.s.
Total 









Note. Post 9/11 news stories including AJ-evaluative content were examined. Stories 
shorter than 151 words were excluded from the calculation. 
aThe number of news stories that cited at least one AJ-as-subject source. 
 
subject source. Most remarkably, the percentages of beats-oriented news, in which the 
most newsworthy information or points of view came from government/military-
controlled beats, differed considerably across the newspapers (χ2= 8.439, d.f. = 3, p = 
.038). The two pro-war newspapers showed higher percentages of this category (43.8% 
of Journal stories and 50.0% of Telegraph stories) than did the remaining anti-war 
newspapers (26.2% of Times stories and 29.0% of Guardian stories). This is congruent 
with the prior findings that the two countries’ pro-war news outlets were more likely than 
their anti-war counterparts to limit the debate to the confines of official voices.  
Shifting the focus into the category of icon-driven news, the percentages of stories 
assigned to this news context were higher in the anti-war press (34.4 % of Times stories 
and 33.9% of Guardian stories) than were in the pro-war press (25.0% of Journal stories 
and 20.5% of Telegraph stories). The differences in percentage in this category among 
the newspapers, however, failed to meet the commonly accepted significance level (χ2 = 
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3.312, d.f. = 3, p = .346). Next, in the category of other/unclear news context, the 
percentages were slightly higher in the anti-war press (39.3 % of Times stories and 37.1% 
of Guardian stories) than in the pro-war press (31.3% of Journal stories and 29.5% of 
Telegraph stories), but the inter-newspaper differences were not statistically significant 
(χ2 = 1.393, d.f. = 3, p = .707). 
Although the inter-newspaper differences in the percentage of icon-driven news 
stories were statistically insignificant, there existed noticeable differences in story 
frequency between the pro-war and anti-war papers. The story frequencies of icon-driven 
news in the anti-war press (21 each for the Times and the Guardian) were more than 
twice the number found in the pro-war press (8 Journal stories and 9 Telegraph stories). 
Moreover, when the unit of analysis was the unique source, not the story, clear 
differences were found between the pro-war and anti-war newspapers in the percentages 
of both beats-oriented news and icon-driven news. Table 17 presents the occurrence of 
AJ-as-subject sources by news context type. As shown in the data, especially in the anti-
war press, a substantial proportion of AJ-as-subject sources were cited through icon-
driven news reporting. In the pro-war newspapers, more than 40% of unique sources 
were cited in stories classified into beats-oriented news (44.4% for the Journal and 
40.8% for the Telegraph), while the percentages of source occurrences in icon-driven 
news stories remained about 30% (28.9% for the Journal and 32.4% for the Telegraph). 
Conversely, in the anti-war newspapers, about 45% of AJ-as-subject sources appeared in  
the context of icon-driven news (43.9% for the Times and 46.8% for the Telegraph), 
while beats-oriented news context accounted for only about 25% of all source 
occurrences (28.3 % for Times and 24.5% for the Guardian).  
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Table 17: Citation of AJ-as-subject Source within Each News Context 
Pro-war Paper Anti-war Paper
News Context Type Journal Telegraph Times Guardian Sig. 
AJ-as-subject source is cited in       
Beats-oriented news 44.4% 40.8% 28.3% 24.5% p<.05 
Icon-driven news 25.4 32.4 43.9 46.8 p<.05 
Other/unclear context 30.2 26.8 28.3 28.7 n.s.
Total  









Note. All unique sources were found in the post 9/11 news stories including AJ-
evaluative content. Stories shorter than 151 words were excluded from the analysis.  
 
Concerning the proportions of source occurrences by news context type, the 
differences in percentages across the newspapers were statistically significant in the 
categories of beats-oriented news (χ2 = 10.086, d.f. = 3, p = .018) and icon-driven news 
(χ2= 9.752, d.f. = 3, p = .021). On the other hand, the inter-newspaper differences in the 
percentage of source occurrences in the other/unclear news context were not statistically 
significant (χ2 = .201, d.f. = 3, p = .978). These results suggest that the discrepancies in 
AJ-as-subject source patterns among the newspapers are largely attributable to the 
dichotomy of beats-oriented news and icon-driven news. Recalling that in the article-unit 
analysis the differences among the newspapers in the percentage of icon-driven news 
stories were statistically insignificant, the results of the source unit analysis indicate that 
the inter-newspaper discrepancies associated with icon-driven news became enlarged 
when the unique AJ-as-subject source was used as the unit of analysis.  
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Because the variable of news context was introduced as a parameter for 
evaluating the features of the news discourse, we can examine more closely how different 
types of news context were associated with the selection and the gravity of voices 
uttering AJ-related views. In short, icon-driven news, especially compared with beats-
oriented news, provided a greater degree of source diversification in the portrayal of 
events, issues, and actors related to Al-Jazeera. The extent of source diversity within each 
news context can be examined in three aspects: the frequency of AJ-as-subject sources, 
the preference for certain source categories, and the direction of opinion among cited 
sources.  
First, icon-driven news stories tended to cite a higher number of AJ-as-subject 
sources than did beats-oriented stories and other news stories. For the stories classified as 
icon-driven news, the average frequency of AJ-as-subject source per story throughout the 
four newspapers was 2.25 (SD = 1.397). In comparison, for the stories determined as 
beats-oriented news, the average frequency of source occurrence per story was 1.60 (SD 
= 1.055), and, for the stories assigned to other news context, the average frequency was 
1.39 (SD = .873). These differences also explain how, in the case of the anti-war press, 
the percentage of icon-driven news stories stayed about 35% of all stories including any 
AJ-as-subject source (in Table 16), but, after the unit of analysis was converted into 
unique source, the percentage of AJ-as-subject sources cited in icon-driven news context 
rose to around 45% (in Table 17). The relatively high frequency of AJ-as-subject sources 
in the icon-driven news story resulted in an increased proportion of the icon-driven news 
category in the source-unit distribution, and this proportional rise was especially 
noticeable in the anti-war newspapers as they carried more icon-driven news stories than 
did their pro-war competitors. 
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Next, icon-driven coverage differed from beats-oriented coverage in that the 
former type of reporting frequently cited and gave gravity to non-official sources, 
especially nonmainstream voices of Arab media workers and Arab/Muslim audiences 
(including Western Muslims). Table 18 illustrates in the four newspapers the occurrences 
of AJ-as-subject sources within three types of news context: beats-oriented, icon-driven, 
and other/unclear news context. Indeed, the data presented in Table 18 can be seen as 
validating the measurement of news context in the coding, because, by operational 
definitions, U.S./British official voices should be dominant in beats-oriented news, while 
the voices of Al-Jazeera employees or other Arabs/Muslims should be so in icon-driven 
news. Specifically, for the stories determined as beats-oriented news (presented in the 
upper row section of Table 18), the percentages of U.S. and British official sources were 
predominant throughout all the newspapers, ranging between 53.1% and 75.9%, and the 
combined percentages of the official sources and others in U.S. and British society 
(excluding Muslims in the two countries) reached around 75% or higher from all of the 
newspapers. For the icon-driven news stories (in the middle row section of the table), in 
all the newspapers, the percentages of the voices identified as Al-Jazeera employees 
reached around 40% of all AJ-as-subject sources, and the combined percentages of Al-
Jazeera employees and other Arab/Muslim sources (including residents in Western 
Muslim communities) fluctuated between 60% and 90%. In addition, for the stories 
belonging to the “other/unclear news context” category (in the bottom section of the 
table), no common feature in the AJ-as-subject source distribution was found to 
correspond to all the newspapers.29  
Finally, icon-driven news stories differed from beats-oriented news stories in the 
dominant tone of cited opinions.  The relevant data is presented in Table 19. As this  
 
29Because the “other/unclear” news context category was assigned to news stories where neither official 
voices nor Arab/Muslim voices were dominant in the discussion of subjects related to Al-Jazeera 
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Table 18: Distribution of AJ-as-subject Source within Each News Context 
Pro-war Paper Anti-war Paper
Journal Telegraph Times Guardian AJ-as-subject Source 
Category % N % N % N % N
In beats-oriented news 
U.S./British officials 71.4 20 75.9 22 53.1 17 65.2 15
U.S./British others 14.3 4 6.9 2 28.1 9 8.7 2
Al-Jazeera employees 7.1 2 10.3 3 6.3 2 8.7 2
Arab/Muslim others 3.6 1 6.9 2 3.1 1 13.0 3
Others 3.6 1 0 0 9.4 3 4.3 1
Total 100.0 28 100.0 29 100.0 32 100.0 23
In icon-driven news 
U.S./British officials 12.5 2 26.1 6 6.0 3 15.9 7
U.S./British others 0.0 0 8.7 2 14.0 7 11.4 5
Al-Jazeera employees 43.8 7 39.1 9 40.0 20 45.5 20
Arab/Muslim others 43.8 7 17.4 4 36.0 18 15.9 7
Others 0.0 0 8.7 2 4.0 2 11.5 5
Total 100.0 16 100.0 23 100.0 50 100.0 44
In other/unclear news context 
U.S./British officials 31.6 6 21.1 4 25.0 8 11.1 3
U.S./British others 26.3 5 15.8 3 40.6 13 48.1 13
Al-Jazeera employees 6.0 4 10.5 2 12.5 4 7.4 2
Arab/Muslim others 15.8 3 42.1 8 9.4 3 22.2 6
Others 5.3 1 10.5 2 12.5 4 11.1 3
Total 100.0 19 100.0 19 100.0 32 100.0 27
Grand N of unique sources 63 71 114 94
Note. All unique sources were found in the post 9/11 news stories including AJ-
evaluative content. Stories shorter than 151 words were excluded from the analysis.  
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Table 19: Distribution of AJ-as-subject Source Tone by News Context 
Pro-war Paper Anti-war Paper
Journal Telegraph Times Guardian 
AJ-as-subject Source Tone % N % N % N % N
In beats-oriented news 
Favorable/contextually 
favorable 17.9 5 6.9 2 15.6 5 17.4 4
Unfavorable/contextually 
unfavorable 64.3 18 75.9 22 59.4 19 82.6 19
Mixed/unclear 17.9 5 17.2 5 25.0 8 0.0 0
Total 100.0 28 100.0 29 100.0 32 100.0 23
In icon-driven news 
Favorable/contextually 
favorable 68.8 11 47.8 11 60.0 30 56.8 25
Unfavorable/contextually 
unfavorable 18.8 3 39.1 9 24.0 12 18.2 8
Mixed/unclear 12.5 2 13.0 3 16.0 8 25.0 11
Total 100.0 16 100.0 23 100.0 50 100.0 44
In other/unclear news context 
Favorable/contextually 
favorable 31.6 6 57.9 11 25.0 8 40.7 11
Unfavorable/contextually 
unfavorable 47.4 9 21.1 4 53.1 17 48.1 13
Mixed/unclear 21.1 4 21.0 4 21.9 7 11.1 3
Total 100.0 19 100.0 19 100.0 32 100.0 27
Grand N of unique sources 63 71 114 94 
Note. All unique sources were found in the post 9/11 news stories including AJ-
evaluative content. Stories shorter than 151 words were excluded from the analysis. 
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table shows, in beats-oriented news, negative attitudes toward Al-Jazeera were prevalent 
in all the newspapers. The overall percentages of the AJ-as-subject sources classified into 
the tone category of unfavorable or contextually unfavorable toward Al-Jazeera ranged 
from 59.4% to 82.6% among the newspapers, whereas the percentages of sources with a 
favorable or contextually favorable tone stayed between 6.9% and 17.9%. In icon-driven 
news, conversely, the percentages of the favorable or contextually favorable sources 
reached around 50% or higher from all the newspapers, whereas the percentages of the 
unfavorable or contextually unfavorable sources were about 40% or less. For the category 
of “other/unclear” news context, the distributions of source tone were irregular among the  
news outlets, although the percentages of negative tone were somewhat higher than the 
percentages of positive tone for all the newspapers except the Telegraph. 
Given all of these, the characteristics of icon-driven reporting suggest a further 
examination of the relationship among editorial policy, AJ-as-subject source selection, 
and the tone of cited opinion. Using the source-unit frequency data described above, 
binary logistic regression models were developed to estimate the effects of editorial 
policy, national context, and time period for each of two AJ-as-subject source tone 
categories: favorable/contextually favorable and unfavorable/contextually unfavorable. 
For each source tone category, news context, which was dummy-coded in terms of icon-
driven news versus others, was introduced as a mediator variable within a two-stage 
causal framework. This mediator variable was selected because, as stated above, the news 
context factor mirrored source selection patterns and their associated types of reporting; 
these were assumed to be “prior to” the tone of a specific cited opinion in a story, yet 
“posterior to” antecedent variables such as editorial policy, which was beyond the control 
of individual journalists. For the control variable of time period, dates covering real-
world circumstances likely to encourage icon-driven reporting about Al-Jazeera were 
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selected: the Afghanistan War, the pre-Iraq War debate, and the Iraq War periods which 
included the broadcast of bin Laden’s messages, scoop coverage of the Afghanistan War, 
and the airing of the footage showing U.S. prisoners of war in Iraq.30
The two-stage path model consisted of three binary logistic regression equations: two 
logistic regressions of the outcome variable (i.e., favorable/contextually favorable and 
unfavorable/contextually unfavorable source tones) on the antecedent variables and the 
mediator variable, and one logistic regression of the mediator variable (i.e., icon-driven 
news) on the antecedent variables.31 Table 20 shows the results of the analysis. In the 
logistic regression of the mediator variable, both the Al-Jazeera prominence period (b = 
.965) and the anti-war editorial policy (b = .777) significantly increased the chance for an 
AJ-as-subject source to be cited in icon-driven news stories. The British national context 
(b = .230), however, had no significant effect on the occurrence of an AJ-as-subject 
source in icon-driven news. In the logistic regression of the two outcome variable 
categories, only the mediator variable (i.e., icon-driven news) was significantly  
 
30This decision was grounded in the idea that icon-driven reporting is prompted by the occurrences of 
highly prominent “accidental” events associated with an object identifiable as a “news icon” (Lawrence, 
1996). Applying this idea, the researcher selected time periods representing “Al-Jazeera prominence,” 
based on the three highly prominent activities of Al-Jazeera: its broadcast of Osama bin Laden’s messages, 
scoop coverage of Kabul during the Afghanistan War, and airing of footage showing U.S. prisoners of war 
during the Iraq War.  
31Essentially, this statistical technique is a simple version of what can be called “logistic regression path 
analysis” (Knoke & Burke, 1980). This quasi-path analysis follows a sequence of model estimation which 
is logically equivalent to the more familiar linear regression path analysis. Unlike the linear regression path 
model, however, the logistic regression path model does not permit calculation of the magnitude of the 
indirect effects by multiplying them together. Despite this limitation, this approach allows the investigator 
to examine the significance of both direct and indirect effects and to rank the relative importance of study 
variables. In the linear regression path model, use of standardized coefficients is the norm. In the logistic 
regression path model, however, unstandardized logit coefficients, often in combination with their 
corresponding standard errors, are usually preferred over “standardized” ones, in that the standardized logit 
coefficients are neither easy to meaningfully interpret in terms of effect size nor are useful for decomposing 
the total effect of an independent variable into its direct and indirect effects. Admittedly, the comparison of 
unstandardized logit coefficients is often problematic because it does not consider the “rareness” of an 
event represented by a dummy-coded independent variable. If a particular event represented by the 
independent variable has a large effect size but is rare to observe, the effect tends to show a large standard 
error. Given this, one can divide the beta coefficient by its corresponding standard error (b/SEb), giving a 








associated with the modeled source tone categories (for favorable tone, b = 1.407; for 
unfavorable tone, b = -1.505). The icon-driven news context was positively associated 
with the citation of a (contextually) favorable AJ-as-subject source and negatively 
associated with the citation of a (contextually) unfavorable AJ-as-subject source. None of 
the antecedent variables (i.e., editorial policy, national context, and time period 
characteristic), however, were significant in predicting either one of the two AJ-as-
subject source tones. 
Figure 1 shows the significant pathways revealed by the analysis: neither editorial 
policy nor time period had a direct effect on the tone of an AJ-as-subject source’s 
opinion, but both did have indirect effects via the mediator variable of news context. 
Therefore, even after controlling for the association between the time-specific real-world 
conditions and icon-driven reporting, anti-war editorial policy significantly increased the 
possibility for AJ-as-subject source citation through icon-driven reporting. In turn, the 
citation of an AJ-as-subject source in an icon-driven news story significantly increased 
the possibility that the source would be favorable/contextually favorable and decreased 
the possibility that the source would be unfavorable/contextually unfavorable. The two-
stage path model illustrates how editorial policy, interacting with real-world conditions 
and the journalistic norm of balancing, influenced the type of reporting and its associated 
AJ-as-subject source patterns.  
In summary, returning to RQ 2, whose objective was to seek potential differences 
among the major print outlets in their news discourse that involved addressing of AJ as a 
subject of media-mediated debate, the results of the analyses indicated that there were 
discrepancies between the pro-war and the anti-war newspapers in their source patterns 
related to the construction of the media debate referencing Al-Jazeera. The two countries’ 
pro-war newspapers were more likely than their anti-war counterparts to let officials  
set the tone for the media debate as illustrated in Tables 13 and 14 (in other words, the 
anti-war newspapers showed a higher degree of AJ-as-subject source diversification than 
did the pro-war newspapers). Furthermore, although all of the newspapers carried some 
news stories derived from icon-driven coverage, the implication of icon-driven news was 
bigger in the anti-war press discourse than in the pro-war press discourse, by the standard 
of both the number of icon-driven news stories (in Table 16) and the proportion of 
sources cited in the context of icon-driven news (in Table 17). It seems that both the 
Times and the Guardian, by opening the news gate to the voices of Arab media workers 
and citizens in the Arab/Muslim world, provided more depth and richness in coverage of 





CHARACTERISTICS OF MEDIA DISCOURSE ADDRESSING AJ AS 
NORMATIVE ISSUE 
Throughout the entire research period, much discussion and analysis took place in 
Western media outlets about both the propaganda war being constructed by all sides 
concerned and on the importance of winning on the so-called battlefront of the “media 
war.” Markedly, in U.S. and British major news outlets, the controversies related to Al-
Jazeera’s wartime performance played an important part in the discussion about the 
phenomenon of the media war. During the Iraq War, Al-Jazeera broadcast a tape of the 
Iraqi interrogation of U.S. prisoners of war and another that showed dead British 
servicemen, which then led to Coalition officials’ condemnation of the Arabic TV station 
for its alleged violation of media ethics. Al-Jazeera’s determined approach in war 
coverage that focused on civilian causalities also met criticism in Western society, in that 
the Arabic news channel allegedly concentrated too much on showing of horrific images 
of suffering and humiliation. On the other hand, Al-Jazeera accused the U.S. military of 
“deliberately” destroying Al-Jazeera offices and killing its employees in Afghanistan and 
in Iraq. 
All of these ongoing and contentious accusations worked to shape a politicized 
context for the U.S. and British media debate on Al-Jazeera. It may be said that media 
portrayals of the controversies related to Al-Jazeera revealed an increased level of media 
self-reflexivity, in that editors and reporters took time to ponder their roles as well as the 
nature of government-press relations (Schwartz, 2004). Yet this journalistic self-
consciousness was not played out in a political vacuum. Rather, as journalistic self-
reflexivity was intertwined with partisan leanings of news organizations, different ideas 
and thoughts (e.g., media freedom, media responsibility, and the role of media in the 
Arab world) expressed in the politicized context of debate played rhetorical roles of 
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sponsoring or undermining positions of certain parties (e.g., Al-Jazeera or the war-
waging forces) involved in a given controversy. In consideration of this, RQ 3 asks what 
kind of normative themes appeared in the media discourse, in a rhetorical context of 
either undercutting the legitimacy of Al-Jazeera or, to the contrary, advocating the value 
of Arab journalism and furthermore criticizing U.S. behavior toward the news 
organization.  
 
Distribution of Story Tone 
Before proceeding to the analysis of normative media themes, it is helpful to take 
a look at the overall tone of the news stories or opinion pieces that mentioned issues 
involving the Arabic news outlet. Table 21 gives two sets of figures, one from news 
stories and the other from opinion pieces, in regard to the “story tone” toward Al-Jazeera 
– the tone of the AJ-evaluative content measured on the basis of the article. 
The figures in the upper row section of the table show the distribution of story 
tone in the news stories including AJ-evaluative content. It is worth noting that, in all of 
the newspapers, the percentages of the “mixed/unclear” tone category were dominant, 
hovering between 62.5% and 73.8%. A word of explanation about this phenomenon is 
needed. In general, especially when compared with the analysis of opinion pieces, it is 
difficult to measure objectively the “slant” of a journalist’s presentation of news. Given 
this, the predominance of the apparently neutral tone in news discourse can be viewed as 
reflecting the stylistic feature of journalistic writing. 
Nonetheless, the overall features of the distributions in Table 21 suggest that, of 
the four news organizations, the Journal was most likely to reveal an unfavorable tone, 
while the Guardian was most likely to show a favorable tone toward Al-Jazeera even in 
the domain of objective journalism. In the distributions from the two pro-war  
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newspapers, the percentages of the news stories classified into the “favorable/ 
contextually favorable” tone category were considerably smaller (4.2% of Journal stories 
and 6.1% of Telegraph stories) than were the percentages of the stories assigned to the 
“unfavrable/contextually unfavorable” category (35.4% of Journal stories and 21.2% of 
Telegraph stories). On the other hand, in the Times distribution, the percentage of 
positive stories (14.5%) was almost equal to the percentage of negative stories (15.5%). 
Markedly, in the Guardian distribution, the percentage of positive stories (22.4%) 
exceeded the percentage of negative stories (7.1%). By the ratio of positive story tone to 
negative story tone, the Guardian ranked first (3.143), the Times second (.923) and the 
Telegraph third (.286); finally, the Journal marked the lowest (.118).  
The discrepancies across the newspapers are more evident in the analysis of 
opinion pieces including AJ-evaluative content, which is shown in the bottom section of 
Table 21. There was a clear differentiation among the four news organizations in 
enforcing their editorial policies, with the Journal and the Guardian running in opposite 
directions. In the Journal distribution, 81.0% of the editorials or signed columns 
examined revealed a tone unfavorable or contextually unfavorable toward Al-Jazeera. In 
the Guardian distribution, to the contrary, 55.8 % of the opinion pieces examined were 
supportive of or at least contextually favorable toward the Arabic news channel. As for 
the rest of the news organizations, the “intensity” of opinion seemed to be weak in the 
Telegraph and Times op-ed pages. The Telegraph seemed to be somewhat disinclined to 
publicize voiced opinions about Al-Jazeera. Although in terms of a pro and con 
dichotomy the Telegraph distribution was tilted toward a negative direction, the 
frequencies of positive or negative articles were pretty low. In the case of the Times, this 
news organization seemed to make some efforts to “balance” the direction of opinion in 
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commentaries, although the percentage of the positive tone (34.5%) was somewhat 
higher than the percentage of the negative tone (24.1%) in the story-unit distribution.  
Indeed, a further explanation is necessary to fully illustrate the distributive 
features about the story tone found in the Times Op-Ed pages. When the analysis 
included letters-to-the-editor pieces that included AJ-evaluative content, the percentage 
of positive tone in opinion pieces from the Times went up to 43.6% (from 10 to 17 
articles). No remarkable change was found, however, in other newspapers’ story tone 
distributions when letters-to-the-editor pieces were added into the raw data. Thus there 
seemed to be nuanced differences between the Times and the Guardian in publicizing 
“voiced opinions” in their op-ed pages. In Guardian op-ed pages, the predominance of 
the voices sympathetic toward Al-Jazeera was fairly stable, regardless of whether or not 
opinions from ordinary readers were counted. In Times op-ed pages, however, the same 
phenomenon became far weaker when grassroots opinions were excluded from the 
calculation.   
 
Distribution of AJ-as-issue themes 
A content analysis of AJ-as-issue themes was conducted on the news stories and 
opinion pieces that included AJ-evaluative content. AJ-as-issue themes refer to a range of 
normative themes invoked in the AJ-as-issue discourse that described such issues as Al-
Jazeera’s character as an institution of journalism, the quality of news content broadcast 
by the news outlet, the conduct of media workers at the news organization, and the nature 
of an interaction between the news channel and outside forces. As described in the 
section “theme-unit analysis” of Chapter 3, the AJ-as-issue theme list consisted of 14 
theme categories, 7 positive and 7 negative. Each theme group (positive or negative) had 
4 norm-based theme categories (which were further divided into subcategories), 2 
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interaction-based theme categories, and 1 “other/unspecific” theme category. Using a 
unique theme as the unit of analysis, Table 22 gives a simplified version of the AJ-as-
issue theme distribution from the four newspapers, in terms of positive and negative 
themes. All AJ-as-issue themes used in this data presentation came from the post-9/11 
articles with substantial length (i.e., news stories with more than 150 words and opinion 
pieces except letters to the editor). 
When all AJ-as-issue themes found in both news stories and opinion pieces were 
combined, the distributive features (presented in the bottom section of Table 22) show 
that there existed highly significant differences across the newspapers in the proportion of 
positive themes to negative themes (χ2 = 38.851, d.f. = 3, p < .001). Congruent with the 
prior findings from the article-unit analysis of story tone, the Journal discourse was the 
least likely to invoke positive themes related to norms of news media in the evaluation of 
Al-Jazeera (31.8 % of AJ-as-issue themes), whereas the Guardian discourse showed the 
clearly opposite tendency (59.9% of themes). Within this continuum, the Telegraph fell 
closer to the Journal, and the Times was located nearer to the Guardian, in that 38.9% of 
themes from the Telegraph were positive, while 51.0% of themes from the Times were 
positive.  
Furthermore, the differences among the newspapers were also statistically 
significant for both news stories and opinion pieces (for news stories, χ2 = 14.554, d.f. = 
3, p = .002; for opinion pieces, χ2 = 30.507, d.f. = 3, p <.001). It is worthwhile to note that 
the differences were significant not only for opinion pieces but also for news stories in  
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Table 22: Distribution of AJ-as-Issue Themes in Terms of Positive and Negative  
Pro-war Paper Anti-war Paper
Theme type Journal Telegraph Times Guardian Sig. 
In news stories 
Positive theme 36.4% 38.9% 50.5% 56.1% p<.01
Negative theme 62.6 61.1 49.5 43.9  
Total 









In opinion pieces 
Positive theme 21.6 38.9 51.9 67.3 p<.01
Negative theme 78.4 61.1 48.1 32.7  
Total 









When combined  
Positive theme 31.8 38.9 51.0 59.9 p<.01
Negative theme 68.2 61.1 49.0 40.1  
Grand total 










Note. All themes were found in the post-9/11 news stories or opinion pieces including 
AJ-evaluative content. News stories shorter than 151 words and letters to the editor 
pieces were excluded from the analysis.    
 
the same direction. This indicates that the overall disparities across the newspapers based 
on the summation of themes from news stories and opinion pieces were not conflated by 
the inter-newspaper differences that solely originated from opinion pieces. Since the 
editorial policy governed both news and opinion as to the matter of the invocation of AJ-
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as-issue themes in media discourse, the following presentation of further findings does 
not divide news stories and opinion pieces for the merit of simplicity.  
As a next step, using the unique theme as the unit of analysis again, Table 23 
gives an overview of the AJ-as-issue theme distribution from the four newspapers, 
grouping all theme categories within two classes, a positive and a negative theme group. 
Both theme groups consist of four categories based on media norms (free/independent, 
professional/responsible, developmental/educational, alternative media), two categories 
based on media-outside actor interactions (target of bullying and enemy propaganda tool, 
either in their original or contrary form), and one “other/unspecific” category. AJ-as-issue 
theme patterns divided into more detailed categories are shown in Appendix F. 
In general, the two pro-war newspapers were markedly higher than the anti-war 
newspapers in three negative AJ-as-issue theme categories: the negative 
professional/responsible media theme, the negative developmental/educational media 
theme, and the enemy propaganda tool theme. Of all AJ-as-issue theme categories, the 
Journal was highest (25.3%) in the negative professional/responsible media theme, and 
the Telegraph was highest (21.1%) in the enemy propaganda tool theme. In contrast, both 
anti-war newspapers were relatively high in two positive theme categories: the positive 
alternative media theme and the target of bullying theme. The Times and the Guardian, 
however, showed noticeable differences in the positive themes favored by each: the 
Times was higher in the professional/responsible media (11.3%) and the 
developmental/educational media themes (8.8%). Notably, although in all the newspapers 
negative professional/responsible media themes outnumbered positive ones, the Times 
most frequently invoked the positive version of this theme. In the case of the Guardian, 
this British newspaper was distinctive in emphasizing the positive alternative media 
(16.4%) and target of bullying themes (15.4%).    
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Table 23: Distribution of AJ-as-issue Themes by Major Theme Category 
Pro-war Paper Anti-war PaperAJ-as-issue theme 
Journal Telegraph Times Guardian 
Positive theme     
Free/independent media 
status 8.6% (n=14) 9.4% (n=17) 11.7%(n=33) 12.6%(n=40)
Professional reporting 
/responsible conduct 4.9     (8) 6.7   (12) 11.3   (32) 6.6   (21)
Developmental/educational 
function 6.8    (11) 6.7   (12) 8.8   (25) 4.7   (15)
Alternative media role 3.7     (6) 6.3   (16) 9.5   (27) 16.4   (52)
Rebuttal of propaganda 
tool 1.9     (3) 1.7     (3) 4.2   (12) 2.8    (9)
Target of bullying 3.1     (5) 5.0     (9) 7.8   (22) 15.4   (49)
Other/unspecific 1.9     (3) 0.7     (2) 3.2    (9) 3.8   (12)
Subtotal 30.9   (50) 39.4   (71) 56.5 (160) 62.3 (198)
Negative theme  
Not free/ independent 3.7    (6) 1.7    (3) 2.1    (6) 2.2    (7)
Not professional/ 
responsible 25.3   (41) 18.3   (33) 14.1   (40) 10.4   (33)
Not developmental/ 
educational 17.9   (29) 13.3   (24) 10.2   (29) 9.2   (29)
Not alternative 1.2    (2) 1.1    (2) 1.8    (5) 0.3    (1)
Enemy propaganda tool 16.7   (27) 21.1   (38) 9.9   (28) 10.1   (32)
Rebuttal of target of 
bullying 1.2    (2) 1.1    (2) 1.4    (4) 2.2    (7)
Other/unspecific 3.1    (5) 3.9    (7) 3.9   (11) 2.3   (11)
Subtotal 69.1  (112) 60.6  (109) 43.5  (123) 37.7  (120)
Total 100.0  (162) 100.0  (180) 100.0  (283) 100.0  (318)
Note. All themes were found in the post-9/11 news stories or opinion pieces including 
AJ-evaluative content. Only articles of substantial length were examined. 
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To gain further insights in the AJ-as-issue theme patterns, the theme frequency 
data were converted into a matrix of article-based theme co-occurrences and then were 
submitted to a multidimensional scaling (MDS) program available in SPSS. A MDS 
algorithm accepts a matrix of item-item proximities, and then assigns the location of each 
item into a low dimensional space suitable for data mapping. The MDS technique has 
been widely used in the analysis of co-word, co-citation, co-membership, and other types 
of social interaction (Ahlgren, Jarneving, & Rousseau, 2003, p.557). Here, the objective 
was to visually summarize the co-invocation patterns of multiple types of AJ-as-issue 
themes from the four newspapers. The analytical procedure was as follows: (1) by 
modifying AJ-as-issue theme categories to select distinctive theme types, theme co-
occurrences were arranged in a data matrix; (2) a proximity matrix was created to show 
the pair-wise “nearness” between the selected theme types and between each theme type 
and each newspaper; and (3) the proximity matrix was submitted to the MDS computer 
program.  
In the first stage, the theme-unit data found in Table 23 were converted into 
article-based data by reviewing and modifying the AJ-as-issue theme categories to 
determine important theme types and create a matrix of theme co-occurrences. As stated 
above, the original AJ-as-issue theme list had 14 categories, 7 positive and 7 negative: 4 
norm-based categories, 2 interaction-based categories, and 1 “other/unspecific” category. 
For each of the positive and negative theme groups, the 4 norm-based categories (which 
had been further divided into 8 subcategories) were re-arranged based on the frequency 
patterns at the subcategory level.32 As regards the two interaction-based categories, only 
 
32The norm-based theme subcategories were re-arranged according to three principles: (1)  when both of 
the two subcategories in a norm had extremely low frequencies in all the newspapers, the data specific to 
this norm were eliminated (e.g., the negative theme subcategories for free/independent and alternative 
media); (2) when both of the two subcategories had similar frequency patterns in all of the newspapers or 
when one subcategory showed extremely low frequencies, these subcategories were collapsed into the 
larger category (e.g., the positive theme subcategories for free/independent, professional/responsible, 
the original forms of theme invocation (not their “rebuttal” themes) were considered in 
the modified AJ-as-issue theme list.33 The “other/unspecific” categories were eliminated. 
Finally, four dummy-coded newspaper variables (one for each newspaper) were created 
and added to the theme type vectors. As a result, the matrix of theme co-occurrences 
comprised 14 vectors: 5 positive theme types (free/independent, professional/responsible, 
developmental/educational, alternative media, and target of bullying); 5 negative theme 
types (unprofessional/biased, sensational/unethical in handling graphic information, 
dysfunctional for Arab democracy, obstructive to pro-U.S./Western views, and enemy 
propaganda tool); and 4 newspaper dummies. Due to the restrictions in the original 
theme coding protocol, each positive theme type had a possible maximum count of 6 and 
each negative theme type of 3 per article. These data were re-coded on an ordinal scale 
ranging between 1 and 3 (for counts of 3 or higher), which indicated the “strength” of the 
theme type in each article. 
In the second stage of the MDS analysis, a matrix of proximities between themes 
was calculated, using Salton’s (1989) cosine coefficient.34 The cosine similarity measure, 
a popular choice in research of inter-document similarity, was selected because it is 
relatively insensitive to a small number of particularly long documents that contain many 
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developmental/educational, and alternative media); and (3) when two subcategories had distinctive 
frequency patterns across the newspapers, each was treated separately (e.g., negative theme subcategories 
for professional/responsible and developmental/educational media).  
33If an article was multiple-coded for both an interaction-based theme and its rebuttal, the presence of the 
interaction theme in the article was accepted only when the count for the original theme exceeded the count 
for its rebuttal theme in the article. 
34The cosine similarity is the cosine of the angle between two vectors. For this study, the cosine measure 
between two objects O1 and O2 was defined as: 
 
where COij is the value assigned to the co-occurrence (strength score for theme type and absence/presence 
score for newspaper) between ith row (article) and jth column (theme type or newspaper).  
attributes simply due to their length.35 For each of the theme types and newspaper 
dummies in the matrix, a corresponding weight term was created to take into account the 
relative frequency (i.e., the frequency relative to the highest count in the article-unit data 
set).36 Calculation of proximities was based on the strength of each theme type, while 
calculation of weights was based on the presence of each theme type. Hence the weighted 
proximity data set contained two kinds of information about AJ-as-issue theme 
invocation patterns. 
In the final stage of the MDS analysis, the cosine-based proximity matrix and the 
weights matrix were submitted to the PROXSCAL program (using the “full matrix,” 
“ordinal data level,” and “untie tied observations” options). Figure 2 presents the visual 
summary of the AJ-as-issue theme invocation patterns in the four newspapers. The 
specific coordinate values for each theme type and newspaper are presented in Table 24. 
Since most positive AJ-as-issue themes were located to the left of the midpoint on 
the X-axis and most negative themes to the right of it, the eigenvector represented by the 
X-axis was interpreted as the positive-negative dimension. The two pro-war newspapers 
(the Journal and the Telegraph), as anticipated, were located in the negative side and the  
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35The cosine similarity measure, however, assumes an interval scale of data, a condition not met here. For 
comparison, therefore, the same MDS procedure described above was repeated using Spearman’s rank 
order correlation as an alternative similarity measure. Since the results of the two MDS analyses were very 
similar, only the result of the one based on the cosine coefficient is reported here. 
36Since the SPSS program (PROXSCAL) accepts weight terms in a matrix, a matrix of pair-wise weights 
(or relative frequencies) was created by applying the following formula: 
  
where fi (fj) was the number of articles that contained (or belonging to) ith (jth) theme type (or newspaper), 
and fim (fjm) was the highest frequency count either for the theme types (ftm) or for the newspapers (fnm) in 
the data set. For the AJ-as-issue theme types, the enemy propaganda tool theme showed the highest 
presence-based frequency (ftm = 91). For the newspaper variables, the Guardian dummy showed the highest 
frequency (fnm = 117). The formulation of weights was based on the “normalized function” method, one of 
the ways often used in research of online data retrieval to emphasize the effects of certain terms that are 
frequent in a corpus of documents. In the field of information science, several similarity measures and other 
weights parameters, including relative term frequency, have been proposed and assessed on the criterion of 
accurate data retrieval. For details, see Frakes and Baeza-Yates (1992); Salton and Buckley (1988).  
Figure 2. Visualized AJ-as-issue Co-theme Patterns in the U.S. and British Press 
 
two anti-war papers (the Times and the Guardian) in the positive side. On the Y-axis, the 
U.S. newspapers were located in the lower half and the British newspapers in the upper 
half, and thus the eigenvector represented by the Y-axis were interpreted as country 
differentiation. Remarkably, both British papers were located relatively close to the 
negative theme of sensational/unethical in handling graphic information. This can be 
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explained by the British-specific issue environment during the Iraq War, which involved 
controversy over the BBC’s airing of Al-Jazeera footage of dead British soldiers. During 
the Iraq War, several British soldiers were missing; later it was discovered they had been 
captured and executed by Iraqis. Al-Jazeera broadcast footage showing the dead bodies. 
BBC’s airing of part of the footage over the objections of the bereaved families sparked 
controversies related to media ethics. While the direct target of criticism was BBC rather 
than Al-Jazeera, British media coverage of and commentary on this topic often contained 
negative insinuations about Arab media behavior.  
The positive-negative dimension clearly differentiates between the pro-war and 
anti-war newspapers in their AJ-as-issue theme invocation patterns. The county 
differentiation dimension is especially helpful for differentiating between the two pro-war 
newspapers: the Journal was located close to all negative themes except the 
sensational/unethical in handling graphic information, while this was the theme closest 
to the Telegraph. Both newspapers frequently invoked the interaction-based theme of 
propaganda tool, which was located around the midpoint between the two pro-war 
newspapers. The British media’s focus on Al-Jazeera’s handling of controversial footage, 
however, seems insufficient to explain the differentiation between the Times and the 
Guardian.37 Although the Guardian was located close to the sensational/unethical in  
 
37This interpretation was backed by the results of an additional MDS analysis, using a weighted MDS 
(WMDS) procedure. Often called individualized differences scaling (INDSCAL), WMDS accepts multiple 
sub-group proximity data and allows the investigator to produce low-dimensional spaces, not only the one 
shared by all subgroups but also the one specific to each subgroup. Each group-specific space configuration 
space is generated by applying the “dimension weights” derived from the common space configuration (for 
details, see Kruskal & Wish, 1978). For the WMDS procedure, the analytical steps described earlier were 
repeated, except that this time the newspaper dummy variables were not included in the proximity data. 
Instead, four matrices of newspaper-specific proximities, along with their corresponding weights matrices, 
were created in the MDS design of < 10 AJ-as-issue theme types × 10 AJ-as-issue theme types × 4 
newspapers >. The coordinates from the prior MDS analysis were used as a starting configuration and the 
PROXSCAL program was run for iterations of one (the minimum allowed by the program), because the 
purpose of the analysis was to determine the dimension weights for each newspaper with regard to the two 
dimensions already known from the prior MDS analysis. The SPSS program yielded a two-dimensional 
weights plot, in which the dimension weights for each newspaper were projected on a two-dimensional 
space. On the positive-negative dimension, both of the pro-war papers showed higher weight values than 
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did the anti-war papers, which indicated a differentiation between the pro-war and anti-war press. On the 
country differentiation dimension, however, a clear differentiation between the U.S. and British press was 
not observed, which suggested that the “country differentiation” dimension did not fully differentiate 
between the U.S. and British press. 
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handling graphic information theme, the two-dimensional plot revealed other noticeable 
differences between the two anti-war newspapers: relatively speaking, the Times favored 
the professional/responsible and developmental/educational media themes, while the 
Guardian favored the alternative media and especially the target of bullying theme. 
Returning to RQ 3, all of the findings described so far make three points about the 
inter-newspaper differences as follows:  
 
1. The anti-war newspapers were more likely than the pro-war newspapers to invoke 
positive themes related to Al-Jazeera. 
2. The two pro-war newspapers were more likely than the other two anti-war 
newspapers to concentrate on the invocation of the negative themes suggesting 
either Al-Jazeera’s unprofessional, sensational, or irresponsible behavior or its 
propagandistic practice without journalistic integrity. 
3.  When the two anti-war newspapers were compared, the Times was more likely 
to invoke the positive themes that focused on either the professional qualifications 
of Al-Jazeera or the developmental role of this news organization in bringing 
democratic changes to the Arab worldm while the Guardian was more likely to 
invoke the positive themes that highlighted either the role of Al-Jazeera as an 
alternative medium or an unjustifiable intimidation by outside forces toward the 
Arab network.  
 
A meaningful interpretation of the differences between discourses of the two anti-
war newspapers goes beyond a simplistic decision of which was “more favorable” toward 
Al-Jazeera. Rather, the findings suggest how differently journalists at the two newspapers 
used their discretion to project certain normative visions about news media onto events or 
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issues involving Al-Jazeera, thereby attempting to shift the focus of debate in a wartime 
environment politicized by the confrontation between the U.S.-led war forces and the 
Arab network. In strategic terms, the key difference between the Times discourse and the 
Guardian discourse can be explained through the analogy of defense and attack. While 
the Times was concerned with “defending” Al-Jazeera from the allegations that it was not 
a legitimate news organization by the standards of professional or developmental media, 
the Guardian took a confrontational approach, highlighting the role of Al-Jazeera in 
disseminating challenging views about the U.S. foreign policy and by “attacking” the 
U.S. government for its alleged intimidation and misconduct of the Arab network. 
This interpretation just given can be documented by comparing the two 
newspaper’s editorials that mentioned Al-Jazeera during the major military campaigns in 
Iraq. In this period, three Times editorials and two Guardian editorials expressed views 
about issues related to Al-Jazeera. Although these editorials constituted only a small part 
of the entire AJ-as-issue discourse, they establish a strong basis from which the strategic 
positions of the two news organizations can be best inferred. As a supplementary 
discussion, the following section gives a brief qualitative analysis of the editorials that 
were published at the zenith of hostility from the two anti-war newspapers. 
 
Further Analysis of Anti-war Newspaper Discourse 
It is worth noting that the Iraq War period involved two controversies related to 
the Arab TV network. One issue was Al-Jazeera’s broadcast of the footage showing U.S. 
prisoners of war in Iraq as well as dead American and British servicemen, which was 
intensely criticized by Coalition leaders. The other was the U.S. military’s attacks on a 
hotel in Baghdad that killed foreign journalists including an Al-Jazeera employee, which 
this time, incurred accusations of the U.S. Command in the Arab world. Because these 
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two events had very different political implications for the ongoing tensions between the 
Arab broadcaster and the U.S. government, a supplementary review of the two 
newspapers’ editorial responses to these incidents helps clarify the differences between 
the U.S. and British anti-war newspapers in their rhetorical use of the Al-Jazeera case in 
the politicized context of debate.  
Two of the three aforementioned Times editorials were intended to comment on 
the New York Stock Exchange’s temporary expulsion of two Al-Jazeera reporters, which 
happened shortly after the controversial broadcast. In its second editorial on this topic, 
titled “Why Al-Jazeera matters,” this newspaper criticized the stock exchange’s decision 
and gave an excuse for the practice of Al-Jazeera as follows: 
  
The exchange’s complaint against Al-Jazeera is that it is not “responsible.” This is 
a cryptic allegation but it seems linked to the television stations’ decision last 
Sunday to show images of dead American and British soldiers as well as P.O.W.’s 
in Iraq. But Al-Jazeera says that after the Pentagon asked it to remove the pictures 
until families had been notified it did so for eight hours, while the television 
stations of numerous countries continued to show them (March, 30, 2003).  
 
In comparison, the Guardian took a different rhetorical strategy. In its editorial 
titled “The Geneva Convention can’t be applied selectively,” the British newspaper 
acknowledged Rumsfeld’s claim that Al-Jazeera’s showing of images of U.S. prisoners 
of war in Iraq was a violation of the Geneva Convention, by stating that the kind of 
journalistic practice that Al-Jazeera showed “smacks more of political manipulation for 
propaganda purposes than journalism.” However, the British newspaper soon quickly 
shifted its tone by pointing out a U.S. double standard: 
 
Such practices are revolting and should not be allowed to occur. Rumsfeld was 
right to say so. But he would be in a better position to stick up for the Geneva 
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Convention if he applied it himself. He does not. He was among the very first 
leading members of the U.S. administration who refused – and who still refuses – 
to grant the status of P.O.W.’s to the hundreds of people captured during the 
campaign in Afghanistan who are being held at the U.S. base in Guantanamo, 
Cuba (April, 3, 2003). 
 
Thus, the examples above suggest that the key difference between the two 
newspapers fits into the analogy of defense and attack; the Times was concerned with 
locating Al-Jazeera’s controversial conduct within the realm of legitimate journalism, 
while the Guardian made use of the incidence in turning the brunt of criticism to the 
disadvantage of the U.S. government.  
The other incident, the U.S. air raid on a Baghdad hotel that housed Al-Jazeera 
offices and its following tank shelling firing on the same building, took place on the 10th 
of April in 2003 – one Al-Jazeera reporter was fatally wounded during the air strikes and 
two other foreign journalists were killed later due to the tank fire. The Arab news 
channel’s editor-in-chief and some other journalists claimed that the building has been 
deliberately targeted to stifle coverage of the ongoing events in Baghdad. Immediately 
after the tragedy occurred, the Times editorially responded to these accusations. For 
instance, in “Covering the war,” this U.S. newspaper expressed sympathy toward those 
killed, but denounced Al-Jazeera employees’ claim that the U.S. military deliberately 
targeted foreign journalists to stifle coverage of the events in Baghdad, by saying: 
 
It is not surprising that Al-Jazeera staff members lashed out angrily in a moment 
of great pain, but their suspicions were groundless. The Bush administration has 
gone out of its way to accommodate the Arab media, particularly Al-Jazeera, the 
first completely uncensored TV channel in the Arab world. The last thing the 
military wanted to do so, with dozens of cameras from all over the world focused 
on its activities, was to assault the one foreign news network where it most covets 
favorable coverage (April, 10, 2003).  
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In contrast, the editorial page of the Guardian gave much more credit to the 
allegation that the U.S. military deliberately targeted the hotel. In its editorial titled 
“Excessive force by U.S. makes covering Iraq war deadly,” the Guardian pointed out that 
the U.S. Command had been aware of the hotel where most foreign journalists covering 
the war in Baghdad had been staying. The editorial at first described the U.S. tank shell 
firing on the hotel that killed two cameramen, one a Reuters reporter and the other a 
cameraman from Spanish TV channel Telecinco. Based on testimony by witnesses, the 
British newspaper rejected the Pentagon’s claim that the tank took a reflex action against 
initial firings from the hotel, and characterized the American fire as a “cool, calm, and 
deliberate act.” The editorial then mentioned the death of Al-Jazeera’s special 
correspondent Tarig Ayub that occurred hours before on the same day due to the U.S. air 
strikes on the building. This British newspaper, after describing the enraged reactions in 
the Arab world and among foreign journalists, concluded:   
 
The attack on the Palestinian hotel says much about the tactics used by the 
American army in Baghdad, which call for a massive barrage of firepower to deal 
with the slightest threat or apparent threat. The number of civilian victims 
probably runs into hundreds. […] What is at issue here is a type of military 
culture that doest not balk at using massive force against the smallest danger, 
whatever impact on civilians (April, 17, 2003). 
 
The differences in the editorial tone between the two newspapers just shown 
suggest that the Guardian was far more skeptical of the fundamentally benevolent nature 
of American power intervening in foreign regions – a core belief or a national ideology of 
which the Times did not make an issue, at least in its own editorial statements. As a 
matter of fact, this U.S. newspaper, a few days after the abovementioned editorial came 
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out, put up a letter-to-the-editor piece that criticized the news organization’s view. In the 
name of the Committee to Protect Journalists, the piece titled “Deaths of journalists” said: 
 
[T]he allegation by the staff of Al-Jazeera that the coalition directly targeted its 
offices was not merely an emotional reaction to the loss of a colleague. Al-
Jazeera’s office in Kabul, Afghanistan, was also destroyed by an American 
missile in November 2001. The bombing of the Baghdad office of Al-Jazeera 
came on the same day as strikes on two other media facilities in Baghdad: the 
office of Abu Dhabi TV was damaged by tank fire, and the Palestinian hotel was 
struck by a tank round, killing two more reporters (April, 14, 2003).  
 
The example above shows that a strong suspicion of the unjustifiable U.S. 
intimidation of Arab journalism did exist in the Times discourse. Yet this news 
organization’s editorial view, along with its treatment of this outsider perspective also 
suggests that non-mainstream or “radical” voices critical of an American-led war were 
marginalized under the hierarchy of access in the media-constructed debates over 
concerns related to Al-Jazeera.  
This does not mean that the Times was editorially uncritical of the Bush 
administration’s approach to problems related to Al-Jazeera. In the early phase of the 
War on Terror period and thereafter, this newspaper carried some news analyses and 
opinion pieces that criticized the White House’s inability to recognize the influence of the 
TV network in the Arab world and to utilize the news channel for a public relations 
campaign in a war to win the hearts and minds of the Arab Muslims. Still, such criticisms 
of the U.S. handling of Al-Jazeera seemed to have been contained under the news 
organization’s editorial policy that governed the overall coverage of the post-9/11 U.S.-
involved foreign crises – a political stance and its related rhetorical strategy that 
concentrated on problems with the U.S. performance, rather than on the ultimate 
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soundness of the government policy in favor of a militaristic solution to foreign 
problems.  
This editorial line is documented by a Columbia Journalism Review article 
(Mooney, 2004), which examined editorial responses of major U.S. newspapers to the 
U.S. decision of going to war in Iraq and concluded that all the newspapers examined, 
including the Times, remained uncritical of the ambiguous U.S. claims of the Iraq 
possession of weapons of mass destruction. Even in the case of anti-war newspapers, 
according to the article, the specific reasons given for their opposition to the war had less 
to do with the credibility of the government-claimed case for a war than with problems 
regarding the implementation of the war, especially the insufficient international support 
for the proposed U.S. plan to overthrow the Iraq regime.  
Not only did the Times suppress the strongly suspected U.S. military misconduct 
toward Al-Jazeera, the newspaper occasionally relied on the effectiveness of the 
government’s war-promoting rhetoric to underscore a U.S. need to respect Al- Jazeera’s 
way of doing journalism. For instance, a few days earlier than the abovementioned “Why 
Al-Jazeera matters,” the Times published an editorial titled “Stock Exchange follies” in a 
series of commentaries on the New York Stock Exchange’s ban of Al-Jazeera reporters. 
In the editorial, this newspaper criticized the stock exchange’s decision by making a 
reference to the Bush administration’s claimed reasons for the Iraq War and the 
Pentagon’s “embedding” program for journalists including Al-Jazeera reporters:  
 
One of the stated purposes of the war in Iraq is to bring freedom to the Iraqi 
people – including, presumably, freedom of speech and freedom of the press. To 
underscore the message, the Pentagon made sure that reporters from Al-Jazeera, 
the hugely influential Arab network, were included among all the other 
correspondents traveling with the United States military. It is thus, the height of 
irony, if not foolishness, that the New York Stock Exchange has now seen fit to 
 153
revoke the credentials of two Al-Jazeera reporters who have covered the exchange 
without incident for more than five years (March, 26, 2003). 
 
The example above gives an illustration of how this news organization 
rhetorically managed its tone of voice, siding with Al-Jazeera in line with the dominant 
government policy position. Critical U.S. media researchers have noted that the 
mainstream U.S. news media, in coverage of the government’s foreign policy and its 
implementation, tends to patrol the boundaries of an issue culture and keep discords 
within the bounds set by government officials (e.g., Hallin, 1986; Herman & Chomsky, 
1988; Mermin, 1996). Given this critique, the Times’ editorial view on Al-Jazeera can be 
seen as staying within, rather than departing from, the general tendency of the U.S. media 
just noted.  
In summary, the researcher’s close reading of the editorial pages of the two news 
organizations helps in further understanding the politicized nature of the media 
discussion of normative concerns related to Al-Jazeera, against the background of the 
ongoing conflicts between the Arab broadcaster and the American/British government 
leaders. Recalling the results of the AJ-as-issue theme analysis in the previous section, 
much of the differences in theme invocation patterns between the Times and the 
Guardian can be recapped through the analogy of defense and attack in strategic terms. 
The Times discourse underscored Al-Jazeera’s independent status in the Arab world and 
engaged itself in matters of whether the Arab news channel is professionally responsible 
or developmentally desirable, to defend the TV station from the charges of deviant media 
behavior. In comparison, the Guardian discourse depicted Al-Jazeera as an alternative 
source of suppressed news and views in the political environment of a confrontation 
between the Arab world and the U.S.-led forces. This approach laid out groundwork for 
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the newspaper’s editorial attacks on U.S. “bullying” or its “double standard” implying the 





SUMMARY OF FINDINGS  
This research project, as the title of this dissertation suggests, has attempted to 
uncover how American and British editors and reporters at major news organizations paid 
attention to and made use of Al-Jazeera, through their journalistic efforts to describe and 
comment on part of the complex reality on the U.S.-led war on terror and its subsequent 
war in Iraq. To grasp the multifaceted journalistic use of Al-Jazeera, the researcher 
identified three modes of media discourse related to the Arab TV network, addressing AJ 
either as a source of information, as a subject of media-mediated debate, or as a 
normative issue related to the principles of journalism. For the purpose of a comparative 
content analysis, this case study introduced into the research design two possible sources 
of variation, one being a newspaper’s editorial policy toward the war (pro-war versus 
anti-war) and the other being the national context (American versus British).  
With regard to RQ 1, the followings are the characteristics of the newspaper 
discourses addressing AJ as source:  
 
1. The pro-war newspapers (i.e., the Journal and the Telegraph) were more likely 
than their anti-war counterparts (i.e., the Times and the Guardian) to restrict the 
use of Al-Jazeera as a source of news to cover matters related to Osama bin Laden 
or the Al-Qaeda organization. In comparison, the anti-war newspapers showed a 
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higher level of content diversity in picking up information from Al-Jazeera for 
news reporting. 
2. The anti-war newspapers were more likely than the pro-war newspapers to cite 
Al-Jazeera as a source of regional news, including the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
stories, and opinions originating from the Middle East. 
 
With regard to RQ 2, the followings are the characteristics of the newspaper 
discourses addressing AJ as subject of media-mediated debate:  
3. The pro-war newspapers were more likely than the anti-war newspapers to let the 
voices of their government/military officials set the tone for the debate in the 
news discourse describing the controversies involving Al-Jazeera. 
4. All of the newspapers examined carried some news stories suggesting journalistic 
use of Al-Jazeera as a news icon, through which the voices of Al-Jazeera 
employees and audience members in the Arab/Muslim communities were given a 
priority in the media-constructed debate of the subjects related to the Arab TV 
network. 
5. Icon-driven reporting was more extensive in the anti-war press than in the pro-war 
press. By the criteria of both quantity and quality of icon-driven news stories, the 
two anti-war newspapers provided more depth and richness than did their pro-war 
competitors in the coverage of the issues involving Al-Jazeera. 
 
Finally, with regard to RQ 3, the followings are the characteristics of the 
newspaper discourses addressing AJ as normative issue: 
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6. In both reporting and commentary, the pro-war newspapers were more likely than 
the anti-war newspapers to invoke negative themes in the media description and 
evaluation of Al-Jazeera. 
7. The pro-war newspapers were more likely to invoke negative themes implying 
Al-Jazeera’s irresponsible conduct, unprofessional reporting, or its role in 
spreading anti-U.S. propaganda. Meanwhile, the anti-war newspapers were more 
likely to invoke positive themes suggesting the role of Al-Jazeera as an alternative 
media outlet or its status under an unjustifiable intimidation by outer forces. 
8. Between the anti-war newspapers of the two countries, differences were found in 
the types of positive themes frequently invoked. Relatively speaking, the Times 
invoked more frequently positive themes advocating Al-Jazeera’s professional 
qualifications or its role in liberalizing the Arab world, while the Guardian was 
mainly concerned with highlighting the status of Al-Jazeera as a source of 
challenging views and also with criticizing the U.S. government and military for 
its problematic conduct toward the Arab broadcaster.  
 
Generally speaking, regarding the two-by-two factorial research design, the 
findings indicate that the differences between the pro-war and anti-war press were far 
more pronounced than were the differences between the U.S. and British press. 
Therefore, the factor of newspaper editorial policy (pro-war versus anti-war) accounted 
for most of the variances within media discourse in three areas of examination: media 
discourse addressing AJ as a source of information, as a subject of media-mediated 
debate, and as a normative issue of journalism. In both the U.S. and British newspapers, 
the anti-war press showed a higher degree of content diversity in terms of AJ-as-source 
topic than did the pro-war press. The degree of the AJ-as-subject source diversification 
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was also higher in the anti-war press than in the pro-war press. Finally, the newspapers of 
the anti-war policy category invoked favorable AJ-as-issue themes more frequently than 
did the pro-war newspaper delineation.  
The other two-conditional factor, national context (American versus British, 
which was assumed to lead to country-specific media practices), proved limited in its 
ability to account for the features of the media discourse concerning Al-Jazeera. To a 
limited extent, some findings indicated cross-national differences. Specifically, the 
analysis of AJ-as-source topics showed that the two British newspapers, regardless of 
their editorial policy, showed a higher percentage of the war information category than 
did their American counterparts. This may suggest that the two British newspapers were 
more likely than the two U.S. newspapers to incorporate into their news discourse the 
war-related information supplied by Al-Jazeera. However, the results of the same 
analysis failed to support this interpretation when the raw data were limited to news 
stories whose AJ-sourced content had medium or high importance.   
Therefore, national context, at least as an isolated factor, did not seem to greatly 
affect much the features of AJ-sourced or AJ-evaluative content. However, it is important 
to note that some cross-national differences were found in the thematic expressions in 
AJ-evaluative content when the condition of newspaper policy was anti-war. The Times 
and the Guardian, although both newspapers invoked favorable AJ-as-issue themes more 
often than unfavorable ones, were differentiated in that the U.S. newspaper frequently 
invoked the kind of themes “defending” Al-Jazeera, while the British broadsheet 
frequently invoked themes “attacking” the U.S. government.  
On the surface, these discrepancies in the AJ-as-issue theme distribution seem to 
originate from the “unique” characteristic of each individual news organization under the 
same condition of anti-war policy. At a deeper level, however, the use of the analogies of 
 159
                                                
defense and attack, which characterize the differences in the rhetorical strategies between 
the Times discourse and the Guardian discourse, can be seen as reflecting the influence 
of national context in a subtle form. As illustrated in the additional editorial analysis, the 
Times refrained from expanding its defense of Al-Jazeera to the extent of questioning the 
soundness of the U.S. decision to go to war, while the Guardian demonstrated little 
reservation for criticizing the U.S. government by making a reference to Al-Jazeera. 
Critical media scholars, as mentioned at the end of Chapter 4, have noted the 
ideologically limited nature of American journalism patrolling the boundary of an issue 
culture, especially with regard to U.S.-involved foreign affairs (e.g., Hallin, 1986; 
Herman & Chomsky, 1988). Considering this, national context, which was defined in the 
Introduction (Chapter 1) as a national issue culture providing a meaningful context for 
media reporting and commentary, can be thought of as establishing a certain degree of 
“permissible” ideas expressed in media criticism of the government policy. In this sense, 
the possible “effect” of a nationalistic issue culture (i.e., a condition that represents a high 
degree of cultural restraint on permissible media criticism) would occur largely in the 
press opposing the government policy, not in the press favoring the government policy.38 
The findings from the cross-national analysis of AJ-as-issue media discourse suggest that 
British journalists, compared with their American colleagues, were surrounded by a less 
nationalistic issue culture, thus maintaining a wider latitude for the journalistic use of the 
 
38To paraphrase this interpretation, the presumed effect of national context can be thought of as 
establishing a certain degree of cultural restraint on permissible media criticism. Then, the effect of national 
context would be largely interactional with newspaper editorial policy, depending on the condition of the 
latter variable (pro-war versus anti-war). Specifically, the size of the interaction effect (in a negative 
direction) would be more pronounced in the anti-war newspaper condition than in the pro-war newspaper 
condition. As a result, under the two-by-two research design of this study, the ant-war newspaper group 
(i.e., the Times and the Guardian) would show a higher level of differentiation due to the different 
conditions of national context (high cultural restraint versus low cultural restraint) than would the pro-war 
newspaper group (i.e., the Journal and the Telegraph).  
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Al-Jazeera references and sources as a means of criticizing the U.S.-leading war-oriented 
policy. 
In summary, the whole results of this study indicate both the shared and the 
particular features of the U.S. and British media discourses concerning Al-Jazeera. First, 
in both countries’ newspapers, a parallel form of polarization was found between the pro-
war and anti-war papers, in the extent of (1) giving gravity to Al-Jazeera as a legitimate 
source of news, (2) expanding the range of voices uttering views regarding Al-Jazeera, 
and (3) describing favorably Al-Jazeera or describing unfavorably political actors in 
conflict with the news organization. Second, the difference in terms of defense and attack 
in the theme invocation patterns between the Times and the Guardian can be interpreted 
as reflecting a combined influence (or an “interaction effect”) of a news organization’s 
political stance and country-specific issue culture.  
 
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS 
The findings summarized above also provide useful data for further 
interpretations with regard to the theoretical issues identified in Chapter 2 – the diversity 
of news content in the international news flow from Al-Jazeera to the U.S. and British 
press; journalistic use of accidental events related to Al-Jazeera as a catalyst for bringing 
non-mainstream views into news discourse; and the rhetorical role of media-related 
norms in the politicized debate of the Al-Jazeera case. 
 
Diversified International News Flow  
This case study began with the researcher’s comment on the relay by Western 
media of content supplied by Al-Jazeera – an interesting anomaly, given the international 
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flow of news that usually runs from the West to the East (or from the North and to the 
South). However, concerning the range of the Al-Jazeera-sourced news material picked 
up by American and British reporters, one may raise the following question: after all, was 
the Arab news outlet able to provide to the American and British news discourse not only 
much-hated Al-Qaeda messages but also alternative accounts of war and “Arab-oriented” 
perspectives on the post-9/11 U.S. military intervention within the Arab/Muslim region 
and on the continuing Israeli-Palestinian problem? This question has significance in the 
discussion of whether and how much the “reverse” news flow contributed to the U.S. and 
British media’s broadened, comprehensive, and evenhanded approach in coverage of the 
Arab world during the period of hostility.    
In short, the answer to the question seems to be yes, but certainly within a limited 
range and with substantial variations among the two countries’ press examined. The 
positive answer is especially relevant to the Times and the Guardian, the newspapers that 
editorially criticized their governments’ decision of going to war in Iraq. The two 
newspapers, in their selection of the news content broadcast by Al-Jazeera, seem to have 
treated the Arab news outlet more than as a propaganda outlet chosen by Osama bin 
Laden. Certainly, one main purpose for both newspapers of quoting the satellite TV 
station was to report and analyze bin Laden’s chilling statements and their related 
incidents. Yet each news outlet also provided a considerable number of news stories that 
included news contents from Al-Jazeera or opinions of its employees in the U.S. or 
British press coverage of other affairs, such as war developments in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, the second Intifada in the West Bank, and Arab opinions concerned with the 
ongoing crises in the Middle East. Given that few sources of news existed outside of the 
Pentagon’s version of events during the Gulf War in 1991, Al-Jazeera’s availability to the 
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Western media in recent years made less successful the U.S. military’s control of the 
factual and contextual information getting out to the American and British news outlets.  
Admittedly, this interpretation should accompany an important warning; that is, 
quoting a non-Western TV station is not the same as accepting it as a trustworthy source 
of information. The content analysis of AJ-sourced content yielded a finding that, in all of 
the newspapers, Al-Jazeera was usually cited as a supplementary or counterbalancing 
source of information, except when it appeared as the first source in breaking news 
stories about Osama bin Laden’s latest messages. In addition, the researcher found that 
the U.S. and British newspapers occasionally showed strong reservation about the 
credibility of the war-related information supplied by Al-Jazeera, by treating the TV 
station as an unconfirmed source of battle reports or allegations made by the “U.S. 
enemy” about American military setbacks. All in all, the distribution of AJ-as-source 
topics in the Times and the Guardian shows that correspondents working for the news 
organizations made use of Al-Jazeera as a convenient hub of Arab news, in order to cope 
with difficulties accessing radical voices and scenes of violent conflicts in the Middle 
East. This does not mean, however, that the two countries’ media granted the Arab TV 
network as much credibility as major Western news agencies or other West-based 
institutions of journalism would usually receive.  
 
Journalistic Use of News Icon in Foreign Affairs Coverage  
Another theoretical issue underlying this research is concerned with a question of 
whether and to what degree the U.S. news media are independent from the clout of 
official sources, especially in coverage of U.S. foreign policy. As discussed in the 
theoretical review, many researchers agree that American reporters tend to give an 
excessive priority to views expressed in the mainstream governmental debate while 
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marginalizing grassroots and activist opinions. Yet scholarship on this topic also suggests 
two conditions for a departure from this media habit. One possibility comes from the 
journalistic formula requiring counterbalancing. According to this view, journalists can 
seek out oppositional voices and foreign elite sources outside the official circle of debate 
to meet the journalistic norms of balancing and conflict, especially under a condition in 
which members of the opposition party in Congress do not dare to challenge a dominant 
policy position (e.g., Althaus, 2003; Althaus, Edy, Entman, & Phalen, 1996). This 
scenario seems to have been realized during the period of the pre-Iraq War debate at U.N. 
Security Council, for U.S. journalists had good reason to cite French and German leaders 
as legitimate foreign elite opinions opposing the U.S.-led war plan. 
The other possibility concerns the characteristics of accident- or icon-driven 
news. Some studies shed light on the journalistic use of an accidental occurrence beyond 
the control of official sources as a challenging “news icon,” a means of symbolically 
addressing a broader issue beyond the specific incident itself and expanding the range of 
views expressed in news stories (e.g., Bennett & Lawrence, 1995; Lawrence, 1996). Prior 
research on icon-driven news, however, focused on media coverage of domestic issues, 
not on U.S. foreign policy or its implementations. This case study recognizes that the rise 
and performance of Al-Jazeera was one of the most dramatic examples signifying the 
foreign challenge to U.S. policymakers. The results of this study indicate that, in the 
media presentation of news topics related to Al-Jazeera, there existed competing types of 
news reporting – especially between the routine coverage occurring largely within 
government- or military-controlled beats and the non-routine coverage implying Al-
Jazeera’s near-iconic status in the practices of wartime journalism. Markedly, the anti-
war newspapers displayed a higher level of critical independence by more frequently 
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employing occurrences related to Al-Jazeera as symbolic pegs on which to hang Arab 
Muslim points of view or criticisms of the administration policy. 
However, it would be an overstatement to say that the media accounts of the 
events involving Al-Jazeera mainly came from accident- or icon-driven reporting. The 
U.S. and British officials exercised their influence to play down the credibility of Al-
Jazeera-sourced information and played catch-up with the unexpected political spin-offs 
to suppress their negative effects on the wartime public relations campaign. Markedly, 
the pro-war newspapers seemed to have let the authoritative sources set the agenda and 
the tone of the media debate. Furthermore, it must be noted that news reports about Al-
Jazeera and its related incidence were, after all, only a part of the entire media coverage 
of the U.S.-led War on Terror policy and its following war in Iraq. Thus, the findings 
from the analysis of AJ-as-subject discourse should be interpreted as indicating, not the 
overall features of the post-9/11 media coverage of U.S. foreign policy, but the unique 
characteristics in the journalistic construction of a side issue in wartime, where the 
presence of non-routine news contributed to a wider distance between the White House’s 
preferred version of foreign affairs and the ways the media actually reported them.  
 
Politicization of the Normative Character of Journalism  
The third theoretical topic is connected to the rhetorical significance of media-
related cultural norms in public debates over issues related to news media or government 
policy involving the media. As noted in the theoretical review, normative thinking about 
news media has an important status in our understanding of democracy and politics. At 
the same time, the normative aspects of journalism have a pluralistic and contestable 
nature in discursive practices, which is exploitable by various interests including 
government officials, journalists, media owners, and other actors engaged in the 
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discussion of media-related affairs. Successful political communication requires the 
framing of events, issues, or actors in ways that promote certain perceptions and 
interpretations that benefit one side while hindering the other (Entman, 2003, p.416). 
Framing theorists have noted the significance of culturally salient ideas and narratives in 
the framing process, stating that frames that employ culturally resonant terms have 
greater potential for influence (e.g., Gamson, 1992; Snow & Benford, 1988). In this 
regard, familiar media-related notions such as media freedom and responsibility can be 
thought of as widely-accepted cultural themes resonating with certain facets of 
events/issues/actors which are selected and highlighted through framing efforts. 
With this theoretical premise, the researcher examined how the U.S. and British 
newspapers, in news reporting and commentary, underscored certain event/issue/actor 
characteristics out of the stream of occurrences involving Al-Jazeera, in ways that 
invoked media-related normative themes, and subsequently conveyed moral judgments 
about the situation described. The findings indicated that the two countries’ pro-war press 
frequently presented negative evaluations of Al-Jazeera based on professional or 
responsible media criteria, while their anti-war counterparts more often gave either 
positive evaluations of Al-Jazeera or negative evaluations of political actors who were in 
conflict with the Arab news outlet, on the basis of cultural norms related to alternative 
media or unjustifiable threat to press freedom. Furthermore, a supplementary review of 
the editorial pages of the Times and the Guardian in the Iraq War period suggests that 
many of the features of the AJ-as-issue discourse were the outcome of the news 
organization’s political consideration — the editorial issue position and its related 
rhetorical strategy in wartime reporting. Specifically, the Times was mainly concerned 
with presenting Al-Jazeera as a “legitimate” source of oppositional voices, while the 
Guardian concentrated on taking advantage of the Al-Jazeera case to symbolically 
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recount the problematic nature of the U.S. military invasion and the resistance of the 
Arab/Muslim world. The discrepancies in the normative theme invocation pattern among 
the American and British newspapers support an interpretation that the organizational 
filter of editorial policy played an important role in determining the direction of the 




The most important finding from this cross-national study is that, in all the three 
areas of examination (i.e., the analyses of the media discourse addressing AJ as source, 
subject, and normative issue), the differences associated with newspaper editorial policy 
were much greater than the differences associated with country-specific national context. 
Therefore, the Journal was closer to the Telegraph than to the Times, not only in the 
editorial view of Al-Jazeera but also in other features of reporting — specifically, in the 
degree of limiting both the scope of information supplied by Al-Jazeera and the range of 
voices expressing their views about the Arab broadcaster. A news organization’s editorial 
stance toward the dominant government policy seemed to govern the reporting and 
commentary of the newspaper in many aspects. 
This result raises a warning signal against the oversimplification of media 
characteristics into country-specific terms, such as the discussion of some “common” 
features of American (or British) press. Some characteristics of a major U.S. news 
organization may not be applicable to other U.S. news organizations and may not be 
U.S.-specific. As discussed in preceding sections, the journalistic use of information 
sourced from Al-Jazeera was not limited to the relay of Al-Qaeda terrorist messages; nor 
was the media coverage of issues involving the Arab TV station reduced into the “routine 
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news” occurring within the government-controlled beats. These findings, however, were 
predominantly relevant to those news organizations that both possessed the personell and 
other types of resources needed to assign to foreign affairs coverage and also were 
editorially opposed the U.S.-led war; the findings were not relevant to U.S.- or U.K.-
based news organizations in general. While it seems obvious that all news organizations 
are not the same, this fact may receive little consideration in a cross-national approach.  
This is not to say that the nationality factor was meaningless. Regarding the media 
selection and presentation of issues related to Al-Jazeera, the analysis of normative AJ-
as-issue theme invocation patterns showed that noticeable differences existed, not only 
between the pro-war and anti-war papers but also within the anti-war press of the U.S. 
and Britain. Concerning the latter result, the researcher suggested that national context, 
which can be interpreted as a national-level cultural restraint on the expression of critical 
ideas in media discourse, may have exercised a subtle form of influence especially on the 
press that editorially opposed the government policy. This helps explain why the Times 
discourse, which was situated in a relatively high national-level restraint condition (i.e., 
U.S. society), was differentiated from the Guardian discourse, in that the former 
discourse focused on defending the practice of Al-Jazeera while the latter discourse 
engaged in criticizing the U.S. government. 
Nevertheless, it must be noted that national context, a country-specific factor 
introduced in this study’s research design, does not mean a country-specific media 
characteristic inherent in the practices of news organizations. Rather, national context, as 
a national issue culture constituting the work environment for the journalist, can be 
thought of as a cultural form of restraint establishing the boundary of “legitimate” media 
criticism. Logically, a nationalistic issue culture does not have to restrain the practice of 
all news organizations in the political culture when some news organizations choose to 
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favor the issue culture. Taking into consideration all of the findings from the multiple 
analyses, the overall results of this case study indicate that the national context factor, at 
least when considered alone, was not highly associated with the features of either AJ-
sourced content or AJ-evaluative content. Consequently, U.S.-specific (or British-
specific) characteristics in the media discourse concerning Al-Jazeera, independently 
from newspaper editorial policy, were not clearly identifiable. Considering this, for future 
cross-national research, it is advisable to clarify the meaning of “nationality” and 
examine under what conditions and to what extent some country-specific factors can 
exercise certain forms of influence on the practices of journalism. 
As discussed in the introduction to this research project (Chapter 1), the recent 
dynamics of anti-war opinion around the world and the rise of Al-Jazeera are phenomena 
related to an emerging “global news arena” (Reese, 2004), where different versions of 
reality and related points of view from multiple and often cross-referencing sources 
compete with each other through varied forms of media. From this perspective, the U.S. 
and British media discourse concerning Al-Jazeera can be interpreted as showcasing how 
the two countries’ news media responded to the rise of Arab journalism in the emerging 
global news arena when U.S. war-oriented policy encountered worldwide resistance 
facilitated by the changing global media environment. For American and British editors 
and reporters in charge of gate-keeping and foreign affairs coverage, the central issue was 
whether Al-Jazera — the unprecedented, non-Western, nonconformist satellite TV 
network from the Middle East — could be regarded as a “legitimate” news outlet that 
deserves as much credibility as Western news agencies or other institutions of journalism 
would receive. On this question, the two countries’ pro-war and anti-war press examined 
in this study, as illustrated in the thematic analysis, displayed a wide range of competing 
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and polarized views of Al-Jazeera that invoked such pluralistic norms as media freedom 
and responsibility.  
This diversity in the media discourse inevitably makes us wonder about the “true” 
character of Al-Jazeera, or, more generally, the nature of Arab journalism in the global 
news environment. The rise of the new Arab media in recent years has been controversial 
both internally and externally. In the Arab world, criticism of Al-Jazeera involves issues 
of state-press relations, provocative news reporting, and the nature of televised political 
controversy in political communication. Although Al-Jazeera is generally regarded as the 
most independent Arab news outlet, some critics contended that the Qatari-based 
network, still partially funded by the state, avoids criticism of that country’s political 
elite; Al-Jazeera’s hard-hitting news reporting infuriated Arab government officials and 
its coverage of Palestinian resistance led to Israeli accusations of a pro-Palestinian bias; 
the confrontational talk show style that Al-Jazeera popularized generated concerns over 
whether it truly strengthens civic culture or only results in unhealthy extremism. In the 
post-9/11 wartime period, similar controversies also took place within American and 
British society, including allegations that the Arab network is committed to promoting 
anti-Americanism by airing bin Laden messages, distressing scenes of civilian casualties, 
and embarrassing images of Coalition soldiers.  
These controversies suggest that Al-Jazeera is not immune from political 
pressures and economic constraints and has limits in journalistic autonomy and quality. 
For a fair-minded assessment, however, it is necessary to distinguish between limits that 
are particular to Al-Jazeera and limits that are universal to all news organizations (Miles, 
2005). In this regard, one may want to compare the post-9/11 wartime journalism of the 
Arab broadcaster with American ones. Such a comparison helps us to put the praises and 
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criticisms of the Arab network into a relevant framework and distinguish between 
standards that are constructive rather than unrealistic and even ethnocentric.  
For instance, the criticism of Al-Jazeera’s lack of autonomy from the Qatari 
government may have an element of truth. When Secretary of State Colin Powell asked 
the Qatari Emir to tone down the Al-Jazeera channel in the winter of 2001, the Emir 
reportedly underscored the American value of press freedom. Behind the scenes, though, 
a deal seems to have been struck between Al-Jazeera and the U.S. government, allowing 
the White House to know the content of bin Laden tapes before they were aired by the 
network (Borger & Whitaker, 2003). This example may be interpreted as an incident 
compromising Al-Jazeera’s autonomy in handling of the extremely sensitive terrorist 
messages. Yet, one should not fail to recall that Al-Jazeera’s post-9/11 wartime coverage 
did not follow Qatar’s pro-American policy and regularly challenged the U.S. version of 
what was happening in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Palestine. Moreover, when considering 
U.S. networks’ uncritical coverage of the Bush administration’s “War on Terror” 
campaign, the American free broadcast media system — in other words, media 
dependence on the market for funding — does not seem to have provided a particularly 
better situation for journalistic independence than dependence on state sponsorship. The 
Arab network’s “inferiority” when it comes to autonomy is more an assumption than a 
proven fact.  
What about the criticism of Al-Jazeera’s controversial broadcasts of dead or 
captured Coalition soldiers? When the Arab network aired footage of U.S. prisoners of 
war, the Coalition officials blamed the Iraqi regime and Arab media for the alleged 
violation of the Geneva Conventions. Certainly, the exposure of personal tragedies or 
embarrassments on television is morally problematic, especially when this media 
behavior can be interpreted as serving a warring party’s propaganda purpose. Still, it is 
 171
unclear to which extent the “humane treatment” principle should apply to media coverage 
of war reality. The issue becomes more complicated when everyone does not feel the 
same way about the sensitivity of the media content at dispute. While family members of 
the solders were shocked at the scene of Iraqi interrogation, others — for example, 
German Red Cross President Knut Ipsen — saw the footage as part of media coverage of 
war, “just like footage of injured people in hospitals” (Lanz, 2003). In reality, neither the 
Iraqi regime nor the U.S. administration seemed to worry much about photographing 
those involved in the war when they were not on “our side.” In January of 2002, the 
Pentagon released pictures of detainees — “unlawful combatants,” not prisoners of war, 
according to the U.S. definition — at Guantanamo Bay, and the pictures appeared in 
American media (Rozenberg, 2003). In July of 2003, when American officials publicized 
pictures of the contorted, blooded faces of Saddam Hussein’s two dead sons — one of 
whom appeared to have shot himself in the head — the major U.S. cable news networks 
did not hesitate to show the pictures (Pook, 2003). All of these taken together, Al-
Jazeera’s showing of images of the military personnel was hardly more problematic than 
the American broadcasters’.   
There have also been complaints over the bloody and gruesome images of war 
shown on Al-Jazeera TV. As an empirical matter, it is apparent that the Arab network 
gave much weight to negative rather than positive images of war. This may be called 
unbalanced journalism. But does it mean bad journalism? This is a subjective question, 
and the answer depends on the critic’s political stance. To some, Al-Jazeera’s news 
reporting unnecessarily overstated some inevitable tragedies of war. To others, Al-
Jazeera’s journalism represented a humanitarian pursuit of the truth of the brutality of the 
war. It suffices to say that the introduction of Al-Jazeera TV into the recent global news 
environment provided the world with a better chance than ever of accessing two different 
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versions of what was happening in the U.S.-led war — with one being the “bloody” 
version of the war coming from the Arab media and the other being the “sanitized” 
version of the war supplied by the Western, especially U.S., media — and making their 
own decisions about how to put together the competing war stories. In these 
circumstances, Al-Jazeera’s accounts of war significantly improved our understanding of 
the underlying reality. 
All of the discussions thus far do not mean that Al-Jazeera is an ideal news 
organization and that all criticisms of the network are baseless. Al-Jazeera, like other 
news organizations in the real world, has only relative autonomy from political-economic 
constraints and may falter in some aspects of journalistic ideals. The point is that some 
apparently problematic aspects of the Arab news organization cannot justify the 
exclusion of it from the group of “legitimate” news organizations — Western news 
agencies and other institutions of journalism in the developed and free world. This is why 
certain types of criticism of Al-Jazeera were unwarranted and even ethnocentric in the 
politicized context of debate.  
In this regard, the cleavage between the pro-war and anti-war newspapers — 
which was the most important finding of the present study — implies varying journalistic 
practices wavering between nationalistic and cosmopolitan values in reporting of and 
commentary on the so-called “Al-Jazeera” phenomenon. In addition, some findings from 
the thematic analysis of AJ-as-issue discourse and the qualitative editorial analysis 
suggest that media professionals at the Times, while they made a considerable effort to be 
fair-minded, were affected by a tendency to avoid offending the ideological tenets of the 
post-9/11 U.S. foreign policy. In the age of the global news arena, the question of how to 
reconcile nationalistic and cosmopolitan values will provide a continuing challenge for 
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Table A1: Assessment of Inter-coder Reliability for Main Measures 
Variable Inter-coder agreement Cohen’s Kappa 
Preliminary coding of initial raw dataa
Type of AJ-related 
article 87% .82 
Article-unit coding of AJ-sourced contentb
AJ-as-source topic 
Coder 1-coder 2 pair 
Coder 2-coder 3 pair 









Pairs average 85% .81 
Content importance 
Coder 1-coder 2 pair 
Coder 2-coder 3 pair 









Pairs average 89% .84 
Voice within AJ-sourced 
content 
Coder 1-coder 2 pair 
Coder 2-coder 3 pair 









Pairs average 90% .86 
Source-unit coding of AJ-evaluative contentc
Identity of AJ-as-
subject source 92% .88 
AJ-as-subject 
source tone 87% .83 
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News context 88% .82 
Theme-unit coding of AJ-evaluative contentd
AJ-as-issue theme 86% .83 
Story tone 85% .77 
Total average 88% .83 
Note. All coding procedures except the coding of AJ-sourced content involved 
participation of two coders. Three coders participated in the coding task of AJ-sourced 
content.  
aFor the assessment of inter-coder reliability in the preliminary coding stage, 100 
randomly selected articles were used. 
bFor the assessment of inter-coder reliability in the article-unit stage, 75 randomly 
selected articles that included AJ-sourced content were used. 
cFor the assessment of inter-coder reliability in the source-unit coding stage, 50 randomly 
selected articles that included AJ-evaluative content were used. Specifically, a total of 69 
coding decisions, which involved the identification of AJ-as-subject sources at least by 
one coder, was examined. For the variable “news context,” 5o coding decisions were 
tested because the coding decision was article-based. 
dFor the assessment of inter-coder reliability in the theme-unit coding stage, 50 randomly 
selected articles that included AJ-evaluative content were used. Specifically, a total of 
124 coding decisions, which involved the identification of AJ-as-issue themes at least by 
one coder, was examined. For the variable “story tone,”50 coding decisions were tested 






Codebook for Initial Data Categorization 
 
1. Article ID 
 
2. Name of newspaper 
(1) The Wall Street Journal 
(2) The New York Times 
(3) The Daily Telegraph/the Sunday Telegraph 
(4) The Guardian/the Observer 
 
3. Date (mm/dd/yy) 
 
3-1. (Only for British newspapers) Day of the week 




(1) Pre-9/11 (01/01/1997 – 09/10//2001)  
(2) Afghanistan War (09/11/2001 - 12/31/2001) 
(3) Palestinian uprising (01/01/2002 - 09/11/2002) 
(4) Pre-Iraq War debate (09/12/2002 - 03/16/2003) 
(5) Iraq War (03/17/2003 - 05/01/2003)  
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(6) Post-Iraq War (05/02/2003 - 12/31/2003) 
 
5. Placement of news story 
(1) Page 1 
(2) Inside (other page) 
 
6. Length of story 
(1) Short (less than 151 words) 
(2) Medium (151-1000 words)  
(3) Long (1001 words or more) 
Note: If the article is a compilation of short independent news or opinion pieces, 
accept only the portions including the content related to Al-Jazeera.    
 
7. Type of story 
(1) Straight news (standard news report) 
(2) News analysis (interpretative news story)  
(3) Feature (interview & story highlighting a person/group/organization)  
(4) Nonpolitical news (e.g. stock price, book review, film review, travel guide, 
etc.) 
(5) Transcript (e.g., transcript of bin Laden message) 
(6) Editorial 
(7) Signed column 
(8) Letter to the editor  
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(9) Trivial content (e.g., News index, photo caption, list of past events, TV 
program listing without further description, list of bestsellers, etc – stop coding for the 
article) 
Note. For further coding, category (1) – (4) are considered news stories, while 
category (6) - (8) are considered opinion pieces. 
 
8. Type of AJ-related article 
(1) Article only with AJ-sourced content (applies to a news story in which the 
reporter cites the news organization Al-Jazeera, an individual affiliated with Al-Jazeera, 
or some material broadcasted by Al-Jazeera, as a source of information) 
(2) Article only with AJ-evaluative content (applies to a news story or opinion 
piece in which either the reporter, any source quoted by the reporter (for news stories), or 
the writer (for opinion pieces), shows a positive, negative, or mixed tone in describing or 
commenting on the news organization Al-Jazeera, an individual affiliated with Al-
Jazeera, or some material broadcasted by Al-Jazeera, or the behavior of another actor 
toward Al-Jazeera) 
(3) Article with both types of contents (applies to a news story that meets the 
conditions for both the first and the second categories) 
(4) Article without any type of content (applies to a new story or opinion piece 
that does not meet the conditions for any of the prior categories)      
Note. Mark on the upper side of the article the number of the category you 




Codebook for Article-unit Analysis of AJ-sourced Content 
 
[1-7: the same as the codebook for the preliminary analysis].  
 
8. AJ-as-source content topic 
(1) Messages from Osama bin Laden or other Al-Qaeda leaders 
(2) Messages from Taliban leaders or Saddam regime officials 
(3) Military developments (applies to Al-Jazeera’s news content about, or an Al-
Jazeera reporter’s comments on, the military conflicts in Afghanistan or in Iraq) 
(4) Showing of dead/captured soldiers (applies to Al-Jazeera’s broadcast of the 
footage that shows either U.S. servicepersons in Iraqi captivity or dead bodies of U.S. or 
other Coalition troops) 
(5) Civilian damage (applies to Al-Jazeera’s coverage of civilian damage that 
occurred in either Afghanistan, Iraq, or a zone affected by the U.S./Coalition forces, 
except the violent conflicts between Israel and Palestine) 
(6) Palestinians-related affairs (applies to Al-Jazeera’s news content about 
incidence related to Israel-Palestinian conflicts, which may involve civilian damage) 
(7) Other affairs & opinions in the Arab world (applies to Al-Jazeera-sourced 
Arab/Muslim opinions concerned with either the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or U.S. 
foreign policy in the Middle East) 
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(8) Performance of Al-Jazeera (applies to information acquired from staffs or 
other employees at Al-Jazeera, regarding the performance of the news organization itself 
or other Arab media) 
(9) Threat to Arab media activities, U.S.-involved (applies to Al-Jazeera’s news 
content or its employee’s statements regarding a U.S.-involved incident that can be 
interpreted as a threat to Arab media freedom) 
(10) Threat to Arab media activities, except U.S.-involved cases 
(11) Others 
 
9. Content importance   
(1) High (applies when the news organization Al-Jazeera or its employee was 
treated as either the first source in a breaking news story or a primary source in a news 
analysis or a feature) 
(2) Medium (applies when the importance of the AJ-sourced content in the story 
fits nether the previous “high” nor the following “low” category and thus can be seen as 
falling between the two opposing ends) 
(3) Low (applies when the AJ-sourced content meets two following conditions – 
first, it has a full length of no more than one paragraph; second,  the content is located 
only at the end of the news story, or it describes only some “old” information that was 
covered previously) 
 
10. Identity of voice within AJ-sourced content 
(1) U.S. Enemy (Osama bin Laden and other leading members of the Al-Qaeda 
network, leaders of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and officials of the Hussein regime 
in Iraq) 
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(2) Al-Jazeera employees, not in their news programs (Al-Jazeera representatives, 
reporters, staffs, and other individuals affiliated with the news organization, not in the 
context of citing Al-Jazeera’s own news stories but in other context) 
(3) Palestinian/ radical Muslim leaders (officials of the Palestinian Authority and 
leaders of Palestinian factions, such as Hamas, and of Islamic militant groups. Al-Qaeda 
members are excluded here) 
(4) Other Arab/ Western Muslims (other Arab Muslims and Muslim residents in 
the United States and Europe, including both Arab elites and ordinary people) 




Codebook for the source-unit analysis of AJ-evaluative content  
 
[1-7: the same as the codebook for the preliminary analysis].  
 
8. Identity of AJ-as-subject source 
(1) U.S./British government/military officials  
(2) U.S./British others  
(3) Al-Jazeera employees (applies when an individual affiliated with Al-Jazeera is 
cited as a voice commenting on the news organization itself or some issue involving Al-
Jazeera) 
(4) Arab/Muslim others  
(5) Others. 
Note 1. AJ-as-subject source refers to a range of sources, named or unnamed, who 
are directly or indirectly cited as those expressing their views on such subjects as the 
characteristics of Al-Jazeera, the content of some news material aired by Al-Jazeera, the 
conduct of Al-Jazeera employees, or the conduct of other (governmental) actors toward 
the news organization. Purely factual statements about Al-Jazeera offered by a source are 
ignored.  
Note 2. Count an AJ-as-subject source only once for the article, regardless of the 
amount of the quotation (i.e., the portion allotted to the utterance of an AJ-related view) 
from the source. However, if there exist in a news story multiple AJ-as-subject sources all 
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of whom are coded into the same category, count all of these sources. For example, if the 
news story has three relevant quotes from Donald Rumsfeld and two relevant quotes from 
Tony Blair, count two AJ-as-subject sources, both of whom are coded on the category of 
(1) U.S./British government/military officials.  
 
9. AJ-as-subject source tone 
(1) Favorable or contextually favorable  
(2) Unfavorable or contextually unfavorable  
(3) Mixed or unclear 
Note. The term “contextually favorable (or unfavorable)” is applied to the case in 
which the source in question does not directly engage in the evaluation of Al-Jazeera but, 
by making a value judgment about either other news media in comparison or another 
actor’s conduct toward the Al-Jazeera, gives “contextually” an advantageous (or 
disadvantageous) statement toward the Arab news organization. 
 
10. News context 
(1) Beats-oriented news (applies when the predominant voices in the story 
originated from government- or military-controlled beats, including both the regular ones 
in Washington and the temporary ones set up by the U.S. Central Command at Doha 
during the military campaigns in Iraq) 
(2) Icon-driven news (applies when the dominant portion of those voicing a 
perspective came from either Al-Jazeera employees, ordinary members of Arab/Muslim 
audiences of the news channel, or Arab media professionals and experts commenting on 
the news organization) 
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(3) Other/unclear news context (applies when any group of voices mentioned 
above does appear but does not dominate in news discourse and it is thus hard to choose 
between the two types of news context, or (b) when the news story highlights other kinds 
of voices or topics and therefore neither of the two news contexts seems relevant)  
Note. The coding decision here is based on the article, not the individual AJ-as-
subject source. Due to this, all AJ-as-subject sources cited in a news story are classified 




Codebook for the theme-unit analysis of AJ-evaluative content 
 
[1-7: the same as the codebook for the preliminary analysis].  
 
8. Instruction for coding of AJ-as-issue themes:  
An AJ-as-issue theme meets two following conditions: (1) this theme should be 
applied to the evaluation of either the news organization Al-Jazeera, output from Al-
Jazeera, an individual affiliated with Al-Jazeera, or an outside force whose relations with 
Al-Jazeera were brought into focus; (2) the theme should reflect some “normative” idea 
about news media. A list of these normative ideas is given at the end of this instruction 
(See Table A2 following this instruction). Solely performance-based evaluations of Al-
Jazeera on the basis of either journalistic activity (e.g., Al-Jazeera’s scoop on the U.S. 
military setback) or media business (e.g., increased subscription to Al-Jazeera channel in 
wartime) are ignored. 
Familiarize yourself with the multiple types of AJ-as-issue themes suggested by 
the table below. Since on the same normative basis Al-Jazeera may be advocated (e.g., 
“Al-Jazeera is an independent news outlet”) or criticized (e.g., “Al-Jazeera is not as 
independent as it may seem”), all the themes found in the article should be coded as 
either “positive” or “negative,” according to the instructions of the table.  
When a linguistic expression is found as reflecting one of the four normative 
criteria presented below (e.g., “Al-Jazeera is a professional news organization,” which 
reflects professional reporting/ responsible conduct criterion) but is too ambiguous to tell 
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which specific theme was invoked, the assertion in question should be assigned to the 
first theme within the relevant theme-group category (e.g., for the prior example, the 
objective/impartial news reporting theme). If some thematic elements are found within a 
quotation, make a coding decision in conjunction with the inferable intention of the 
reporter or the writer. This said, if the reporter/writer citied a source in a favorable or 
neutral fashion, the presence of a theme within the quote are accepted. However, when 
the reporter/writer expressed doubts about or rebutted the source’s claim, the thematic 
elements within the quote should be ignored (when doubted) or interpreted as constituting 
a theme in a reverse direction (when rebutted). 
Use your best judgment to identify the presence of ANY AJ-as-issue theme listed 
below for each PASSAGE containing AJ-evaluative content. You are encouraged to code 
multiple AJ-as-issue themes from a passage as long as each theme is coded into a 
DIFFERENT category. However, do NOT count more than once the same theme from a 
single passage. In addition, the highest number of times to count the same theme from a 
single story is limited to THREE. Therefore, do not count four times or more for the same 
theme in the story.   
When you read the contents of the table, you can notice some examples carry a 
qualification of “in a derogatory tone.” This means that purely factual or neutral 
statements referring to the characteristic of Al-Jazeera in question are NOT regarded as a 
negative theme. For example, factual statements about Al-Jazeera’s financial dependence 
on the Qatari government are not counted as a negative form of free press without outside 
control unless the description carries a derogatory tone.   
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Table A2: List of AJ-as-issue Themes 
Media norm Positive invocation Negative invocation 
Free/independent media status   
Free press without outside control 1. the most independent 
media in the Arab world; 
no state censorship 
2. (rebuttal of the negative 
theme) 
1. state ownership; 
government control; 
financial dependence on 
the state (in a derogatory 
tone) 
2. (rebuttal of the positive 
theme)  
Adversary to authoritarian regime 1. vigorous criticism of the 
Qatari/other Arab 
government 
2. (rebuttal of the negative 
theme) 
1. editorial timidity toward 
the Qatari/other Arab) 
government 





Professional/balanced reporting 1. objective; impartial; 
neutral; fair; balanced; 
unbiased 
2. (rebuttal of the negative 
theme) 
1. unfair, biased; pro-
Palestinian slant (in a 
derogatory tone) 
2. (rebuttal of the positive 
theme) 
Non-sensational/ethical handling 
of graphic information 
1. non-sensational; not 
rating-driven; meeting 
public taste and decency 
2. responsible; ethical; 
respecting  human 
dignity; minimizing harm 
to family members (in the 
context of praising 
withholding of sensitive 
graphic information) 
3 (rebuttal of the negative 
theme) 
1. inflammatory; emotive; 
hate-provoking; 
sensational; rating-driven 
2. irresponsible; unethical; 
violating the Geneva 
Convention (in the context 
of criticizing releasing 
sensitive graphic 
information) 





Catalyst for Arab democracy 1. bringing democratic 
changes/free and open 
debate to the Arab world 
2. (rebuttal of the negative 
theme) 
1. causing instability in the 
Arab world (in a 
derogatory tone) 
















(in a derogatory tone) 
2. (rebuttal of the positive 
theme) 
Alternative media role   
Source of oppressed voices/views 1. providing Arab-oriented 
perspectives (in an 
affirmative tone)  
1. (rebuttal of the positive 
theme) 
Antidote of Western bias 1. counterbalancing 
Western bias/stereotyped 
views  
1. (rebuttal of the positive 
theme) 
Media-outside actor interaction   
Target of bullying 1. under unjustifiable 
intimidation by others 
(sympathetic toward Al-
Jazeera or derogatory 
toward its counter-party) 
1. (rebuttal of the positive 
theme) 
Enemy propaganda tool 1. (rebuttal of the negative 
theme) 
1. bin Laden’s mouthpiece;  
propaganda outlet (in a 
derogatory tone) 
Other/unspecific   
 1. (applies to a positive 
evaluation of Al-Jazeera on 
an anti-U.S./Western, other 
“irrational,” or unspecific 
basis)  
1. (applies to a negative 
evaluation of Al-Jazeera on 
an anti-U.S./Western, other 
“irrational,” or unspecific 
basis) 
 
9. Story tone 
(1) Favorable or contextually favorable  
(2) Unfavorable or contextually unfavorable  
(3) Mixed or unclear 
Note 1. The term “contextually favorable (or unfavorable)” is applied to the case 
in which the source in question does not directly engage in the evaluation of Al-Jazeera 
but, by making a value judgment about either other news media in comparison or another 
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actor’s conduct toward the Al-Jazeera, gives “contextually” an advantageous (or 
disadvantageous) statement toward the Arab news organization. 
Note 2. The coding decision here is based on the article, not the individual AJ-as-
issue normative theme. Due to this, all AJ-as-issue themes invocated in a news story are 
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